I've gotten a few questions about this page - the Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan fact page about the Fukushima water release. I've also seem a few people sharing links to it.
I gave it an read and spotted some concerning statements. Let's review:
First, the FoE page was updated in August, but does not incorporate or reference any of the important lab testing verification work conducted by the IAEA and its third-party laboratories on the contents of the water.
Here's what it has to say about the IAEA report:
The FoE statement on the nature the IAEA's review is inaccurate. The IAEA's role is to assess, oversee, and review the accuracy of TEPCO's measurements and other work.
To do this, samples were gathered, on-site, under observation, and sent to different labs for testing.
The results from the IAEA lab testing answer one thing very specifically: If we gather water the same way TEPCO did, and test for the same things TEPCO did, do we get the same results?
We need to know if those lab results show good statistical alignment with TEPCO's results.
Thus, the role of the IAEA is not to endorse, but to VERIFY & VALIDATE (V&V).
They are checking TEPCO's results by verifying that the filtration results claimed by TEPCO, for the same tank, under the same conditions, are reproduced via testing in other labs.
Next, the FoE page mentions that the testing data being verified only covers 3% of the tank groups.
This is accurate. But, it targets the K4-B tank group, because that's the tank group that will be discharged first (is being discharged now). This is the key point.
The IAEA testing plan covers each tank group in turn, according to the schedule that they will be released.
This is a 30 year discharge, and the IAEA testing will be verifying TEPCO's test results the entire time, for each tank group.
Finally, the FoE claims that the IAEA is not a neutral third party, as its role is to promote nuclear power.
This is where the flimsiness of their position really becomes apparent, that they must adopt this approach.
Let's take a look at the IAEA mandate and mission statement:
The IAEA is a UN support, oversight, & watchdog organization, not a lobbyist/advocacy group.
Friends of the Earth is an anti-nuclear lobbyist/advocacy group.
I don't think much of ad hominem reasoning, but if anyone is vulnerable to it here, it's certainly not IAEA, but FoE.
In summary, we have three big problems with the FoE's statement on the IAEA lab report.
Why are they so determined to discredit and disregard the IAEA's lab testing verification results?
Most likely because these testing results invalidate many of their other arguments.
For instance, in this section, they a cite 2018 news report that a 2014 test result for I-129 was still above regulatory limits.
But now that we have the verified IAEA test results from 2022, so why would we look at 2014 test results from TEPCO?
The IAEA labs all tested for I-129 in 2022, and all returned satisfactory results (except Los Alamos, which used a testing method with rougher results, and thus was excluded from the statistical analysis).
Korea's results (KINS) were low enough to be potentially discrepant.
It's not hard to see why FoE wouldn't want to engage with the IAEA lab results, and seek to discredit or mischaracterize them - they completely invalidate this entire "we don't really know what's in the water" line of reasoning.
We DO in fact know what's in the water.
Lets take another FoE argument, that TEPCO is only testing the water in 3% of the tanks.
This is a dishonest argument, that they have repeated in several places.
The testing so far has focused on one tank group, the K4-B, because this is the first tank group to be released (right now).
Per TEPCO, K4 tanks underwent ALPS treatment back in 2016.
Recall they were also the subject of the IAEA sampling for verification.
In the future, each subsequent tank group will have its own round of testing and verification before release, with the IAEA monitoring onsite.
So the "3%" figure is irrelevant.
I will repeat the same screenshot from above, because the statement applies again:
I can't speculate to the motivation for FoE to post misleading commentary and refusing to engage currently-existing reports that address these concerns.
I will only summarize: It's confused/misinformed at best, intentionally dishonest at worst.
Next, this FoE point about tritium concentration is also misinformed.
Their complaint is that the tritium being diluted to "1/40th" of the regulated standard is misleading, because the water contains things other than tritium.
However, their objection is what's misleading.
The verified lab testing results show clearly that the ALPS filtration process is effective in reducing the levels of other radionuclides, but NOT the tritium.
The testing results show tritium concentration of around 150,000 Bq/L (see reference value in the final column).
As the regulatory limit is 60,000 Bq/L, to get to 1/40th of the regulatory limit (which is 1,500 Bq/L) we need to reduce the dilution by ~100 times.
This means mixing the ALPS-treated water with a LOT of fresh seawater, before the final discharge, to dilute the tritium.
Meanwhile, what was the total radioactivity contribution of the other radioisotopes? Well, let's add up...
So after water has been diluted ~100x, to get tritium concentration to 1/40th of the regulatory limit, what's the total activity level in one liter of the water?
Tritium: 1500 Bq/L
All the other stuff: 0.2 Bq/L
FoE's concern is exaggerated and misleading.
Per IAEA: During discharge, the water is tested for other radionuclides after leaving the K4-B tanks (keep in mind, this is a verification of IAEA's verification of TEPCO's previous test results).
And then in the dilution facility, it is mixed with ~100x volume of seawater.
That's why the very last test on the discharge is the tritium monitor.
Every single other thing has been tested and verified multiple times by now.
The final FINAL check is whether the 100x dilution of fresh seawater has succeeded in getting tritium down to 1,500 Bq/L.
So, that's my summary of the main issues I found on the Friends of the Earth website.
They offer misleading, dishonest, and outdated commentary, while ignoring relevant, recent, detailed materials that directly address their concerns. It's not a quality source.
are you fucking kidding me I spent hours on this so I could write
"I gave it an read"
IN THE VERY FIRST TWEET asdfasdfkajsdf;lkasdfj
@Buki_YGV For example, I laughed out loud when I read this in an IAEA report.
How did they not anticipate that doing this without a broad explanation would make people even more concerned/confused?
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I've just wrapped a 10 days on the North Yunnan loop route, hitting Dali, Lijiang, Diqing/Shangri-la, and Nujiang. Some of the most beautiful places I've seen in China.
Lots of essay content from the trip coming soon, but here's a summary of the route first, 1 tweet per city.🧵
...oh, and I'm writing this partly as a travel report/guide for others who might like to do a similar tour in the future, and partly as a foundation for the essay content that's coming next.
So I'll try to provide both travel details and some background info for each spot...
Dali: Dali was the only city on this trip that I'd visited before. It was the last stop on my loop tour but it could have been the first too, as it has many flights from everywhere and high-speed rail from Kunming.
Dali City has just 660k people (versus the greater Dali Prefecture with 3.2m). Like most Chinese cities of its size, it has both a busy, loud, crowded old city section, but also a clean, tidy, comfortable modern city section. The modern city has skyscrapers, shopping malls, a university, some manufacturing industry, AND a flourishing tourism sector based around Erhai Lake with its great views of Cangshan and Jizushan (mountains). It also boasts several train stations, an airport, and good highway connectivity.
Dali is a T4 city in Yicai's city rankings, coming in at #179, which is actually very close to the median (169). If it werent for the lake and the tourism, it would be just another moderately-developed medium-sized city. But it has that lake...
I feel like I'm supposed to be a snob and say I don't like Dali because it's too touristy, but I actually think it's still a good vibe, especially in the evenings when the tourists go back to their hotels and stop clogging up the roads with their rented convertibles. It IS very commercialized, and I don't recommend staying near the ancient city or even on that side of Erhai Lake (the west side), but I'd still love to own a vacation home here someday, halfway up one of the mountains with a view of the lake and the rolling hills.
I've already seen many helpful summaries of Xi's announcements at the UN Climate Summit regarding China's new emissions goals, so I won't repeat them here. Go read them!
I will focus my analysis on the power item specifically; namely: 3600 GW of wind and solar by 2035. 🧵
This was described as a 6x escalation over the 2020 numbers. This is basically correct.
China had roughly 535 GW of wind and solar at the end of 2020 so 6x would be 3210. So actually, 3600 GW is 6.7x the 2020 numbers.
China today has roughly 1600 GW of wind and solar.
To get from 1600 to 3600 over 10 years implies average capacity growth of 200 GW per year.
At first blush, this indeed seems very conservative. After all, China added 360 GW of wind and solar in 2024 and should be somewhere in that neighborhood (maybe slightly less) this year.
A fun thing about Chinese rivers I learned from my research last week:
This map shows the ancient courses of the Yellow River (in blue) and the now-disappeared Ji River (in red). The upper blue line the Yellow route during the Western Han. The lower is its modern path. 🧵
Actually, the Western Han route of the Yellow is one of the MANY known routes it has taken over the last 2000 years, as you can see from this image.
From 1128-1855, the Yellow spent 700+ years flowing in an entirely different direction - southeast. During that period, it merged with the Huai River near modern-day Huai'an in Jiangsu, and then traveled northeast again to dump into the ocean. The silt deposits around its estuary pushed the coastline out dozens of kilometers over those 700 years.
That lake system you can see at the bottom of the map above didn't exist at the time. That's Hongze Lake 洪泽湖 (literally: "flood marsh lake") which formed because after the Yellow River's course changed in 1855, the Huai River, lacking the volume of water the Yellow had previously provided, silted up itself, lost its exit to the ocean, formed Hongze Lake, and ended up finding a new outlet connecting south to the Yangtze near Yangzhou, turning the Huai River into a Yangtze tributary, rather then a Yellow tributary.
The Huai only regained its outlet to the ocean in the 1950s when the PRC built the North Jiangsu Main Irrigation Canal.
Involution 内卷 or 卷 doesn't have to be a hard word, but I keep seeing it misused in China commentary, e.g. this article, which I also have mixed feedback on.
Simply: Involution is the state of intense competition AND the symptoms of that competition.🧵 csis.org/blogs/trustee-…
Quick history lesson:
内卷 (nei juan) is the original word for involution used today to describe a state of intense and fruitless competition. It literally translates as "inward coiling" and was borrowed from the anthropology field.
It began to see its new use in China around 2019-2020, initially as a noun. Students and young people feeling exhausted by intense competition in school, for jobs, and society in general described those environments as having 内卷.
The key point is the competition. So in 2020 you'd see usages like "job market involution" (职场内卷)" society involution" (社会内卷).
But the full word is less common these days vs. the slangier word for involution, which sees the "内” portion dropped in favor of just "卷".
This is the layout for China's national computing strategy. Under the "East Data, West-Computer" 东数西算 slogan, high-priority tasks are handled by local clusters, while lower-priority tasks are outsourced to the energy-rich west.🧵
According to China's renewable consumption quota policy, all new data centers in these hub regions must buy at least 80% of their power from renewable sources.
This should be no problem for the blue hubs, located in renewables-rich regions. Might be trickier for red hubs.
Local municipalities might have their own, even more stringent requirements. Ningxia, for instance, requires new data centers be 100% green.
Good news for wind and solar developers, looking for a new offtake channel now that the FiTs are gone. No relief for coal power.
This op-ed on Chinese cleantech overcapacity and competition was in The Wire China a few days ago. Unfortunately it contains many huge errors about Chinese cleantech sectors I can't ignore.
[Oh, and this will be another long thread. It probably should have been a long-form essay instead, but I already wrote more than half of it before I realized how long it had gotten. Sorry in advance.]
This piece has problems immediately in the second paragraph, starting with:
"China's domestic demand for green tech has also peaked given the massive frontloading of installed capacity during the last few years, fueled by subsidies."
This has two big errors:
1. Chinese demand for green tech has not peaked, as evidenced by the steadily rising annual installed capacity figures for wind and solar. In fact, the installed capacity isn't just rising each year, but even the volume of new installs in a single year has grown every year from 2020-2024. Last year saw 277 GW of solar PV and 80 GW of wind.
Even now in 2025, with the offtake policy reforms starting from 1 June, it looks like solar is going to at least match the capacity growth from last year, while wind is actually going to EXCEED the capacity figures from last year. Domestic demand is strong. As for next year, we'll see what the market reforms bring.
2. Chinese newbuild solar and wind farms have not been subsidised for several years already now (since 2021). Over the past few years (until 1 June 2025) they were built on a feed-in-tariff (FiT) basis, which means they earn a fixed on-grid price from the gridco, independent of what's happening in power markets.
If market prices are high, the FiT may be less than the market rate. If market prices are low, the FiT may be more than the market rate. In a power market context, this is very different from a subsidy (although it could be construed as/look like a subsidy if market prices end up lower than the FiT rate for long periods).
Same second paragraph, continued:
"plummeting external and domestic demand have forced Chinese tech companies to compete aggressively to gain market share by cutting prices"
This is wrong on both the domestic and international counts. We already know from the last post domestic demand for wind and solar installs is still rising.
Meanwhile, in the international space, Chinese solar panel exports totaled 236 GW in 2024, rising 13% YoY. Wind turbine exports were 5.2 GW, rising 42% YoY.
In 2025 to date, completed *panel* exports have fallen 5%, but cell and wafer exports are rising dramatically, up 73% and 26% YTD, respectively. Exports to some countries are down, but they have been more than offset by rising exports to other countries and regions. Unfortunately, I don't have a source on YTD wind turbine exports for 2025 so can't comment there.
The point I'm trying to make here is that while there's oversupply relative to demand, it's not reasonable to attribute much - if any - of this supply-demand mismatch to the demand side. Demand is fine. The primary driver of the supply-demand mismatch is coming from the supply side.