🧵As I watch the Iranian attack on Israel, it is becoming clear that we are less and less able to deter our adversaries. Russia, Hamas, Houthis and now Iran. It’s time to ask ourselves why revisionist state and non-state actors believe they can attack and get away with it. 1/6 Rhetoric not backed by action is just talk. Could it be that over the past three decades of “peace dividend” we forgot the basics of hard power? Could it be that each time our self-deterring approach when it comes to dealing with aggression only encourages our adversaries? 2/6

🧵A few thoughts on where we are 3yrs into the Russian 2022 invasion of #Ukraine. First, much as in the first year following Ukraine's steadfast resistance there was considerable optimism after Ukraine's successful first year counteroffensive, now it's excessive pessimism. 1/8 I call for some balance in assessments of where #Ukraine is today. Any accurate assessment of Ukraine is very hard to do, and though the situation is difficult I caution against extreme scenarios today, for its fate is intertwined with foreign and domestic politics worldwide.2/8

🧵After several days in #Warsaw, and having just arrived in #Helsinki, one thing is clear: @NATO allies on the Eastern frontier get it when it comes to the nature of Russian threat. They're ready to do what is necessary to return NATO to its collective deterrence/defense role.1/9 The Poles and Finns understand the existential nature of the threat #Russia poses. If anyone should doubt that, ask yourself why #Poland joined @NATO in 1999, and why #Finland abandoned its neutrality to join the alliance after the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. They get it. 2/9

🧵As I head to Europe for a series of workshops, first a huge shout out to #Sweden on becoming a member of @NATO. Welcome to the family-your entry is important to rebuilding @NATO's capabilities. But, regrettably, outside the flank, I still don't see the requisite urgency. 1/5 I don't want to revisit the % of GDP on defense argument-yes, meeting or failing to meet 2% is an indicator of political will, or the lack thereof. But what matters is whether @NATO allies actually field real exercised military capabilities to resource the new regional plans. 2/5

🧵We seem to be running out of time when it comes to our intestinal fortitude in the West (if there ever truly was one) to support #Ukraine. Our commentariat is oozing pessimism and pundits seem to try to outdo each other debating end-game scenarios, negotiated deals, etc. 1/7 Let me simply say this: Please stop all the speculation about a "Ukraine settlement" and focus on the only thing that matters today, i.e., helping #Ukraine win on the battlefield. This is war, not some conference where we muse about outcomes. This is about Ukraine's survival.2/7

🧵I have noticed that of late the same pundits who used to talk about "American hegemony" seem intent to declare the imminent decline of the United States. At times I sense a sort of Schadenfreude in those pronouncements, enumerating gleefully America's recent missteps. 1/10 To those who seem intent to declare that the United States is going the way of the Habsburg empire of yore, I only say this: Breathe. This is not to say the US doesn't have its problems-I would be the last person to argue that the post-Cold War decades were America's finest. 2/10

🧵It's reasonable to expect that after Putin’s March reelection, Moscow will prioritize another round of mobilization. I would also expect a Russian summer 2024 offensive to coincide with @NATO's Washington summit. At that point I wouldn't rule out Russia widening the front.1/6 As part of those preparations, Russia continues to attack Ukrainian logistics and #Ukraine's critical infrastructure. In what has become a war of attrition, #Ukraine faces two key vulnerabilities: shortage of weapons and munitions and the constantly growing stress on manpower.2/6

🧵About a year ago while attending the @MunSecConf I wrote a comment on twitter that Europe increasingly felt to me like something straight from history books. The comment was picked up by @MKarnitschnig and included here in his @POLITICOEurope piece.1/7 politico.eu/article/munich… At a risk of over-rationalizing history, I feel we are at a point akin to 1938. Back then, Germany and Japan were aggressive and rapidly arming, while the US was stubbornly isolationist and while leaders in Europe believed that diplomacy would avert war and preserve peace. 2/7

🧵To all who follow me here: I wish you a Happy New Year. May 2024 be better than 2023. Most of all, I hope that in 2024 we finally recognize that it's not enough to respond to crises, but that we must shape the world in a way that favors freedom and prosperity. My wishes: 1/7 There are just months before we elect our new President. In this critical election year in the US, we need to stop using the current normative language about "defending the rules-based international order" and shift to a straightforward conversation about national interest. 2/7

🧵I have been silent for a while, reading what’s being considered by analysts in the US and Europe to be the “new normal” of power configuration worldwide. I have to say—regretfully—that much of it has been cliches about a “post-American world” we are supposed to accept. 1/4 This isn’t to say the US doesn’t have its share of problems—most of it domestic and self-induced. But this Republic is nowhere near where the European empires of yore are today. I’m stunned how easily our European allies seem to assume America is now in terminal decline. 2/4

🧵Watching political gyrations in the US and Europe re: continued military and economic aid to #Ukraine, I’ve become convinced that unless the West replaces the mantra “for as long as it takes” with “whatever Ukraine needs to win as quickly as possible” this will end badly. 1/5 We can resupply weapons/munitions but if #Ukraine continues to hemorrhage people it will not be able to sustain the effort. In my assessment, Russia now has about a fourfold advantage when it comes to population relative to Ukraine. Kyiv needs to offset this with technology. 2/5

🧵I hear once again arguments that sophisticated military capabilities matter more than sheer numbers, and how @NATO governments should prioritize smaller but more capable militaries. Let me restate my view that this is not an either-or proposition. 1/5 atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla… When it comes to national security and defense, the US and especially our European allies in @NATO need to rebuild the armed forces by both continuing to invest in new mil. capabilities but also by building up the numbers to scale, especially trained reserves. And do it now. 2/5

🧵Since several responses to my recent postings have recycled the the mantra of “multipolarity,” I have to say this: That concept is just about as useful when it comes to crafting a national strategy as “complex interdependence.” I’m sorry but I left academia for a reason… 1/4 I also don’t do “narratives.” Do you know what it feels like when you sit in a meeting and bureaucrats talk about their country’s national security in terms of “narratives” while our enemies build weapon systems, munitions and expand their armies’ manpower? Seriously…? 2/4

🧵I work on nat’l security affairs, so let me share what has been on my mind lately. Having returned to the US after 7 yrs overseas, I’m convinced that we need to move our public discourse away from group categories and refocus on the centrality of citizenship in a democracy. 1/7 Citizenship is about responsibility for the country. We seem to have forgotten that it is about owning the nation’s fate, and about a mutuality of obligation to people you never met simply because they are part of our nation. It’s about the public good trumping partisanship. 2/7

🧵Having read this piece, I should point out that—like most of what’s been written on the war in #Ukraine—it presumes we have the ability to shape the outcome at will. Since we haven’t provided weapons in numbers Kyiv needs to win, that isn’t the case. 1/6 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/redefi… Ukraine’s negotiating position will depend on what happens on the battlefield. Kyiv had a real chance to deal Russia a strategic defeat during the first counteroffensive, when Russia had no defenses position in place, no working logistics and no leadership to speak of. 2/6

🧵I seldom write on domestic politics--over the years I penned maybe a dozen such pieces. But now that I am back in the US after 7yrs overseas, I want to share my impressions while they are still fresh. It's a bit like rediscovering your country--both good and troublesome. 1/10 On many levels Washington, DC is its old self--high energy, vibrant--the corporate town when it comes to government and policy. For someone like me working on national security issues this is the place to be. But it's also a city where I sense a profound sense of unease. 2/10

🧵I have been back in DC for 1.5 months now, and I'm struck by the apparent lack of urgency in our national security policy debates when it comes to addressing the threats the US and its allies face, as they continue to multiply at speed. 1. #UkraineWar is in its 2nd year. 1/9 2. We're looking at potentially another major regional war triggered by Hamas's attack on #Israel. It has expanded the front and put additional strains on America's military resources. 3. As pressure build on Kosovo, I'm concerned that the Balkans may become another theater. 2/9

🧵I'm weary of the fact that our national security debate continues to recycle shibboleths about "strategic competition," "great power competition" and such. I recently saw the acronym "GPC" on several PPT slides, so this nomenclature is now firmly embedded in the bloodstream.1/7 Looking at the horrors perpetrated by RUS in #Ukraine, now the attack by Hamas against #Israel, and with a conflict with #China brewing in the Indo-Pacific, why is it that we don't hear the "W" word, as in "war." Is it because to say so would require democracies to mobilize? 2/7

🧵Cui bono? The Hamas attack on #Israel of this magnitude required planning and external backing. Moscow’s ties to Teheran have grown exponentially since the Russian re-invasion of #Ukraine—Shoigu’s recent visit to Teheran underscored it. This attack creates a new theater. 1/5 We are in a period of protracted systemic instability where regional power balances will be critical to averting a wider war. The Hamas attack draws Washington’s attention away from #Ukraine and #Taiwan. It puts additional pressure on Western weapons and munitions supply. 2/5

🧵I read some of the exchanges about @stephenWalt’s recent piece on #Ukraine via @ForeignPolicy. I won’t rehash Steve’s argument or various counters that were posted on @X in response to his piece. He believes what he believes, and so do those criticizing him. Fair enough. 1/7 My point: IR theory as practiced for the last 30 yrs at US universities has precious little to offer when it comes to understanding the war in #Ukraine. Profs opining about a country which they don’t know, don’t read the language etc is essentially a self-contained exercise.2/7

🧵I just reviewed a longer piece on the war in #Ukraine written by an eminent Western analyst. I was struck by how differently it sounded from what I hear from Ukrainians. Westerners tend to speak in conceptual generalities about the need to ensure that UKR remains sovereign.1/6 Equally general and borderline vacuous is the often repeated Western argument that #Russia cannot be allowed to win, but with precious little about what that means in practical terms, i.e., what Moscow’s defeat in this war is supposed to look like and what should happen next. 2/6