The shares of the major currencies in global reserves, as reported to the IMF.
1/
The dollar's weight in global reserves is roughly 3 times the United States weight in the global economy (maybe a bit less0; the euro's weight is close to its weight in the global economy -- and China still punches way below its weight, for obvious reasons!
2/
A far more interesting chart showing global reserves --
The big, interesting important story isn't shifts in share ... but the huge increase in reserve holdings from 02 to 14, and the subsequent reduction in the pace of accumulation.
3/
A technically demanding global reserves chart -- one showing actual flows (purchases + retained interest income) by currency.
The bond market adjustment complicates everything; I don't yet have a good bond market adjustment for the euro.
4/
China's reserve sales in 15-16 obviously figure heavily in that chart ...
and there was a quite large pickup in reserve accumulation in 2020-21 that we now tend to forget.
5/
And some of the most interesting stories told by the reserves data have nothing to do with China --
For example, EM Asia sold a lot of reserves last summer and fall, in what I think was a successful defense against an overshot of their currencies when oil was high!
6/
And, as I have noted many times and in many different ways, looking only at formal reserves misses much of the picture these days -- China has as much money in state banks, its policy banks and state investment funds as it holds in its formal reserves ...
7/7
So there are stories to tell that don't hinge on creatively graphing these two lines ...
8/8
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My actual concern -- a concern that is global -- is that China's unbalanced domestic economy has contributed to an incredibly unbalanced pattern of global trade.
China has a great deal of agency. It chooses to have its state banks intervene to hold its currency down v the USD. It has chosen to maintain a regressive tax system (with heavy taxes on low wage work and consumption) and to limit redistribution and social benefits
2/
I do wonder what parts of my actual policy recommendations Dr. Hauge objects to -- the increase in Chinese social spending? an increase in income tax collections? more central government domestic spending and less state bank fx intervention?
US imports are on track to be up modestly for the year
(with strong electronics imports driven by the AI boom and the tariff exclusion for chips offsetting weakness in vehicle trade)
2/
Set aside the craziness in pharmaceuticals and gold -- which drove enormous volatility in the reported trade balance in both q1 and q2 -- and the monthly trade data looks surprisingly normal
Probably time for China to try a different strategy
The IMF article IV is due this fall. Shouldn't the IMF be recommending that the central government use its obvious fiscal space to directly support household spending?
1/
The FT stated the obvious "Beijing has relied on exports in recent years to meet its ambitious annual growth targets" - the IMF should too ...
The IMF staff, in an excellent 2023 working paper, found that the central government doesn't really have any net debt (unlike some of the more indebted local governments). Time for the IMF to start reflecting those findings in its policy advice ...
A chart that I always find interesting -- global reserves v Treasury notes and bonds (reserve managers generally don't buy bills) as a share of US GDP
Period between 03 and 08 notable for reserve growth w-o // increase in supply of US classic reserve assets
1/
Always striking to me that there is a lot more talk about the dollar as a reserve currency now, when the impact of reserve holdings on markets is waning, than there was talk of the market impact massive reserve growth back when it was happening
2/
A similar chart for the euro area -- there haven't been enough euro area securities to meet all global reserve demand since 2006!
Not a fan of most of the Miran paper (and the Treasury restructuring proposals), but also not a fan of Employ America's claim that dollar strength doesn't impact the US manufacturing sector
This argument in particular has two particular problems --
a) it ignores lags, and treats 02 to 08 as one period of dollar weakness
b) it doesn't look at petrol and non-petrol trade
2/
In reality, dollar strength impacts trade flows with long lags (8 to 12qs on exports is standard), so the dollar's exceptional strength in 2000 and 01 and still relatively strong levels in 02 and 03 were weighing on exports for some time (see graph)
Set aside politics for a moment (which no one in Argentina ever does) and focus on the numbers. Milei's core problem is that fiscal adjustment hasn't generated balance of payments adjustment. Net out IMF lending and Argentina has been burning through its reserves
1/
and set aside funds borrowed from the IMF and SDR conversion -- even so Argentina's net fx reserves are flat (data through July). And ~ half of that fx more or less is CNY from the PBOC swap line which isn't freely convertible into USD ...
2/
A strong harvest (plus Chinese buying as China isn't buying from the US) actually brought the current account deficit down this summer -- but those inflows aren't expected to last, and the real problem is that there is once again a deficit ...