Thread by @TrentTelenko

Jan Kallberg, @Cyberdefensecom, has a wonderful piece on Russian Army logistics in Southern Ukraine that is well worth the read.

I'm going to clip from and expand upon it in this 🧵

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https://twitter.com/Cyberdefensecom/status/1694370486413590785

The previous strikes on Crimean rail bridges, the more recent ones on the Henichesk, Chonhar, & Kerch bridges, interwoven with the systematic destruction of ammo/fuel depots in Southern Ukrainian and Dzhankoy Crimea, means that the "land bridge" that goes through Rostov-on-the
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...Don, Taganrog (Russia), Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Melitopol on the M-14 highway is the primary ground line of communications (GLOC) logistical artery for the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) in Southern Ukraine.

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This M-14 road route is too long for supporting the RuAF ground forces in Zaporizhia with enough fuel/ammo and all of it is in strike range of Storm Shadow missiles and many Ukrainian drones.

Given no trains, these are the Russian truck logistical facts of life:

- At ~300 miles/480 km, tactical truck's only payload is fuel for a return trip**

- A 56 mile/90 km radius from a supply point allows three trips a day with refueling & mechanized logistics to load & unload a truck.

- RuAF doesn't have mechanized logistics, AKA pallets,

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...forklifts, and trucks with the built in tie down points like D-rings to secure pallet loads.

[** Russian trucks use manual transmissions with poorly trained drivers.  So 300 miles/450 km is the "realistic range."]

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The use of manual labor to fill/unload tactical trucks takes a lot more time than with all terrain forklifts.

This means RuAF trucks do one trip a day to 93 mile/150 km and maybe two a day to 47 mile/75 km with the drivers getting a little sleep and their trucks getting no
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...preventive maintenance.

RuAF has to put what amounts to truck stops every 47 miles/75 km or so for the M-14 highway for fuel and wrecker support of broken down tactical trucks.

The operational attrition from this has caused a lot of problems.

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https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1666935969562628096

Russia has had to replace tactical trucks with semi-tractor trailers on the M-14 road.

This clip from @Cyberdefensecom article is the basic 'combat math' of Ukrainian weapons systems reach (GMLRS) & the distance to the M-14 road.

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The Russian semi-tractor trailer fleets supplying the ground forces in southern Ukraine are from the Russian economy, AKA the Oligarchs.

Those fleets are GMLRS bait west of Berdyansk when Ukraine pushes to the outskirts of Tokmak.

See the implications laid out by Kallberg⬇️

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In terms of weight transported per day, fuel is the RuAF primary need for operations, after that comes artillery ammunition, with every other supply, including food for troops, a distant third.

We are now seeing a lot of Russian civilian fuel stations out of fuel in Crimea,

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...which indicates all available civilian fuel semi-tractor trailers in Crimea have been absorbed into the RuAF fuel logistics to the Zaporizhia front.

This is an extremely dangerous position for RuAF to be in as the non-command armored fighting vehicle fleet lacks auxiliary
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...power units -- small engines -- to generate electric power to recharge batteries powering radios, night vision sights and electronic fire control.

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Powering up hundreds of 500 hp to 1000 hp engines every day, three times a day simply eats a whole lot of fuel while sitting still.

Russian trucks & AFV's without fuel cannot keep their artillery & UAV radio batteries charged.

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Russian firepower will simply be what they can see to shoot and either carry on foot or shoot from deadlined vehicles

With fuel cut off west of Melitopol on the M-14, Russian forces there are in the world biggest prison

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RuAF soldiers choices in Southern Ukraine west of Melitopol will then be either surrender or die, because it is politically impossible for Ukraine to let out of supply Russians ravage Ukrainian civilians.

14/14 End