Military analyst & military history expert.
Following the war in @Black_BirdGroup
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✉️ emil.kastehelmi@gmail.com
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Jun 1 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Ukraine has struck multiple strategic bombers in Olenya, Murmansk oblast, 1800 km from Ukraine. This is one of the most successful drone strikes against against Russian air bases in the entire war. The extent of the damage is yet unclear, but I can already say it's significant. 1/
Russia had transferred the valuable planes to Olenya to avoid the exact scenario we're seeing on the videos and photos coming from the area. Bombers operating from the field have repeatedly struck Ukraine with cruise missiles. 2/
May 28 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
During April and May, the Russians formed a dangerous salient against the Ukrainian defenses between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
The so-called spring offensive has progressed relatively quickly, and serious issues may lie ahead in the near future. 1/
Defending forces in the area initially consisted of newer, less capable brigades, such as the 142nd, 155th & 157th. Elements from other units were also present. Reserves have been brought in – first the 36th marine brigade, and now the 82nd air assault brigade, among others. 2/
May 7 • 13 tweets • 4 min read
Russia has five active air bases near northern Finland and Norway. In this thread, I will go through the bases and their recent changes in activity and infrastructure, and how the war in Ukraine has affected them.
There have been some surprising developments. 1/
The five air bases are located in Murmansk oblast: Severomorsk-1, -2 and -3, Monchegorsk and Olenya. There are more air bases near Finland further south in Karelia and St. Petersburg, but currently most of the largest and militarily active ones are in the north. 2/
May 2 • 12 tweets • 4 min read
Russia is developing its military infrastructure and conducting organizational reforms near Nato’s northern flank, especially near Finland. News agencies from different countries have asked me about the topic, and in this thread I will share some recent observations. 1/
Firstly, a brief overview of the organisational level. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District (LMD) as a part of a larger reform of the military districts. The LMD covers the north-western Russia, including Baltic and arctic directions. 2/
Apr 19 • 10 tweets • 2 min read
Putin declared a temporary ceasefire. What can be expected?
Firstly, Russia only makes such an announcement if it benefits Russia's diplomatic or military goals. Russia isn't suddenly seeking a quick peace, this is most likely a measure related to ongoing negotiations. 1/
Putin says that Russian forces must be ready to repel potential ceasefire violations and provocations.
It's possible Russia will try to accuse Ukraine of breaking the ceasefire, which could then be used as evidence of Ukraine's unwillingness to reach a peace settlement. 2/
Mar 29 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
In the Russian-Ukrainian border region, both parties have continued offensive operations since the Ukrainian defense in Kursk collapsed.
While Russia is pushing Ukrainians out of Kursk and its own soldiers into Ukrainian territory in Sumy, Ukraine has again attacked Belgorod. 1/
In Kursk, the Ukrainian-controlled territory had been shrinking for months. It was a slow grind that hit a breaking point in March. The Ukrainian logistical situation had become increasingly difficult, and the Russians conducted a successful operation against the salient. 2/
Mar 3 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Feb 24 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
Ukraine has been fighting for three years in increasingly difficult conditions. Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries announced that they will “pledge to provide equipment and training for a scalable brigade-sized unit”. It’s a textbook example of too little, too late. 1/
As far as I understand from this statement, there will be a new Ukrainian brigade based on Nordic & Baltic training and equipment. In theory, this is positive news. This could, at its best, produce a highly capable unit, trained by some of the best militaries in Europe. 2/
Feb 10 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Ukraine has carried out a series of counterattacks in several directions, especially southeast of Pokrovsk. They have entered Pishchane, but currently it's unclear if they have fully retaken the village.
At the same time, the Russians are still attacking in the area too. 1/
Ukrainians are achieving limited success. It's likely an attempt to further grind down the Russian attacks which have slowed down during the last two months. The Ukrainians certainly also want to contain the threat of an encirclement around Pokrovsk. 2/
Feb 7 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
After six months of combat in the Kursk salient, the Ukrainians launched another attack in the southeastern direction of Sudzha. The Ukrainians seemingly breached the first Russian defences, and an armored column managed to advance up to 5-7 kilometers deep towards Ulanok. 1/
The attack was carried out by a battlegroup of likely 1-2 battalions in size, also equipped with engineering vehicles. Ukraine has a relatively large grouping of air assault, mechanized and other brigades in Kursk, but it’s unclear which participated in this operation. 2/
Feb 2 • 17 tweets • 4 min read
Vellyka Novosilka and Kurakhove have fallen, and Russians continue their offensive towards Pokrovsk.
In this thread I will examine what is to be expected of the most critical area of the eastern front in the near future, and what can the Russians realistically achieve. 1/
The losses of Velyka Novosilka and also Kurakhove ultimately had a rather limited impact on the broader dynamics of the battlefield in the southern and central Donetsk directions. The defensive importance of the towns had already decreased earlier, as the flanks fell. 2/
Jan 5 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Ukrainians have continued their attacks in Kursk. Today, an armored column advanced towards Bolshoye Soldatskoye, and reportedly fighting is ongoing in other villages too.
I find it unlikely that these actions could produce very significant results. 1/
The Ukrainians are facing a stronger enemy. It's possible they achieve some tactical success with the element of surprise, and in the best case scenarios they may be able to enter some villages. In the big picture, however, the general situation will likely remain the same. 2/
Dec 29, 2024 • 14 tweets • 4 min read
During the past year, there have been several attacks against critical infrastructure near Finland. Russians are being increasingly apparent in their will to escalate the situation in the Baltic Sea.
These events must be set in the right context to understand why they happen. 1/
In the most recent case, cargo ship Eagle S damaged the Estlink-2 cable. The investigation has just begun, so officially Finland isn’t blaming anyone. However, there’s a recurring pattern and practically only one country can be behind it - Russia. 2/
Dec 14, 2024 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
It has been claimed that this is a video of North Korean infantry attacking in Kursk. A few of points:
Firstly, this isn't a human wave assault, as there's no fighting. Around 40 soldiers can be counted, which means it's likely a platoon on the move through an open field. 1/
The video quality is low, I can't visually confirm if they are NK soldiers. However, it's possible they are, as they should currently be in the area.
Other videos of similar actions from nearby locations have also been posted on Telegram channels.
Dec 13, 2024 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
It seems that the Ukrainian defenders in Hannivka may be encircled, as Russians pushed deeper into Uspenivka.
Based on geolocated footage and both Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels, a Ukrainian detachment of unknown size has been cut off from the rest of the troops. 1/
The situation in Hannivka has reportedly been difficult before already, as the enemy could threaten the thin supply lines from both sides. Despite the obvious threats the Ukrainians seemingly were not given the order to retreat from the dangerous positions. 2/
Dec 1, 2024 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
This fall has been grim for Ukraine. According to our assessment, between 1 September and 30 November, the Russians captured over 1600 km2 in Ukraine, and retook roughly 500 km2 in Kursk. The rate of advance accelerated every month, despite the Russians suffering heavy losses. 1/
Already at the end of the summer, the situation seemed to be developing in a worrying direction. Especially in August, the Russian gains were relatively large, and it did not seem like the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk would significantly slow down the Russians. 2/
Nov 13, 2024 • 16 tweets • 4 min read
Russia is advancing, but it’s also spending significant amounts of men and material in the process.
In this thread I’ll take a look on two important directions: Kurakhove and the concerning developments there, and the politically motivated Kursk counteroffensive. 1/
In Kurakhove, the Russians are closing in from almost all directions. They have entered the eastern part of the town, and it seems a couple of large Ukrainian fortified strongpoints have already fallen. Some troops also entered the village of Dalne. 2/
Oct 29, 2024 • 18 tweets • 5 min read
The Russians recently launched a large offensive in eastern and southern Donetsk, on a 70 kilometers wide front.
The attack has breached Ukrainian defences in just a few days in many areas, and there can be some dangerous developments ahead, which I’ll discuss in this thread. 1/
The operation has two main focus areas, the Selydove-Kurakhivka area and the southern direction, where the enemy is currently advancing in the area between Shakhtarske and Bohoyavlenka. Both directions have their own problems and threats. 2/
Oct 24, 2024 • 14 tweets • 3 min read
Recently, it has been said that North Korean troops in Ukraine are a sign of Russia’s weakness.
While this arrangement naturally proves once again that the war isn’t going as Russia initially wanted, I view this as a practical solution rather than just simple weakness. 1/
Russia's problems shouldn't, of course, be downplayed.
You don’t have to be Clausewitz to understand that the quick operation to subjugate Ukraine isn’t going very well, when you hear the words “North Korean troops will likely soon arrive in Kursk to help Russia”. 2/
Oct 14, 2024 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
Assessment of the situation in Kursk direction
In the last few days, the Russians have continued successful attacks against the western flank of the Ukrainian-controlled area in Kursk. The Ukrainian defences were breached and Russian troops were able to push relatively deep. 1/
Let’s take a brief look at the recent developments.
Russians have carried out multiple counterattacks in Kursk in September and October. The first major success was opening the land route between Glushkovo and Korenevo. For Ukraine, this was a problematic setback. 2/
Oct 1, 2024 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Vuhledar has now most likely fallen to the Russians.
Some Ukrainian sources are still reporting of resistance inside the city, but because of recent geolocations, I believe the Russians are now de facto controlling the town. The fighting continues in the surrounding fields. 1/
There can of course be some small pockets of Ukrainian defenders inside the town, and they may even have a foothold on the northeastern corner of Vuhledar. However, it can't be said that the Ukrainians would be in control of Vuhledar anymore. 2/