I've gotten a few questions about this page - the Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan fact page about the Fukushima water release. I've also seem a few people sharing links to it.
I gave it an read and spotted some concerning statements. Let's review:
First, the FoE page was updated in August, but does not incorporate or reference any of the important lab testing verification work conducted by the IAEA and its third-party laboratories on the contents of the water.
Here's what it has to say about the IAEA report:
The FoE statement on the nature the IAEA's review is inaccurate. The IAEA's role is to assess, oversee, and review the accuracy of TEPCO's measurements and other work.
To do this, samples were gathered, on-site, under observation, and sent to different labs for testing.
The results from the IAEA lab testing answer one thing very specifically: If we gather water the same way TEPCO did, and test for the same things TEPCO did, do we get the same results?
We need to know if those lab results show good statistical alignment with TEPCO's results.
Thus, the role of the IAEA is not to endorse, but to VERIFY & VALIDATE (V&V).
They are checking TEPCO's results by verifying that the filtration results claimed by TEPCO, for the same tank, under the same conditions, are reproduced via testing in other labs.
Next, the FoE page mentions that the testing data being verified only covers 3% of the tank groups.
This is accurate. But, it targets the K4-B tank group, because that's the tank group that will be discharged first (is being discharged now). This is the key point.
The IAEA testing plan covers each tank group in turn, according to the schedule that they will be released.
This is a 30 year discharge, and the IAEA testing will be verifying TEPCO's test results the entire time, for each tank group.
Finally, the FoE claims that the IAEA is not a neutral third party, as its role is to promote nuclear power.
This is where the flimsiness of their position really becomes apparent, that they must adopt this approach.
Let's take a look at the IAEA mandate and mission statement:
The IAEA is a UN support, oversight, & watchdog organization, not a lobbyist/advocacy group.
Friends of the Earth is an anti-nuclear lobbyist/advocacy group.
I don't think much of ad hominem reasoning, but if anyone is vulnerable to it here, it's certainly not IAEA, but FoE.
In summary, we have three big problems with the FoE's statement on the IAEA lab report.
Why are they so determined to discredit and disregard the IAEA's lab testing verification results?
Most likely because these testing results invalidate many of their other arguments.
For instance, in this section, they a cite 2018 news report that a 2014 test result for I-129 was still above regulatory limits.
But now that we have the verified IAEA test results from 2022, so why would we look at 2014 test results from TEPCO?
The IAEA labs all tested for I-129 in 2022, and all returned satisfactory results (except Los Alamos, which used a testing method with rougher results, and thus was excluded from the statistical analysis).
Korea's results (KINS) were low enough to be potentially discrepant.
It's not hard to see why FoE wouldn't want to engage with the IAEA lab results, and seek to discredit or mischaracterize them - they completely invalidate this entire "we don't really know what's in the water" line of reasoning.
We DO in fact know what's in the water.
Lets take another FoE argument, that TEPCO is only testing the water in 3% of the tanks.
This is a dishonest argument, that they have repeated in several places.
The testing so far has focused on one tank group, the K4-B, because this is the first tank group to be released (right now).
Per TEPCO, K4 tanks underwent ALPS treatment back in 2016.
Recall they were also the subject of the IAEA sampling for verification.
In the future, each subsequent tank group will have its own round of testing and verification before release, with the IAEA monitoring onsite.
So the "3%" figure is irrelevant.
I will repeat the same screenshot from above, because the statement applies again:
I can't speculate to the motivation for FoE to post misleading commentary and refusing to engage currently-existing reports that address these concerns.
I will only summarize: It's confused/misinformed at best, intentionally dishonest at worst.
Next, this FoE point about tritium concentration is also misinformed.
Their complaint is that the tritium being diluted to "1/40th" of the regulated standard is misleading, because the water contains things other than tritium.
However, their objection is what's misleading.
The verified lab testing results show clearly that the ALPS filtration process is effective in reducing the levels of other radionuclides, but NOT the tritium.
The testing results show tritium concentration of around 150,000 Bq/L (see reference value in the final column).
As the regulatory limit is 60,000 Bq/L, to get to 1/40th of the regulatory limit (which is 1,500 Bq/L) we need to reduce the dilution by ~100 times.
This means mixing the ALPS-treated water with a LOT of fresh seawater, before the final discharge, to dilute the tritium.
Meanwhile, what was the total radioactivity contribution of the other radioisotopes? Well, let's add up...
So after water has been diluted ~100x, to get tritium concentration to 1/40th of the regulatory limit, what's the total activity level in one liter of the water?
Tritium: 1500 Bq/L
All the other stuff: 0.2 Bq/L
FoE's concern is exaggerated and misleading.
Per IAEA: During discharge, the water is tested for other radionuclides after leaving the K4-B tanks (keep in mind, this is a verification of IAEA's verification of TEPCO's previous test results).
And then in the dilution facility, it is mixed with ~100x volume of seawater.
That's why the very last test on the discharge is the tritium monitor.
Every single other thing has been tested and verified multiple times by now.
The final FINAL check is whether the 100x dilution of fresh seawater has succeeded in getting tritium down to 1,500 Bq/L.
So, that's my summary of the main issues I found on the Friends of the Earth website.
They offer misleading, dishonest, and outdated commentary, while ignoring relevant, recent, detailed materials that directly address their concerns. It's not a quality source.
are you fucking kidding me I spent hours on this so I could write
"I gave it an read"
IN THE VERY FIRST TWEET asdfasdfkajsdf;lkasdfj
@Buki_YGV For example, I laughed out loud when I read this in an IAEA report.
How did they not anticipate that doing this without a broad explanation would make people even more concerned/confused?
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It’s 6am and I’m in a Lyft en route to Dulles airport in Washington DC. I’m bleary-eyed and drowsy, but my driver seems chipper. He hops out of the vehicle to help me load luggage, a spring in his step.
Clearly a morning person. That makes one of us.🧵
My driver is about my age. He looks Chinese, and the app says his name is Tong, but he doesn’t sound Chinese. He speaks with the soft tones and elongated vowels of someone from SEA…perhaps Thailand.
“Hello sir, good morning, sir. Dulles Airport…which terminal please?”
“Uhm…not sure. United Airlines”
“Okay, I know it sir”
“Okay great. You have a lot of energy this morning…I guess you just started your shift?”
“Yes…just started this morning.”
On the morning of November 28, China's newest nuclear power plant, a Hualong One reactor at Zhangzhou in Fujian, connected to the grid just just 61 months after construction.
How does China build these so fast? Let's review the timeline. 🧵
The first thing to know about Zhangzhou NPP is it's NOT a new reactor. Actually this thing has been planned for AGES.
The first mention I can find of it goes back to 2007, when Guodian (one of the plant owners) set up a Project Office in Zhangzhou.
We learn from this very early notice that the site plans to use AP1000 reactors imported from Westinghouse. Keep in mind, the Westinghouse AP1000 export deal had basically JUST been signed at this point. The first unit at Sanmen wasn't even under construction yet. This was a wild time...there were dozens of AP1000s sites all across China being planned all at once.
In March 2009, the Guodian Zhangzhou Project Office publishes its first public consultation notice. It has contracted the Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) to do an environmental impact assessment report for the site selection phase.
We learn that they plan to pour concrete in August 2011 on the first of six reactors, across two phases, with grid connection targeted for August 2016. hbj.zhangzhou.gov.cn/cms/siteresour…
Hugely important development here. China's Southern Grid region (Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hainan) is the pilot region for China's unified cross-provincial grid reform.
The deadline to get this cross-provincial spot market to full commercial operations is 2025.
When the Southern Grid is unified, all of those five provinces will in be the same system, with pricing reflecting real-time supply and demand conditions system-wide.
In theory, an abundance of power in one province could be immediately reflected in lower pices in another.
...of course, that assumes available transmission capacity between the node where the power is generated and the node where the power is consumed. Figuring out transmission is one of the great dilemmas of this whole process.
I've spoken to researchers working for Southern Grid on the regional unification project who told me one of the big barriers was figuring out how to incorporate certain transmission assets that were financed and constructed in the past under the assumption that they would be operated all the time. But now, allowing them to run all the time is a non-market action that can cause the market to "break" by making transmission unavailable when it's supposed to be, and also making power prices in exporting regions HIGHER than in importing regions.
Balancing what is good for the grid and the needs of power customers vs. what is good for the grid company itself is a fundamental and neverending effort.
"No one mentions this" because it's not relevant. Chinese landholders hold a good deal of power to hold up infrastucture projects and have, MANY times before.
Indeed, national SOEs like China Railway are perhaps the MOST vulnerable to having their plans "derailed" this way.
This is because national SOEs building e.g., highways or railways are the most obligated to do things by the book. The "book" here means the seminal 2007 Property Law, which specified and codified individual property rights in one place for the first time. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_…
That means citizens must be offered compensation and must agree to the terms offered (i.e. have the right to refuse).
In later years, more tweaks have been made to land rights laws. In 2011, the requirement for "compensation" was changed to "just compensation", and in 2019, the Amendment to the Land Administration Law in 2019 further specified that compensation must be "just and reasonable".
These definitional changes have opened up a great deal of room for legal interpretation for what is "just" and/or "reasonable. When negotiations fail, we get those famous cases of so-called "nail houses". My sense is these enhanced legal protections have contributed to nail houses becoming MORE common in recent years.
Chinese power consumption for October 2024 hit 774 TWh, up 4.3% against a high base from October 2023.
Healthy consumption growth in services and residential was balanced out by anemic growth in the industrial sector. 🧵
Secondary industry was up an underwhelming 2.7% YoY. This is the lowest YoY growth I've seen since I started tracking this dataset last year.
This is now the fifth month in a row where industrial power demand growth has been been bad, and also the weakest so far.
It's not immediately apparent what's driving weak industrial power demand, since October saw broad improvement on macroeconomic indicators like PMI, retail sales, and consumer sentiment.
Oct 2023 was indeed a high base, but not so high as to explain just 2.7% growth this year.
Solar project operators especially want nothing to do with shot-term power markets, and hope to delay the day when they are exposed to them for as long as possible.
Under their current power sales scheme, they enjoy guaranteed dispatch at a fixed rate (grid company buys).
They earn the local coal-fired benchmark power rate for that province, which is much less generous than before, but still an offtake volume and price guarantee.
By contrast, selling into the market at real-time power rates strips away guarantees for volume and capture price.