I've gotten a few questions about this page - the Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan fact page about the Fukushima water release. I've also seem a few people sharing links to it.
I gave it an read and spotted some concerning statements. Let's review:
First, the FoE page was updated in August, but does not incorporate or reference any of the important lab testing verification work conducted by the IAEA and its third-party laboratories on the contents of the water.
Here's what it has to say about the IAEA report:
The FoE statement on the nature the IAEA's review is inaccurate. The IAEA's role is to assess, oversee, and review the accuracy of TEPCO's measurements and other work.
To do this, samples were gathered, on-site, under observation, and sent to different labs for testing.
The results from the IAEA lab testing answer one thing very specifically: If we gather water the same way TEPCO did, and test for the same things TEPCO did, do we get the same results?
We need to know if those lab results show good statistical alignment with TEPCO's results.
Thus, the role of the IAEA is not to endorse, but to VERIFY & VALIDATE (V&V).
They are checking TEPCO's results by verifying that the filtration results claimed by TEPCO, for the same tank, under the same conditions, are reproduced via testing in other labs.
Next, the FoE page mentions that the testing data being verified only covers 3% of the tank groups.
This is accurate. But, it targets the K4-B tank group, because that's the tank group that will be discharged first (is being discharged now). This is the key point.
The IAEA testing plan covers each tank group in turn, according to the schedule that they will be released.
This is a 30 year discharge, and the IAEA testing will be verifying TEPCO's test results the entire time, for each tank group.
Finally, the FoE claims that the IAEA is not a neutral third party, as its role is to promote nuclear power.
This is where the flimsiness of their position really becomes apparent, that they must adopt this approach.
Let's take a look at the IAEA mandate and mission statement:
The IAEA is a UN support, oversight, & watchdog organization, not a lobbyist/advocacy group.
Friends of the Earth is an anti-nuclear lobbyist/advocacy group.
I don't think much of ad hominem reasoning, but if anyone is vulnerable to it here, it's certainly not IAEA, but FoE.
In summary, we have three big problems with the FoE's statement on the IAEA lab report.
Why are they so determined to discredit and disregard the IAEA's lab testing verification results?
Most likely because these testing results invalidate many of their other arguments.
For instance, in this section, they a cite 2018 news report that a 2014 test result for I-129 was still above regulatory limits.
But now that we have the verified IAEA test results from 2022, so why would we look at 2014 test results from TEPCO?
The IAEA labs all tested for I-129 in 2022, and all returned satisfactory results (except Los Alamos, which used a testing method with rougher results, and thus was excluded from the statistical analysis).
Korea's results (KINS) were low enough to be potentially discrepant.
It's not hard to see why FoE wouldn't want to engage with the IAEA lab results, and seek to discredit or mischaracterize them - they completely invalidate this entire "we don't really know what's in the water" line of reasoning.
We DO in fact know what's in the water.
Lets take another FoE argument, that TEPCO is only testing the water in 3% of the tanks.
This is a dishonest argument, that they have repeated in several places.
The testing so far has focused on one tank group, the K4-B, because this is the first tank group to be released (right now).
Per TEPCO, K4 tanks underwent ALPS treatment back in 2016.
Recall they were also the subject of the IAEA sampling for verification.
In the future, each subsequent tank group will have its own round of testing and verification before release, with the IAEA monitoring onsite.
So the "3%" figure is irrelevant.
I will repeat the same screenshot from above, because the statement applies again:
I can't speculate to the motivation for FoE to post misleading commentary and refusing to engage currently-existing reports that address these concerns.
I will only summarize: It's confused/misinformed at best, intentionally dishonest at worst.
Next, this FoE point about tritium concentration is also misinformed.
Their complaint is that the tritium being diluted to "1/40th" of the regulated standard is misleading, because the water contains things other than tritium.
However, their objection is what's misleading.
The verified lab testing results show clearly that the ALPS filtration process is effective in reducing the levels of other radionuclides, but NOT the tritium.
The testing results show tritium concentration of around 150,000 Bq/L (see reference value in the final column).
As the regulatory limit is 60,000 Bq/L, to get to 1/40th of the regulatory limit (which is 1,500 Bq/L) we need to reduce the dilution by ~100 times.
This means mixing the ALPS-treated water with a LOT of fresh seawater, before the final discharge, to dilute the tritium.
Meanwhile, what was the total radioactivity contribution of the other radioisotopes? Well, let's add up...
So after water has been diluted ~100x, to get tritium concentration to 1/40th of the regulatory limit, what's the total activity level in one liter of the water?
Tritium: 1500 Bq/L
All the other stuff: 0.2 Bq/L
FoE's concern is exaggerated and misleading.
Per IAEA: During discharge, the water is tested for other radionuclides after leaving the K4-B tanks (keep in mind, this is a verification of IAEA's verification of TEPCO's previous test results).
And then in the dilution facility, it is mixed with ~100x volume of seawater.
That's why the very last test on the discharge is the tritium monitor.
Every single other thing has been tested and verified multiple times by now.
The final FINAL check is whether the 100x dilution of fresh seawater has succeeded in getting tritium down to 1,500 Bq/L.
So, that's my summary of the main issues I found on the Friends of the Earth website.
They offer misleading, dishonest, and outdated commentary, while ignoring relevant, recent, detailed materials that directly address their concerns. It's not a quality source.
are you fucking kidding me I spent hours on this so I could write
"I gave it an read"
IN THE VERY FIRST TWEET asdfasdfkajsdf;lkasdfj
@Buki_YGV For example, I laughed out loud when I read this in an IAEA report.
How did they not anticipate that doing this without a broad explanation would make people even more concerned/confused?
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This post got me thinking about the interesting way small Chinese cities self-identify vs. the city that governs them.
The Yangtze River Delta is full of small cities with strong cultural and economic identities that have weak or zero feeling of kinship with their parent... 🧵
I've mentioned before in other essays how discussions of Chinese cities are usually focused on prefecture-level cities (地级市).
There are 337 prefecture-level cities in China, but IMO it's more appropriate to mentally organize them as "prefectures" in English (that is, an administrative tier smaller than a province and larger than a city).
For ease of governance purposes, many cities and counties in China are grouped together into "prefectures" in ways that aren't linguistically, historically, or culturally coherent; often they are simply geographically adjacent.
In this example, Robert was visiting Fenghua, which until 2016 was a county-level city governed by Ningbo (it is now a full district of Ningbo).
If we look at the administrative map below, we can see the denser urban area of what most people would recognize as "downtown Ningbo" (Jiangbei and Zhenhai) along with a large halo of suburban and exurban regions also governed by Ningbo. This is why I prefer a word like "prefecture" to translate 地级市. These areas not continuous urban agglomerations.
This thread is a deliberately nerdy look at Chinese administrative geography, but I think the outcome is helpful for understanding why people from small cities like Yuyao might not answer a simple question the way outsiders expect, and how we can think about these cities from a development perspective when we visit.
The small city of Yuyao (population ~1.3 million) in the northern part of Ningbo prefecture, is a particularly vivid example of strong place-identity. Just south across Hangzhou Bay from Shanghai, Yuyao's downtown is physically separated from Ningbo proper by about 70 kilometers. So...it is "part of" Ningbo?
*deep breath*
The modern-day prefecture-level city immediately west of Ningbo is Shaoxing (best known today for Shaoxing cooking wine). In pre-modern times, Yuyao (余姚) was governed as a county under Shaoxing - whether as Shaoxing Prefecture or the Shaoxing Circuit, depending on the era - during the Song, Ming and Qing Dynasties. During the Republican era (1911-1949) it belonged to various Zhejiang provincial offices, but *never* to one headquartered in Ningbo.
After the Communist victory in 1949, Yuyao became part of Zhejiang’s Second Special District, which had its administrative seat in Ningbo. It held that status from 1949 to 1964, before once again being reassigned to Shaoxing, this time under the Shaoxing Special District. When modern administrative reform began in 1983, Yuyao was transferred to the newly established prefecture‑level city of Ningbo, arguably the first time in its history that it was formally "part of" Ningbo (or perhaps the second, if one counts 1949–1964).
Following the sustained economic growth in the area (Yuyao is one of the ten richest county-level cities in China) the county was upgraded in 1985 to county-level status, This concluded Yuyao's long historical evolution to its current position: a county-level city administered by Ningbo.
Compared to Ningbo, Yuyao maintains a distinct history, economy, culture, and even dialectal markers. Yuyao and Ningbo speak mutually intelligible varieties of Taihu Wu, but Yuyao's speech is considered by locals as being closer to Shaoxing than Ningbo.
All of that makes the answer to the next question more obvious: If you ask someone from Yuyao "are you from Ningbo?" what answer do you think you're going to get...?
I rented a place for 5 days in this lovely seaside apartment complex in Bo'ao, Qionghai City, Hainan.
The same housing complex also had 12 lovely, unsold luxury villas, facing the ocean.
They were obviously abandoned and unlocked, so I gave myself a tour...😁
A fun thread. 🧵
As you can see, these units were designed to be quite fancy, with 4-5 bedrooms, pools, balconies facing every direction, a vaulted ceiling in the living room, even an elevator...
This complex was completed in 2013. The apartments all sold alright. But not a single villa...
After my self-guided tour, I walked back into the inhabited part of the complex and bumped into an middle-aged man from Beijing (maybe 65ish), energetically doing his morning stretches while listening to a program on a portable radio at roughly 1000 decibels. I decided to ask if he knew what's up.
"HELLO SIR GOOD MORNING!"
"GOOD MORNING!"
"CAN I ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS?"
He blessedly turned down the radio to a more humane level. "Sure. What about?"
"You live here, right? Do you know what's the deal with these villas? Are they all empty?"
"Yes, they're all empty. No one lives there. I've stayed here the last few weeks. We are traveling up the coast from Sanya, trying out the different areas to see where we would like to buy a property"
Image: Beijing uncle in his natural element (calisthenics and deafening radio)
Just back from 10 days in Hainan. A few practical observations on transportation to/around the island - this seems as good a place as any to start a place review. Hope it's helpful to anyone planning a trip.
There are currently three commercial airports in Hainan: Sanya, Haikou, and Qionghai.
The first two have daily connections to pretty much any large city in China, plus a handful of international flights. Qionghai (琼海) is much smaller, with only a few flights each day, built primarily to serve visitors to the Bo'ao Forum ("Asia's Davos") which just wrapped up last week.
There is also a new commercial airport under construction in Danzhou (儋州), an industrial hub on the northwest coast, scheduled for completion by ~2030.
Bonus: If you fly to Hainan, there's a good chance you'll get to try Hainan Airlines, widely considered China's best airline.
I flew in and out of Sanya Phoenix Airport, which is a rare example of an airport in China that feels undersized for its passenger load (most airports feel...very overbuilt).
There’s a brand-new Terminal 3 (opened Feb 2026) meant to ease perssure on Terminal 2 (2018) and Terminal 1 (built 1994, expanded 2011). But when I passed through, Terminal 1 still felt overloaded and disorganized - and this wasn't even peak season. March is a shoulder season before the summer lull (rain and typhoons).
But even the creaky old Sanya Terminal 1 still had better dining options than Shanghai’s Pudong, which remains an utter disgrace of a flagship international airport no matter how shiny it looks, and I will never stop hating on it until it does better.
Image: Sanya Airport Terminal 1
While trying to understand why the Sanya airport feels so congested, I went down a rabbit hold and found some fascinating backstory:
The core issue is actually simple: Sanya is a single-runway airport. No matter how many terminals it has, it will always be bottlenecked by this. At 22 million annual passengers, is already the third-busiest single-runway airport in China, behind only Xiamen and Urumqi (both much larger cities than Sanya btw).
The long-term plan has always been for Sanya to build a new airport with multiple runways and and greatly expanded capacity. The new Terminal 3 is mostly about buying time to do this. This wasn't supposed to still be a problem in 2026. There was a scandal...
See, last decade, there WAS a plan to build a massive new airport on an offshore man-made island in Hongtang Bay, with 3-4 runways and long-term capacity of 50-60m passengers. It required enormous land reclamation. Eager to move fast, reclamation began in 2016, before the final environmental approvals were granted. This classic 先建后批 model used to be very standard. Until one day it wasn't.
In 2017, during the first round of Central Environmental Inspections, the project was publicly identified as an illegal, unapproved reclamation project, with construction ordered to stop. Further inspection found the project interfered with habitats of protected ecosystems and species, including coral reefs and the migration path for endangered Chinese white dolphins (which environmental NGO groups had been complaining about for several years already as well). The Hongtang Bay airport project eventually ended up being canceled entirely.
Hongtang Bay became a symbol of a broader shift in attitude towards and environmental governance on large-scale land reclamation projects. Many similar projects in Hainan (though none this large) were affected by the 2016-2018 nationwide environmental crackdowns from. We would see a few more of them later on the trip.
It's worth noting that although Hongtang Bay airport was formally owned by Sanya government-backed companies, it was widely considered to be strategically controlled by HNA Group (owner of Hainan Airlines) executing a province-level airport and industrial zone plan.
HNA Group was NOT an SOE at any government level. But as a quasi-national champion, it often behaved like one, with deep local governance alignment and extensive state bank support.
In the end, all formal enforcement actions were directed only at the project SPVs, with mostly implicit reputational damage to HNA. But this is considered one of the major events that contributed to HNA Group's fall from grace, and eventual collapse and bankruptcy restructuring in 2020-21.
Image 1: Artist's rendering of Hongtang Bay Airport
Image 2: Satellite view of Hongtang Bay Airport site construction 2015-2019
Image 3: Drone footage of reclaimed land efforts
For my own education, I've been trying to make sense of China's industry exposure to the Iran conflict and Hormuz closure. I wanted to share what I have now:
My Level-1 taxonomy includes 5 buckets of products that are one conversion step away from crude oil or natural gas:🧵
I defined "finished refinery products" as mostly a pricing channel here. This includes the fuels: gasoline, diesel/gasoil, jet fuel/kerosene, fuel oil/bunker, and petroleum coke as well as non-fuels: bitumen/asphalt and base oils/lubes/solvents.
China refines most of its gasoline/diesel/jet fuel domestically, and has substantial policy levers (large strategic crude reserves and commercial inventories, export quotas) to stabilize local availability. The short-/midterm effect is more likely to be moderately higher costs, rather than shortages, as long as the reserves hold out (and they should be good for quite a few months). Anode-grade petcoke for aluminum smelting is a potential niche outlier here, as there is more import exposure, but that's really it.
Meanwhile, markets for non‑fuel refinery outputs like bitumen are slower‑moving and simpler to buffer via demand rescheduling and/or substitution, with moderate risk mainly via general price levels.
This is where it seems the petroleum side of things gets trickier. The main products here are naphtha, condensate, and reformate. If crude gets expensive and/or scarce, these feedstocks get expensive and/or scarce. The most critical one right now is naphtha.
Natural gas cracking involves heating an appropriate feedstock (usually naphtha, LPG, or ethane) until it thermally breaks down into the desired olefins (propylene, ethylene) which are themselves feedstocks for a huge range of things, most notably plastics. Asia's cracker system is heavily reliant on naphtha as a feedstock and the current disruption to naphtha supply out of the Persian Gulf has already prompted declarations of force majeure at crackers across the region. Like all of Asia, China is currently facing considerable physical supply risk AND price risk for naphtha.
China is not as fragile of a market as ASEAN, but it’s not immune either. Roughly half of China’s naphtha consumption is imported (15-17 million mt last year), and about 40% of those imports are Middle East–sourced. That implies ~20% of total naphtha supply is structurally exposed to a prolonged Hormuz disruption, forcing either expensive replacements or reduced cracker runs (demand destruction).
China’s coal economics are shifting from "generate electricity → get paid" to a messy stack of flexibility revenues, grid services, and capacity payments.
The age of simple coal baseload cash cows is already over. But that doesn't mean it's easy to kick out coal. 🧵
In a increasingly variable renewables-heavy system, only the coal plants that can ramp, cycle, and stay available on demand will survive. And the plants China's building these days are *tricked out*.
I'm talking lower minimum stable load (20-30%), faster ramping capability (in MW/minute), reduced hot/warm/cold start times, reduced start-up fuel burn, world-class fuel efficiency (<250g of coal/kWh), better thermal cycle stress management, modern DCS for better turbine/governor control and AGC tracking for ancillary revenues, ultra-supercritical heat rates...the works.
Older subcritical coal plants weren’t built for this new world. Those that can retrofit affordably will. But many can’t retrofit cheaply. They’ll be pushed out as the system prioritizes flexible, fast-response assets.
Ironically, building a new coal plant in 2026 gives you a competitive edge.
You'll enjoy higher efficiency, lower minimum load, better ramping, better grid-service revenue...printing a license to outlive the older fleet.
Unless there's an outright ban, building will continue.
2. For this reason, globally, about half of all primary aluminum is produced using captive onsite power plants, and roughly two‑thirds of that captive capacity is subcritical coal.
This is the core reason aluminum has such a stubborn emissions profile.