The Ukrainian offensive in the Robotyne sector has progressed, and the first Russian main defence line has been reached.
In this thread we’ll take a closer look at the main defensive line and what might happen next.
This thread includes high resolution satellite imagery. 🧵 1/
Ukrainians have been trying to advance in the Robotyne area since June. After over two and a half months of fighting, Ukraine has liberated most of Robotyne and continued south, bypassing Novoprokokivka.
In this map, you can see the Southern front on 1.6. and now, 27.8.
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The first significant fortified obstacle is located just outside Robotyne. The Russians have prepared formidable defences, which include covered firing positions and bunkers. From here, the Russians can defend against attacks from both north and east.
Zoom in for details. 3/
At the moment it seems like Ukraine doesn’t want to attack straight towards these heavily fortified positions.
Instead, they’re flanking the whole village of Novoprokokivka, and have established themselves between the positions south of Robotyne and the main defence line. 4/
The Ukrainians have roughly two immediate directions:
1. Try to open up the main road in Novoprokokivka and continue towards the heavier main defence fortifications at Solodka Balka.
2. Try to breach the main defensive line near Verbove and continue towards Ocheretuvate. 5/
Let’s take a look at the defences in the village of Solodka Balka. At the beginning of August, Russians were improving the positions they built during spring. You can see a lot of construction material, especially steel elements, which are used as roof material. 6/
The Russians have built 100-350m long communication trenches, which helps them both reinforce or retreat from the fighting positions. The built area of the village works as a buffer zone, and immediately after the village ends, another trenchline begins. 7/
Heavy fortifications are built in order to block any potential advance on the main road towards Tokmak. This is an important avenue of approach, so defending it is very logical. However, while concentrating on this section, the Russians may have missed something important. 8/
The main defence line west of Verbove seems to be in a significantly worse state.
At the beginning of August, no preparation work for finalizing these trenches had begun. At the end of August, low-resolution images show almost no signs of any trench improvements either. 10/
There are sections with no covered firing positions and very few accommodation bunkers, even though great effort was put into this in other places.
However, the Russians tend to fortify the treelines, but only limited indicators of this can be seen in these images.
The topographic heatmap gives also some additional insight to the battlefield. Russians have constructed most of their defences on dominant heights, and there is no way to completely avoid fighting uphill.
The highlighted ridge is the next tactically central point. 12/
The height differences are not extremely dramatic, and the treelines reduce the Russian field of fire. In this area, the best attempt for the Ukrainians would likely be to continue forward, breach the line between Solodka Balka and Verbove, and start flanking operations. 13/
This situation would provide a better basis for future operations, for example attacking the actual villages of Verbove and Novoprokokivka. Widening the salient is necessary in order to create a sustainable frontline. 14/
Soon, AFU has to start clearing the flanks more intensively. The offensive cannot continue south indefinitely - Ukrainians must, at some point, start focusing more on Kopani or Verbove.
Ukraine may face challenges in force distribution and prioritization. 15/
If the attacks in the flanks do not succeed, the spearhead will also slow down, giving the Russians time to prepare defences in depth.
This is actually happening already - the Russians have started constructing additional defense lines in the Berdyansk/Mariupol direction. 16/
So, the main points of this thread:
- Fortifications are not as strong in all areas of the first main defensive line, as known as the Surovikin line
- Russian preparedness varies
- Positive developments for Ukraine are possible in the near future, especially local success
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Thanks for reading, this thread took forever to make. The images are from 1.-2.8.2023. They do not endanger Ukrainian OPSEC in any way.
Thanks also to @wihurinrahasto for funding us!
Our team at @Black_BirdGroup continues to follow the situation. 18(18
There are many things I am good at. In this thread, writing the name of Novoprokopivka correctly was not one of them. The mistake was made in the beginning, and I repeated it multiple tames. Sorry!
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On June 1, Ukraine conducted a successful operation targeting Russian strategic bombers and other aircraft.
Our battle damage assessment can confirm the following losses: 12 destroyed and 3 damaged aircraft, of which 14 are strategic bombers and 1 is a transport aircraft. 1/
From videos and satellite images, 23 distinct aircraft were identified in total as potentially targeted. The condition of 4 aircraft seen in videos remains unclear. Available evidence doesn’t allow for assessing potential damage or whether nearby drones even detonated. 2/
The highest possible number for total losses is 19, if all aircraft in unknown condition are actually damaged. However, this can’t be confirmed at the moment.
In 4 cases, it appears the drones likely missed, did not explode or cause visible damage for other reasons. 3/
Ukraine has struck multiple strategic bombers in Olenya, Murmansk oblast, 1800 km from Ukraine. This is one of the most successful drone strikes against against Russian air bases in the entire war. The extent of the damage is yet unclear, but I can already say it's significant. 1/
Russia had transferred the valuable planes to Olenya to avoid the exact scenario we're seeing on the videos and photos coming from the area. Bombers operating from the field have repeatedly struck Ukraine with cruise missiles. 2/
These are major and expensive losses for Russia that can't be replaced quickly.
Additionally, the air base in Belaya, roughly 4300 km from Ukraine, has been hit. Also Dyagilevo and Ivanovo air bases are burning. This is a very, very successful day for Ukraine. 3/
During April and May, the Russians formed a dangerous salient against the Ukrainian defenses between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
The so-called spring offensive has progressed relatively quickly, and serious issues may lie ahead in the near future. 1/
Defending forces in the area initially consisted of newer, less capable brigades, such as the 142nd, 155th & 157th. Elements from other units were also present. Reserves have been brought in – first the 36th marine brigade, and now the 82nd air assault brigade, among others. 2/
Russia's probable operational objectives for the coming months in the area include:
Formation of an encirclement threat around Kostiantynivka
Formation of an encirclement threat around Pokrovsk
Disruption of Ukrainian supply & command elements in the cities in the AO 3/
Russia has five active air bases near northern Finland and Norway. In this thread, I will go through the bases and their recent changes in activity and infrastructure, and how the war in Ukraine has affected them.
There have been some surprising developments. 1/
The five air bases are located in Murmansk oblast: Severomorsk-1, -2 and -3, Monchegorsk and Olenya. There are more air bases near Finland further south in Karelia and St. Petersburg, but currently most of the largest and militarily active ones are in the north. 2/
In June 2022 Russia announced plans to repair several of the northern air bases. The work has begun. In Severomorsk-1, fighter shelters on the eastern side of the field were repaired somewhere between 2023-24. However, in Severomorsk-2, there are more surprising changes. 3/
Russia is developing its military infrastructure and conducting organizational reforms near Nato’s northern flank, especially near Finland. News agencies from different countries have asked me about the topic, and in this thread I will share some recent observations. 1/
Firstly, a brief overview of the organisational level. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District (LMD) as a part of a larger reform of the military districts. The LMD covers the north-western Russia, including Baltic and arctic directions. 2/
At the same time, Russia is expanding its existing brigades into divisions and bringing entirely new troops into Finland's neighboring regions. For example, the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kamenka was recently transformed into the 69th Motor Rifle Division. 3/
Putin declared a temporary ceasefire. What can be expected?
Firstly, Russia only makes such an announcement if it benefits Russia's diplomatic or military goals. Russia isn't suddenly seeking a quick peace, this is most likely a measure related to ongoing negotiations. 1/
Putin says that Russian forces must be ready to repel potential ceasefire violations and provocations.
It's possible Russia will try to accuse Ukraine of breaking the ceasefire, which could then be used as evidence of Ukraine's unwillingness to reach a peace settlement. 2/
Russia may be trying to show the Trump administration that it has some desire for peace. A minimal gesture of goodwill may buy political points from the United States, although its actual impact on the war is likely to be small. 3/