Thread by @matt_f_mcknight

Ok, summer is over 🫤🫤. Here are a few belated takeaways on the DoD Biodefense Posture Review (BPR) and what it means for biosecurity and biodefense via stream of consciousness [thread] below @concentricbyginkgo @ginkgo media.defense.gov/2023/Aug/17/20…

(1/n) Biological threats are a century-defining problem and biodefense is a core DoD mission. Threats are accelerating because of bad actors' willingness to explore advances in genetic engineering and the combination of AI + biotechnology.
vox.com/future-perfect…

(2/n) Biodefense in the next century is bigger than the select agent list. We must be prepared to defend against biological threats that are not currently on our radar, including novel and engineered pathogens.

(3/n) DoD strongly indicates they believe biology will be used in the next conflict (as do I), now is the time to prepare defenses. Every time humans have learned to engineer a new discipline, people have chosen to apply those technologies to conflict.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/P…

(4/n) DoD identifies Russia, Iran, North Korea and “probably” China as having programs exploring the use of offensive bioweapons, – this is a real threat. We need to get aggressive on figuring this out.
csis.org/analysis/biode…

(5/n) The BPR also notes the PRC focus on biology as a domain of warfare 👀 @CECCgov

(6/n) We need a new tech stack for biodefense that leverages biointelligence (BIOINT). The solution is a technology and systems problem, not a political one - i.e. regulation and international conventions alone won’t fix things (bad actors ignore this).

(7/n) While not quite being ready to add a new Operational Domain, DoD highlights that biodefense must be built into the combatant commands and made operational as a cross cutting “multi-domain” capability (biodefense is no longer a support function). matthewfoxmcknight.medium.com/biology-as-an-…

(8/n) DoD notes that figuring out the difference between good and bad use of new biological engineering capabilities is hard - so we need dedicated technology investment to do so.
thebulletin.org/2023/03/how-to…

(9/n) The core challenge to stopping bioweapon use is establishing deterrence. To do so, we need to credibly signal to potential adversaries that biological weapons will not work, and that their use will carry a cost.
warontherocks.com/2021/09/a-dete…

(10/n) Heavy investment in biosurveillance is the first step in deterrence. Once it is clear that their anonymous use is impossible – that bad actors will be identified by the fingerprints they leave – the political costs will outweigh any benefit.
defensenews.com/opinion/commen…

(11/n) We must detect new biological threats early! We need a new BioRadar as the critical first step to revolutionizing biosurveillance for prevention and deterrence.
aiche.org/resources/publ…

(12/n) The UK also announced their plan to build a “BioThreats Radar.” Biodefense is a global challenge and we need a global solution.
gov.uk/government/new…

(13/n) BIOINT via BioRadar is coming. The DNA of the planet is a high-fidelity data source and we can open it to our use via BioRadar. Satellite imagery demonstrated the power of identifying changes in a system, we need this capability for biology. concentricbyginkgo.com/bioint-the-mis…

(14/n) International partnerships and allies building biosurveillance / BioRadar capabilities are critical to driving early warning. DoD acknowledges the need to support these partnerships, and that interoperability is crucial to successful early warning

(15/n) DoD calls out the use of misinformation/disinformation+bio as a serious threat vector... adversaries could use misinfo attacks to amplify the effects of bioweapons, by eroding our ability to coordinate a whole-of-society response. BioRadar sniffs this out with real data.

(16/n) As examples - Qatar, Rwanda, Botswana, Ukraine, and others are all launching programs with @ginkgo @concentricbygbw and building the future of biodefense cooperation on a common, interoperable platform.
concentricbyginkgo.com/a-new-age-for-…

(17/17) There’s more great stuff in the BPR on supply chain, countermeasure development, training/equipping, DoD org streamlining… all-in-all a GREAT start point for DoD to fundamentally build capabilities to accelerate biodefense infrastructure - hopefully it’s resourced.

@concentricbygbw and also i forgot to be cool and use this 🧵...