The shares of the major currencies in global reserves, as reported to the IMF.
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The dollar's weight in global reserves is roughly 3 times the United States weight in the global economy (maybe a bit less0; the euro's weight is close to its weight in the global economy -- and China still punches way below its weight, for obvious reasons!
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A far more interesting chart showing global reserves --
The big, interesting important story isn't shifts in share ... but the huge increase in reserve holdings from 02 to 14, and the subsequent reduction in the pace of accumulation.
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A technically demanding global reserves chart -- one showing actual flows (purchases + retained interest income) by currency.
The bond market adjustment complicates everything; I don't yet have a good bond market adjustment for the euro.
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China's reserve sales in 15-16 obviously figure heavily in that chart ...
and there was a quite large pickup in reserve accumulation in 2020-21 that we now tend to forget.
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And some of the most interesting stories told by the reserves data have nothing to do with China --
For example, EM Asia sold a lot of reserves last summer and fall, in what I think was a successful defense against an overshot of their currencies when oil was high!
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And, as I have noted many times and in many different ways, looking only at formal reserves misses much of the picture these days -- China has as much money in state banks, its policy banks and state investment funds as it holds in its formal reserves ...
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So there are stories to tell that don't hinge on creatively graphing these two lines ...
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Nice summary of China's economic troubles from the Economist.
Think this Goldman chart more or less nails the core problem
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I am also pleased to see that the need for China's central government to use its own balance sheet to do a household focused stimulus is (almost) now conventional wisdom.
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Until recently, only a few careful observers knew that China's stimulus typically came from local levels of government
& it certainly didn't feel like centrally financed fiscal support was a consensus recommendation back when I wrote this in 2016
Apart from the use of two wildly different axes for the same concept (share of reserves), the story also uses the rather bizarre Stephen Jen concept of valuation adjusted reserves to argue that the dollar's reserve share is falling ...
One of my favorite charts - updated with data through q2.
China's dollar portfolio -- at least its reserve portfolio -- historically can be tracked using the US balance of payments/ TIC survey data.
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China has disclosed that it reduced the dollar share of its reserves from 79% to 58% between 2005 and 2015.
Guess what -- they is what the US data shows (if you remember to adjust for the euroclear account in Belgium/ include equities)
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If you look closely at the first chart, there looks to be a bit of tracking error -- Chinese purchases of US financial assets were a bit stronger than needed to keep a 60% portfolio share in 2022 ...
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The real Irish economy (GNI*) is about half the size of the reported Irish economy -- the gap is a measure of profit shifting by big US companies, and it continues to grow ...
It is hard for me to believe that a well designed US tax reform wouldn't lead some of the current Irish profits -- and the associated tax revenue -- to move back to the US. The sums are no longer small ..
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I particularly appreciated the attention paid the key macroeconomic variables -- like household consumption (note the steep fall in consumption v GDP from 2000 to 2010 ... before Xi ... this fall coincides with the rise in China's external imbalances)
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Note that investment -- which was thought to be unsustainably high in the years before the global financial crisis -- remains substantially higher now than it was from 2005 to 2007 ...
With China defending the yuan (so far through the state banks) and the yen approaching levels where Japan might intervene, the impact of foreign central bank reserves on the Treasury market is getting new attention ...
So it is worth reviewing the basics.
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One, is that central banks often buy longer dated maturities than they tend to sell, for fairly obvious reasons (the most obvious source of liquidity = maturing securities) so the flow impact of purchases and sales might not be symmetric ...
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But more importantly, the foreign central bank bid for Treasuries hasn't been constant over time: think of 3 eras:
03 to 08 (dollar reserve growth exceeds UST issuance)
09 to 14 (big increase in dollar reserves and UST supply)
15 on (no net increase in dollar reserves)