The Ukrainian offensive in the Robotyne sector has progressed, and the first Russian main defence line has been reached.
In this thread we’ll take a closer look at the main defensive line and what might happen next.
This thread includes high resolution satellite imagery. 🧵 1/
Ukrainians have been trying to advance in the Robotyne area since June. After over two and a half months of fighting, Ukraine has liberated most of Robotyne and continued south, bypassing Novoprokokivka.
In this map, you can see the Southern front on 1.6. and now, 27.8.
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The first significant fortified obstacle is located just outside Robotyne. The Russians have prepared formidable defences, which include covered firing positions and bunkers. From here, the Russians can defend against attacks from both north and east.
Zoom in for details. 3/
At the moment it seems like Ukraine doesn’t want to attack straight towards these heavily fortified positions.
Instead, they’re flanking the whole village of Novoprokokivka, and have established themselves between the positions south of Robotyne and the main defence line. 4/
The Ukrainians have roughly two immediate directions:
1. Try to open up the main road in Novoprokokivka and continue towards the heavier main defence fortifications at Solodka Balka.
2. Try to breach the main defensive line near Verbove and continue towards Ocheretuvate. 5/
Let’s take a look at the defences in the village of Solodka Balka. At the beginning of August, Russians were improving the positions they built during spring. You can see a lot of construction material, especially steel elements, which are used as roof material. 6/
The Russians have built 100-350m long communication trenches, which helps them both reinforce or retreat from the fighting positions. The built area of the village works as a buffer zone, and immediately after the village ends, another trenchline begins. 7/
Heavy fortifications are built in order to block any potential advance on the main road towards Tokmak. This is an important avenue of approach, so defending it is very logical. However, while concentrating on this section, the Russians may have missed something important. 8/
The main defence line west of Verbove seems to be in a significantly worse state.
At the beginning of August, no preparation work for finalizing these trenches had begun. At the end of August, low-resolution images show almost no signs of any trench improvements either. 10/
There are sections with no covered firing positions and very few accommodation bunkers, even though great effort was put into this in other places.
However, the Russians tend to fortify the treelines, but only limited indicators of this can be seen in these images.
The topographic heatmap gives also some additional insight to the battlefield. Russians have constructed most of their defences on dominant heights, and there is no way to completely avoid fighting uphill.
The highlighted ridge is the next tactically central point. 12/
The height differences are not extremely dramatic, and the treelines reduce the Russian field of fire. In this area, the best attempt for the Ukrainians would likely be to continue forward, breach the line between Solodka Balka and Verbove, and start flanking operations. 13/
This situation would provide a better basis for future operations, for example attacking the actual villages of Verbove and Novoprokokivka. Widening the salient is necessary in order to create a sustainable frontline. 14/
Soon, AFU has to start clearing the flanks more intensively. The offensive cannot continue south indefinitely - Ukrainians must, at some point, start focusing more on Kopani or Verbove.
Ukraine may face challenges in force distribution and prioritization. 15/
If the attacks in the flanks do not succeed, the spearhead will also slow down, giving the Russians time to prepare defences in depth.
This is actually happening already - the Russians have started constructing additional defense lines in the Berdyansk/Mariupol direction. 16/
So, the main points of this thread:
- Fortifications are not as strong in all areas of the first main defensive line, as known as the Surovikin line
- Russian preparedness varies
- Positive developments for Ukraine are possible in the near future, especially local success
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Thanks for reading, this thread took forever to make. The images are from 1.-2.8.2023. They do not endanger Ukrainian OPSEC in any way.
Thanks also to @wihurinrahasto for funding us!
Our team at @Black_BirdGroup continues to follow the situation. 18(18
There are many things I am good at. In this thread, writing the name of Novoprokopivka correctly was not one of them. The mistake was made in the beginning, and I repeated it multiple tames. Sorry!
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This fall has been grim for Ukraine. According to our assessment, between 1 September and 30 November, the Russians captured over 1600 km2 in Ukraine, and retook roughly 500 km2 in Kursk. The rate of advance accelerated every month, despite the Russians suffering heavy losses. 1/
Already at the end of the summer, the situation seemed to be developing in a worrying direction. Especially in August, the Russian gains were relatively large, and it did not seem like the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk would significantly slow down the Russians. 2/
During the fall, while making progress in Ukraine, Russia also conducted several counterattacks in Kursk. Ukraine lost the western flank of the salient, while also losing positions in the east. Between September and November, Ukraine didn’t advance significantly in the area. 3/
Russia is advancing, but it’s also spending significant amounts of men and material in the process.
In this thread I’ll take a look on two important directions: Kurakhove and the concerning developments there, and the politically motivated Kursk counteroffensive. 1/
In Kurakhove, the Russians are closing in from almost all directions. They have entered the eastern part of the town, and it seems a couple of large Ukrainian fortified strongpoints have already fallen. Some troops also entered the village of Dalne. 2/
The latest advances are threatening the Ukrainian positions between Uspenivka and Yelyzavetivka. It’s unclear how firmly the Russians have been able to establish a presence in Dalne, but the fact that they’re getting there at all so quickly, is already an issue. 3/
The Russians recently launched a large offensive in eastern and southern Donetsk, on a 70 kilometers wide front.
The attack has breached Ukrainian defences in just a few days in many areas, and there can be some dangerous developments ahead, which I’ll discuss in this thread. 1/
The operation has two main focus areas, the Selydove-Kurakhivka area and the southern direction, where the enemy is currently advancing in the area between Shakhtarske and Bohoyavlenka. Both directions have their own problems and threats. 2/
In a short timeframe, Ukraine has very likely lost Selydove (over 21 000 pre-invasion residents), which is the largest city Russia has captured since the fall of Avdiivka. Simultaneously Russians also captured Hirnyk (10 000 pre-invasion residents). 3/
Recently, it has been said that North Korean troops in Ukraine are a sign of Russia’s weakness.
While this arrangement naturally proves once again that the war isn’t going as Russia initially wanted, I view this as a practical solution rather than just simple weakness. 1/
Russia's problems shouldn't, of course, be downplayed.
You don’t have to be Clausewitz to understand that the quick operation to subjugate Ukraine isn’t going very well, when you hear the words “North Korean troops will likely soon arrive in Kursk to help Russia”. 2/
However, this isn’t a relevant way to approach the matter. From Russia’s perspective, there are many benefits in cooperating with the North Koreans.
North Korea has already had a significant impact on Russia’s capabilities by selling them millions of artillery shells. 3/
In the last few days, the Russians have continued successful attacks against the western flank of the Ukrainian-controlled area in Kursk. The Ukrainian defences were breached and Russian troops were able to push relatively deep. 1/
Let’s take a brief look at the recent developments.
Russians have carried out multiple counterattacks in Kursk in September and October. The first major success was opening the land route between Glushkovo and Korenevo. For Ukraine, this was a problematic setback. 2/
From the Russian perspective, it was a pragmatic move, which was likely to happen at some point. It reduced the risk of Ukrainians cutting off and capturing Glushkovo and the area south of Seym river, as the supply didn’t solely depend on temporary bridges anymore. 3/
Vuhledar has now most likely fallen to the Russians.
Some Ukrainian sources are still reporting of resistance inside the city, but because of recent geolocations, I believe the Russians are now de facto controlling the town. The fighting continues in the surrounding fields. 1/
There can of course be some small pockets of Ukrainian defenders inside the town, and they may even have a foothold on the northeastern corner of Vuhledar. However, it can't be said that the Ukrainians would be in control of Vuhledar anymore. 2/
Capturing Vuhledar doesn't give the Russians any immediate benefits or avenues of approach towards Kurakhove.
The battles will likely soon shift to Novoukrainka and Bohoiavlenka. Between Vuhledar and Kurakhove, there's a distance of over 20 km and many fortifications. 3/