1/ Yesterday, I discussed Russian reinforcements and reserves in the South, but didn't mention them specifically. Today, it's safe to say that I was referring to the movement of units from the 76th Guards Air Assault Division from the North-East
2/ I anticipated that it would take a few days for the OSINT community to detect and identify them, hence I waited until today. According to russian military doctrine, at least on paper, 76th division is a part of their strategic reserves, underscoring the seriousness of the move
3/ As of now, refraining from additional statements, it's crucial to acknowledge the twofold implications. On one hand, this strengthens russian operational capacities. On the other, their failure will critically impair of combat-ready reserves for rapid deployment.
4/ Lastly, I want to highlight that the division is comprised of various units. Therefore, it's more accurate to refer to "elements and units of the 76th division,". This is distinct from the complete division with all its constituent units.
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As this war has now extended beyond a year and a half, the issue of cost efficiency becomes even more important. Using the illustration of a russian logistical facility located in Yakymivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, I will explain this challenge in a straightforward manner.
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2/ Since 2022, this logistical node has operated as a russian vehicle repair facility, primarily focusing on armored vehicles. Through a comparative analysis of imagery, it becomes evident that the facility is operational, although its capacity remains somewhat limited.
3/ This leads us to the subsequent question: can we dismiss this facility as insignificant in terms of targeting? Simultaneously, is it truly justifiable to deploy 2-3 million dollar Stormshadow missile, limited in supply, against a relatively basic repair shop setup?
Quick overview of the Russian "wunderwaffe" mine known as "PTKM-1R" - an AT mine designed to engage vehicles through the top. In this thread, I will talk about this touted by russians mine, discussing its effectiveness and purported widespread use. 🧵Thread:
2/ Although the the mine's mechanism is quite complex, the activation process is comparably straightforward: through its sensors, the mine detects, discerns, and trails a target, subsequently deploying submunition into the air, targeting a vehicle's vulnerable roof section.
3/ From the recently surfaced video, it's clear that the mine is notably large, requiring a substantial amount of time for deployment, which must be done manually. Furthermore, the mine's functionality depends on sensors powered by batteries.
Expanding upon the ongoing dialogue about utilizing drones for mine detection, questions have emerged regarding the practicality of employing thermal imaging. In this thread, I will discuss this matter by referencing a specialized manual dedicated to this topic.🧵Thread:
2/ To begin, it's essential to consider a few key aspects. Mines aren't always placed on a top of soil - some remain hidden, making them invisible to drones. This distinction is important, emphasizing the need to refrain from regarding this method as panacea
3/ The parameters for this presentation are outlined as follows:
Temperature: Range of +18 to +20°C (64.4 to 68°F)
Vegetation: Moderate level
Time: 21:00 (9 PM) local time
Altitude: Varied and indicated for each scenario in the image.
Drone: DJI Mavic 3T
Deployment time: 11 AM
In my earlier thread in April, I detailed the emergence of a unit named "PMC" Wolves, comprised of mobilized soldiers. Presently recognized as the 1st Volunteer Reconnaissance Assault Brigade "Wolves," this unit has undergone several transformations. More details in the 🧵Thread:
2/ While soldiers and instructors inside of the Wolves brigade identify it as a PMC, their operational contracts remain under the MoD. Despite possessing a certain degree of autonomy and additional financial backing, their status and activities are channeled through MoD.
3/ The label "PMC" might be somewhat misleading, as combat assignments are determined by the MoD. Though supplementary private sponsors contribute to their support in addition to the MoD, the execution of combat tasks and overall coordination resides within the MoD's purview.
During times of war, determining the enemy's production capacity, often shrouded in secrecy, is a challenging task. As promised, today's focus involves employing satellite imagery analysis and OSINT to approximate production numbers at BTRZ-103 (Armored Repair Plant). 🧵Thread:
2/ Before delving into specifics, let's clarify the role of BTRZ-103. Situated near Chita in Russia's East, this plant specializes in repairing and modernizing vehicles. The facility's current emphasis centers on T-62, BRDM, and BMP vehicle modernizations.
3/ T-62 tanks undergo complete disassembly, with engine replacements, rust removal, installation of new wiring, fire control, sight systems, and upgraded armor with ERA blocks. A contract was awarded to BTRZ-103 for the modernization of 800 T-62 tanks over a 3-year span.
When our troops liberated Kherson and advanced to the Dnipro River, the russians dispersed and relocated their equipment, helicopters, and C2 to various bases beyond the reach of HIMARS. Why is this significant, and what can be learned from this situation?
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2/ In this instance, compiled satellite imagery reveals the establishment of a new base to the south of Henichesk. Its construction commenced around November, aligning with our troops' liberation of Kherson and the departure of russian forces from Chaplynka.
3/ Their decision was correct - shortly after our forces secured Kherson, Chaplynka base experienced several strikes. Nevertheless, most of the equipment, the command and control center, and the helicopters had been relocated. Only minimal logistical operations were still there.