Ukrainian forces have made newly-confirmed tactical gains in the past 24 hours. They are now geolocated to be within 2.5 km of the great anti-vehicle ditch - the next major military engineering obstacle within the Russian layered defense.
We've recessed the Russian control line to the fighting positions behind the dragons teeth. Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that most Russian forces and heavy equipment are deployed south of the dragon's teeth.
The land between the ditch and the dragon's teeth is likely heavily mined.
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Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine and are making some tactical gains, including the liberation of Staromayorske in Donetsk Oblast.
A short thread on today's map changes for @TheStudyofWar.
1. Ukrainian forces liberated Staromayorske on July 27. The Russian positions in Urozhane are precariously held by a river bank. I suspect Russian forces will retrograde from or be beaten out of the Urozhane in the near future.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Mayar stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces captured Staromayorske. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces...
The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding.
A quick rollup on reported (not all confirmed) Wagner Group activities in Belarus.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 22 that approximately 50 Wagner personnel are in Sosnovy, Belarus, (presumably the Sosnovy in Asipovichy Raion immediately adjacent to the known Wagner camp in Tsel,and not either of the two villages named Sosnovy in Gomel Oblast).
The Center also reported that a field camp for approximately 300 Wagner personnel appeared at the Domanovo Training Ground in Ivatsevitsky Raion, Brest Oblast.
Ukrainian forces are conducting a local counterattack near Bakhmut's flanks causing significant panic among Russian milbloggers speculating about Ukraine's anticipated counteroffensive.
This assessment is based primarily off of the available evidence: Russian-sourced reports from sources that regularly provide reliable information as well as some Ukrainian official statements and limited available supporting geolocated visual evidence.
The time cutoff for this map was 1500 ET - before usually reliable Russian milblogger Rybar posted its map showing even more Ukrainian advances than what we mapped today.
Unpacking this assessment in our change of control of terrain around the Dnipro River delta.
This assessment uses a combination of multi-sourced Russian-provided textual reports about Ukrainian activity in this area as well as available geolocated combat footage.
Russian milbloggers Rybar and "Thirteenth" claimed on April 20 and 22 that Ukrainian forces have maintained positions in left (east) bank Kherson Oblast for weeks, established stable supply lines to these positions, and regularly conduct sorties in the area.
Thirteenth explicitly states that Ukrainian forces control everything beyond an unspecified portion of the Antonivsky bridge.
It's not clear what his point of reference on the bridge is, but he explicitly claims Ukrainians control the costal housing in the the red area circled.
Thread unpacking my latest @TheStudyofWar assessment with @KatStepanenko.
We assess Russian occupation authorities are likely conducting a campaign of systematic religious persecution in occupied Ukraine in support of a larger campaign of cultural genocide against Ukraine.
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Our team did a deep dive on religious persecution events that Russian forces have reportedly inflicted against Ukrainians and discovered at least 76 reports of Russian forces deliberately coercing religious groups.
This includes 4 event types:
1. Killing / capturing clergy
2. Closing, nationalizing, or forcefully converting places of worship to the Moscow Patriarchate
3. Killing looting, desecration, or deliberate destruction of a place of worship
GIF: Russian forces at the Obuz-Lesnovsky 230th Combined Arms raining Ground in Brest, Belarus, recently redeployed back to Russia ahead of Russia’s spring conscription call-up on April 1.
Compare equipment levels from mid-February to now.
Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky stated on March 23 that there are about 4,200 Russian servicemen currently in Belarus, indicating a drawdown. Russia had about 12,000 personnel deployed in Belarus in late 2022.
These Russian forces likely deployed back to Russia to free up Belarusian training capacity ahead of Russia’s spring conscription cycle. Russian forces may send more mobilized forces or possibly conscripts for training in Belarus given...