Brad Setser Profile picture
Aug 25, 2023 8 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Perhaps the most boring chart in the world

The shares of the major currencies in global reserves, as reported to the IMF.

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The dollar's weight in global reserves is roughly 3 times the United States weight in the global economy (maybe a bit less0; the euro's weight is close to its weight in the global economy -- and China still punches way below its weight, for obvious reasons!

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A far more interesting chart showing global reserves --

The big, interesting important story isn't shifts in share ... but the huge increase in reserve holdings from 02 to 14, and the subsequent reduction in the pace of accumulation.

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A technically demanding global reserves chart -- one showing actual flows (purchases + retained interest income) by currency.

The bond market adjustment complicates everything; I don't yet have a good bond market adjustment for the euro.

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China's reserve sales in 15-16 obviously figure heavily in that chart ...

and there was a quite large pickup in reserve accumulation in 2020-21 that we now tend to forget.

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And some of the most interesting stories told by the reserves data have nothing to do with China --

For example, EM Asia sold a lot of reserves last summer and fall, in what I think was a successful defense against an overshot of their currencies when oil was high!

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And, as I have noted many times and in many different ways, looking only at formal reserves misses much of the picture these days -- China has as much money in state banks, its policy banks and state investment funds as it holds in its formal reserves ...

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So there are stories to tell that don't hinge on creatively graphing these two lines ...

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More from @Brad_Setser

Jan 5
The appreciation of the yuan (against the dollar) in the second half of 2025 -- and particularly in December -- has attracted a bit of attention.

(h/t to @Mike_Weilandt for the chart)

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It isn't like the yuan's appreciation against the dollar has been particularly fast. But it has been steady. And a predictable no volatility appreciation that exceeds the loss from the rate differential is bound to get attention

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It will be interesting to see the numbers for fx settlement in December. The number of reports of activity in the market (dollar buying to limit appreciation) by state banks in say Bloomberg's fx coverage picked up in December.

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Read 15 tweets
Jan 5
Saudi Arabia's q3 current account numbers are out, and they -- unsurprisingly -- showed an ongoing deficit.

My rough estimate for Saudi Arabia's current account break even (the oil price that results in external balance) continues to be over $90 a barrel

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A reminder -- the external break even is calculating using reported oil export revenues, the non-oil current account, and net exports (my numbers there are dependent on getting regular updates from @Rory_Johnston )

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@Rory_Johnston i.e. Saudi Arabia needs $250 billion a year in export receipts from oil to balance its current account -- and that is much more than it gets with oil at ~ $60 a barrel

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Read 9 tweets
Jan 4
There is a lot of talk -- not the least from the US Administration -- about the windfall from Venezuela's oil. It is worth doing a bit of (boring) quantification.

Bottom line: it isn't going to pay for everything ...

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Venezuela's oil is heavy and sour, so it trades at a discount to sweet light.

2024 production was 0.9 mbd. Domestic consumption isn't zero. To generous, assume 0.75 mbd at day at $50 a barrel -- that generates $14 billion a year in exports.

2/
Industry experts (@Big_Orrin ) think the upper bound on how much additional production could be generated if the international oil service giants came in to revitalize the fields is ~ 1 mbd, or a ~$18b

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Read 14 tweets
Jan 2
Interesting comments from South Korea's Rhee (central bank governor). Seems like there is a level of the won that is too weak even for Korea ...

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Rhee also emphasized the foreign exchange implications of Korea's investment pledge (part of its "deal" with Lutnick and Trump). Rhee "vowed to oppose any US investment decisions that could threaten the stability of the foreign-exchange market"

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I share Governor Rhee's misgivings -- explicitly relying on Korea (and Japan and perhaps Taiwan) to finance investment in the US -- if it actually happens (incentives aren't well aligned) likely implies accepting continued trade imbalances ...

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bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Read 9 tweets
Jan 2
Second Peter's comment. Xi is not for turning. The question is how China's trading partners -- not just the US -- react. Suspect France and Germany will set the direction of policy in 2026 ...

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China's top leadership seems convinced that there is a "fortress" in one country global equilibrium -- where China exports (and controls key supply chains) but doesn't import (at least not much beyond oil and iron)

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But I am a bit skeptical that a China that doesn't import yet continues to export is a sustainable equilibrium, politically or economically.

Note that a constant 1 to 1.5 pp net export contribution implies an ever widening trade surplus



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Read 8 tweets
Jan 1
Let me draw out one point in China's q3 balance of payments (a rather subtle one) -- namely the large sales of Chinese bonds by foreign investors in q3.

(the red bar in the graph)

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This is a reversal of inflows from back in 2023 ... and as my earlier thread notes, I think the change in direction factors into the reported current account surplus (even though it should not technically) given China's error minimization formula post 2022 ...

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And why was there a change in direction in these flows? The answer in part is tied to the pressure on the CNY-USD swap market -- and thus to backdoor state bank currency management ... see this September Bloomberg story

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bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Read 9 tweets

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