The shares of the major currencies in global reserves, as reported to the IMF.
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The dollar's weight in global reserves is roughly 3 times the United States weight in the global economy (maybe a bit less0; the euro's weight is close to its weight in the global economy -- and China still punches way below its weight, for obvious reasons!
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A far more interesting chart showing global reserves --
The big, interesting important story isn't shifts in share ... but the huge increase in reserve holdings from 02 to 14, and the subsequent reduction in the pace of accumulation.
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A technically demanding global reserves chart -- one showing actual flows (purchases + retained interest income) by currency.
The bond market adjustment complicates everything; I don't yet have a good bond market adjustment for the euro.
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China's reserve sales in 15-16 obviously figure heavily in that chart ...
and there was a quite large pickup in reserve accumulation in 2020-21 that we now tend to forget.
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And some of the most interesting stories told by the reserves data have nothing to do with China --
For example, EM Asia sold a lot of reserves last summer and fall, in what I think was a successful defense against an overshot of their currencies when oil was high!
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And, as I have noted many times and in many different ways, looking only at formal reserves misses much of the picture these days -- China has as much money in state banks, its policy banks and state investment funds as it holds in its formal reserves ...
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So there are stories to tell that don't hinge on creatively graphing these two lines ...
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Somehow, the US has ended up with a tariff structure for many goods that doesn't really encourage a shift in production out of China. Quote is from Sean Stein of the US-China Business Council, in a new piece from @AnaSwanson
To be sure, the legacy 25% 301 tariff on lists 1-3 does discourage final assembly of those goods in China -- but the term 2 tariffs haven't added to that penalty ...
The bulk of current US imports from China have a 301 tariff of either 7.5% (many household/ consumer goods) or zero (electronics) and now face a 20% tariff (10 reciprocal, 10 fentanyl) -- which isn't much different from the 19 or 20% tariff on SE Asia.
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Jason Douglass and Jonathan Cheng in the WSJ -- the Trade War Didn't Change China.
In fact, China's economy is more unbalanced and more reliant on exports for the demand than it was when section 301 case first started
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Open trade failed, spectacularly, to liberalize China's political system.
More restricted trade if anything led China to double down on its manufacturing intensive, channel capital to industry model
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I think it is fair to say that China has weaponized the chokepoints generated by its control over the supply of critical inputs (rare earths, magnets, legacy chips, processing of chips) quite effectively --
China's goods and services data on a balance of payments basis is now effectively out for q3 (with the September monthly data) -- and on a balance of payments basis, exports jumped up a bit in q3
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The q2 surplus using China's (whacky) BoP methodology was well below the q2 customs surplus -- but the q3 BoP surplus is strong, and up v q2 (while the customs surplus is down)
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So my estimate for the q3 current account surplus is just over $200b ($800b annualized) -- or well above q2 ...
There needs to be a better consensus number for the tariff on China. The effective tariff rate (Tariff paid/ imports) was 37-38% in July and August. It should fall to under 30% with the recent deal.
As @EtraAlex notes, that is still higher than the effective tariff rate on most other countries (India is a bit of an outlier, but there should be a deal) -- the electronics exclusion lowers the effective tariff on SE Asia ...
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There of course is a lot of sectoral variability in the tariffs -- all sorts of 232s that knock out the reciprocal tariffs, and in some cases (electronics/ chips & pharma) that has really lowered the actual applied tariff (same for the USMCA exclusion)
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China's currency is objectively very weak, especially in inflation adjusted terms (it is down just under 20% from its 2021 high). And it is very tightly managed against the dollar --
But within that broad regime, there has been a tiny bit of appreciation over the last 6ms
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And to be sure, the movement is primarily against the dollar -- the yuan remains incredibly weak against the euro (contributing to the second China shock, China's rising share of the EU auto market & German automotive angst)
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There is something technically very strange about the yuan's appreciation -- it has come even though the onshore spot rate has remained weaker than the daily fix (in theory the mid point of the band). That is strange ...
China, the unexpected "winner" from Trump's second term trade war?
Bringing the Trump 2 tariff on China down to 20% (10% reciprocal, 10% fentanyl) is a huge win for China; it puts the new tariffs at the same level as the new tariffs on SE Asia
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The new tariffs on China would also only be 5 pp higher than the tariffs on US allies like Japan and Korea (and most European countries) ... massive shift away from the campaign proposal
There is a myth that the average tariff on China is now 55%
("it would bring the average tariff on most Chinese imports—currently around 55%—to about 45%. That would put China’s average tariff rate closer to those of other trading partners")
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