Director of the GeoStrategy Initiative and Senior Fellow at @ACScowcroft at @AtlanticCouncil. All views my own. Retweet doesn’t equal endorsement.
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Nov 17 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
🧵As I consider the situation in #Ukraine I believe it’s time to revisit the fundamentals of statecraft. In my career in academia, JPME, think tanks and gov’t I’ve adhered to political realism when analyzing national security and world affairs. I will continue to do so. 1/9
But realism is not appeasement. It’s not about rationalizing one’s lack of courage to confront naked aggression. Or to articulate a vision of victory and persevere. It’s not about conceding that a thug has a point worth entertaining and accommodating as “understandable.” 2/9
Nov 16 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
🧵A few comments on the key task of restoring US deterrence going forward. Deterrence rests on two irreducible factors: capability and credibility. To put it differently, it's about having the means to strike if a redline is crossed, and also the willpower to do so. 1/9
Over the past 4 years we have witnessed multiple cases when deterrence failed: the second Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Hamas attack on America's closest ally in the Middle East, Iran's attacks on Israel, and most recently, North Korean troops entering the war in Ukraine. 2/9
Nov 9 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
🧵This is a post mainly for my followers from Europe, but it also applies to others outside the United States: Please understand how potentially transformative Donald Trump's landslide victory is. Set your biases aside--whether from the left or the right--and consider this.1/9
Analysts often engage in hyperbole about inflection points in history. But the election of Donald J. Trump as 47th President is really a moment when the trajectory America and the world have travelled for close to a quarter of a millennium has been fundamentally altered. 2/9
Oct 29 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
🧵A few thoughts on US foreign policy as we enter the home stretch of the presidential election. Regardless of which candidate wins, the threats will remain. The incoming US administration will face a world more dangerous and fractured than at any time since the end of WWII. 1/9
Unlike in the aftermath of that war, when the United States commanded an absolute and relative economic and military advantage over every other major power in the world (and until 1949 a nuclear monopoly), today it must confront daunting challenges, both economic and military.2/9
Oct 17 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
🧵A brief posting on why we continue to get #Russia wrong: An often-repeated fallacy in DC when it comes to Russia (and academics reinforce it) is that Russia's pressure against the West is really about their security; pushing this alleged Western threat away from its borders.1/6
Not to put too fine a point on it: Anyone who argues that today the West constitutes a credible military threat to Russia should have his/her head examined. It is odd that when it comes to Russia our elites seem unable (unwilling?) to recognize the drivers of RUS expansionism.2/6
Oct 5 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
🧵I have written repeatedly about the devastating impact of offshoring and deindustrialization on America’s absolute and relative power position in the world. I stand by that diagnosis. But of late I’ve been asking why our relative decline has accelerated in recent years. 1/10
We’ve had three catastrophic failures of deterrence since 2022: Russia’s second invasion of #Ukraine; Hamas attacking Israel, America’s closest ally in the Middle East; and then Iran launching direct massive attacks on Israel. Ask yourself: What has accelerated this process. 2/10
Sep 21 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
🧵The #EU seems fixated on moving forward to build EU command structures and forces that are in effect going to take away from Europe’s ability to properly resource @NATO’s regional plans. Pushing yet again for Europe’s so called “strategic autonomy” is simply a bad idea. 1/7
@NATO allies are already struggling to man/equip the forces they pledged as part of the capabilities commitments tied to the regional plans they signed onto at the Vilnius summit. Building additional military structures in the EU, instead do resourcing @NATO makes no sense. 2/7
Sep 14 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
🧵A few thoughts on a discussion about deterrence I had last week. Over the past 3 years we have witnessed three instances when deterrence failed: first, Russia's second invasion of Ukraine in 2022; then Hamas attacking Israel; then Iran attacking Israel. The question is why? 1/7
Deterrence works when two things obtain: 1. you have the requisite capabilities to inflict devastating pain on the enemy, and 2. you have demonstrated that you have the will to do so. Clearly, the US has the requisite capabilities, but do we still have the will to act? 2/7
Sep 1 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
🧵On this day in 1939, exactly 85 years ago, Nazi Germany invaded Poland. Some two weeks later Soviet Russia also attacked it from the East. The Poles fought bravely but were overwhelmed. France and Britain, Poland’s allies, declared war on Germany but did nothing to assist. 1/6
The German/Russian invasion of Poland started World War II-a war that cost millions upon millions of lives, leveled cities, caused untold suffering and when it was all said and done left Germany occupied and divided and all of Eastern Europe enslaved under Soviet communism. 2/6
Aug 23 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
🧵I have written repeatedly about the threat the "Axis of Dictatorships" (Russia, China, Iran and North Korea) poses to the United States and its allies in multiple theaters. I'm back from Europe some 11 months now and I worry about the lack of urgency in DC on this issue. 1/6
I submit that the world is today more volatile than at any point since the end of the Cold War. The ongoing realignment by smaller powers we see today is laying the foundations for what are likely to become wartime coalitions. The old verities of power politics are back. 2/6
Aug 10 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
🧵#Ukraine’s successful military raid into the #Kursk region has stunned the Russians and, equally, all the nay-sayers among armchair strategists in the West. Regardless how this operation ends, it’s already a major win for Ukraine. And there are lessons here for the West.1/5
First, let’s continue to arm #Ukraine and continue to support it politically and economically. Second, we need to stop micromanaging what happens on the battlefield. The Ukrainian military just demonstrated that they know how to fight and how to strike Russia where it hurts. 2/5
Jul 21 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
🧵The debate on US policy towards #Ukraine has accelerated in recent days. It is striking how pessimistic the commentary has been of late, especially compared to the starry-eyed enthusiasm of the West's response in the early stages of the war. It will get worse, I'm afraid.1/9
We're close to the point of no return when it comes to @NATO articulating a clear strategy of victory in #Ukraine. Our national security wonks count tanks and bullets, rather than looking at geopolitics as well as the cultural and temporal dimensions of war. Time to redirect.2/9
Jul 19 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
🧵A few thoughts as I cool my heals at the Athens airport due to a network-wide outage. Here we go: It’s about our crisis of basic competence across the West. I’m generalizing for sure, but consider the post-Cold War 30yrs. First, look at the results of our economic policy. 1/6
The so-called “globalization” has led to unprecedented de-industrialization in the US (and increasingly across Europe) and has resulted in the shrinking of our middle class and increased political instability across the board. It all but destroyed our manufacturing base. 2/6
Jun 26 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
🧵A few observations about where we are relative to the Axis of Dictatorships (#Russia, #China, #Iran and #NorthKorea) more than two years after Russia's second invasion of #Ukraine. Are the US & Europe rearming/rebuilding our forces and defense industries at speed and scale?1/6
Where is @NATO when it comes to rearmament relative to what our enemies are doing? The news is troubling, although some progress has been made. Still, a number of allies, especially those not on the Eastern flank, appear unable (unwilling?) to make the requisite investments. 2/6
Jun 17 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
🧵I’ve read comparisons of our current security predicament to what happened in the late 1930s. There are indeed compelling similarities: Much like before WWII when Germany and Japan positioned themselves to attack, we have two powers, Russia and China, gearing up for war.1/8
Also, much like before WWII most of Europe is daydreaming that a “deal” with #Russia is possible, while the US is not ready for war and turning isolationist. But those comparisons are misleading. I submit that we are already in an early stage of a system-transforming war. 2/8
Jun 10 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
🧵Back from last week's @WiltonPark conference on strengthening @NATO deterrence, I've been thinking about what must be done so that we finally face the reality of the threat from #Russia and #China, and start doing what's necessary to prepare for what's around the corner. 1/6
Our problem is not a lack of resources-democracies have them in spades. Our problem is internal, and it boils down to the lack of leadership. Leaders in the United States and Europe must make it clear to the citizens how dangerous and unstable the world has already become. 2/6
Apr 27 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
🧵I’ll be brief, but I want to reflect on these past seven months of being back in the US and living/working in DC. BLUF: How did it happen that those who preach America’s inevitable decline have captured the national spotlight? What happened to America’s self-confidence? 1/6
The United States is a young republic, blessed with a uniquely secure geopolitical neighborhood and natural resources to match. It continues to hold great promise for anyone who wants to seize the opportunities this country offers. So why all the bellyaching and pessimism? 2/6
Apr 14 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
🧵As I watch the Iranian attack on Israel, it is becoming clear that we are less and less able to deter our adversaries. Russia, Hamas, Houthis and now Iran. It’s time to ask ourselves why revisionist state and non-state actors believe they can attack and get away with it. 1/6
Rhetoric not backed by action is just talk. Could it be that over the past three decades of “peace dividend” we forgot the basics of hard power? Could it be that each time our self-deterring approach when it comes to dealing with aggression only encourages our adversaries? 2/6
Mar 28 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
🧵A few thoughts on where we are 3yrs into the Russian 2022 invasion of #Ukraine. First, much as in the first year following Ukraine's steadfast resistance there was considerable optimism after Ukraine's successful first year counteroffensive, now it's excessive pessimism. 1/8
I call for some balance in assessments of where #Ukraine is today. Any accurate assessment of Ukraine is very hard to do, and though the situation is difficult I caution against extreme scenarios today, for its fate is intertwined with foreign and domestic politics worldwide.2/8
Mar 13 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
🧵After several days in #Warsaw, and having just arrived in #Helsinki, one thing is clear: @NATO allies on the Eastern frontier get it when it comes to the nature of Russian threat. They're ready to do what is necessary to return NATO to its collective deterrence/defense role.1/9
The Poles and Finns understand the existential nature of the threat #Russia poses. If anyone should doubt that, ask yourself why #Poland joined @NATO in 1999, and why #Finland abandoned its neutrality to join the alliance after the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. They get it. 2/9
Mar 8 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
🧵As I head to Europe for a series of workshops, first a huge shout out to #Sweden on becoming a member of @NATO. Welcome to the family-your entry is important to rebuilding @NATO's capabilities. But, regrettably, outside the flank, I still don't see the requisite urgency. 1/5
I don't want to revisit the % of GDP on defense argument-yes, meeting or failing to meet 2% is an indicator of political will, or the lack thereof. But what matters is whether @NATO allies actually field real exercised military capabilities to resource the new regional plans. 2/5