I've gotten a few questions about this page - the Friends of the Earth (FoE) Japan fact page about the Fukushima water release. I've also seem a few people sharing links to it.
I gave it an read and spotted some concerning statements. Let's review:
First, the FoE page was updated in August, but does not incorporate or reference any of the important lab testing verification work conducted by the IAEA and its third-party laboratories on the contents of the water.
Here's what it has to say about the IAEA report:
The FoE statement on the nature the IAEA's review is inaccurate. The IAEA's role is to assess, oversee, and review the accuracy of TEPCO's measurements and other work.
To do this, samples were gathered, on-site, under observation, and sent to different labs for testing.
The results from the IAEA lab testing answer one thing very specifically: If we gather water the same way TEPCO did, and test for the same things TEPCO did, do we get the same results?
We need to know if those lab results show good statistical alignment with TEPCO's results.
Thus, the role of the IAEA is not to endorse, but to VERIFY & VALIDATE (V&V).
They are checking TEPCO's results by verifying that the filtration results claimed by TEPCO, for the same tank, under the same conditions, are reproduced via testing in other labs.
Next, the FoE page mentions that the testing data being verified only covers 3% of the tank groups.
This is accurate. But, it targets the K4-B tank group, because that's the tank group that will be discharged first (is being discharged now). This is the key point.
The IAEA testing plan covers each tank group in turn, according to the schedule that they will be released.
This is a 30 year discharge, and the IAEA testing will be verifying TEPCO's test results the entire time, for each tank group.
Finally, the FoE claims that the IAEA is not a neutral third party, as its role is to promote nuclear power.
This is where the flimsiness of their position really becomes apparent, that they must adopt this approach.
Let's take a look at the IAEA mandate and mission statement:
The IAEA is a UN support, oversight, & watchdog organization, not a lobbyist/advocacy group.
Friends of the Earth is an anti-nuclear lobbyist/advocacy group.
I don't think much of ad hominem reasoning, but if anyone is vulnerable to it here, it's certainly not IAEA, but FoE.
In summary, we have three big problems with the FoE's statement on the IAEA lab report.
Why are they so determined to discredit and disregard the IAEA's lab testing verification results?
Most likely because these testing results invalidate many of their other arguments.
For instance, in this section, they a cite 2018 news report that a 2014 test result for I-129 was still above regulatory limits.
But now that we have the verified IAEA test results from 2022, so why would we look at 2014 test results from TEPCO?
The IAEA labs all tested for I-129 in 2022, and all returned satisfactory results (except Los Alamos, which used a testing method with rougher results, and thus was excluded from the statistical analysis).
Korea's results (KINS) were low enough to be potentially discrepant.
It's not hard to see why FoE wouldn't want to engage with the IAEA lab results, and seek to discredit or mischaracterize them - they completely invalidate this entire "we don't really know what's in the water" line of reasoning.
We DO in fact know what's in the water.
Lets take another FoE argument, that TEPCO is only testing the water in 3% of the tanks.
This is a dishonest argument, that they have repeated in several places.
The testing so far has focused on one tank group, the K4-B, because this is the first tank group to be released (right now).
Per TEPCO, K4 tanks underwent ALPS treatment back in 2016.
Recall they were also the subject of the IAEA sampling for verification.
In the future, each subsequent tank group will have its own round of testing and verification before release, with the IAEA monitoring onsite.
So the "3%" figure is irrelevant.
I will repeat the same screenshot from above, because the statement applies again:
I can't speculate to the motivation for FoE to post misleading commentary and refusing to engage currently-existing reports that address these concerns.
I will only summarize: It's confused/misinformed at best, intentionally dishonest at worst.
Next, this FoE point about tritium concentration is also misinformed.
Their complaint is that the tritium being diluted to "1/40th" of the regulated standard is misleading, because the water contains things other than tritium.
However, their objection is what's misleading.
The verified lab testing results show clearly that the ALPS filtration process is effective in reducing the levels of other radionuclides, but NOT the tritium.
The testing results show tritium concentration of around 150,000 Bq/L (see reference value in the final column).
As the regulatory limit is 60,000 Bq/L, to get to 1/40th of the regulatory limit (which is 1,500 Bq/L) we need to reduce the dilution by ~100 times.
This means mixing the ALPS-treated water with a LOT of fresh seawater, before the final discharge, to dilute the tritium.
Meanwhile, what was the total radioactivity contribution of the other radioisotopes? Well, let's add up...
So after water has been diluted ~100x, to get tritium concentration to 1/40th of the regulatory limit, what's the total activity level in one liter of the water?
Tritium: 1500 Bq/L
All the other stuff: 0.2 Bq/L
FoE's concern is exaggerated and misleading.
Per IAEA: During discharge, the water is tested for other radionuclides after leaving the K4-B tanks (keep in mind, this is a verification of IAEA's verification of TEPCO's previous test results).
And then in the dilution facility, it is mixed with ~100x volume of seawater.
That's why the very last test on the discharge is the tritium monitor.
Every single other thing has been tested and verified multiple times by now.
The final FINAL check is whether the 100x dilution of fresh seawater has succeeded in getting tritium down to 1,500 Bq/L.
So, that's my summary of the main issues I found on the Friends of the Earth website.
They offer misleading, dishonest, and outdated commentary, while ignoring relevant, recent, detailed materials that directly address their concerns. It's not a quality source.
are you fucking kidding me I spent hours on this so I could write
"I gave it an read"
IN THE VERY FIRST TWEET asdfasdfkajsdf;lkasdfj
@Buki_YGV For example, I laughed out loud when I read this in an IAEA report.
How did they not anticipate that doing this without a broad explanation would make people even more concerned/confused?
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A practical guide about how to choose a good restaurant using Dazhong Dianping (大众点评), which is China's main restaurant directory/review/coupon platform, based on my 10+ years of experience using it almost daily...
But first, some general background information: Thread.🧵
Part 1: Background Facts
Dazhong Dianping started out in 2003 as an app focused on local restaurant reviews, predating Yelp by roughly a year. The founder said he was inspired by Zagat ratings.
From 2003-2009, its business was merchant listings and peer reviews. Then, in 2010, competitor Meituan entered the scene, originally as a straight Groupon clone, then adding a merchant directory. From 2010-2014, Dianping added coupons and flash deals, while Meituan added merchant listings and reviews. They competed directly with each other by offering huge discounts and subsidies to consumers, via basically identical app products.
In 2015, they merged in a 15B USD deal, somehow avoiding antitrust oversight that I'm sure would make that merger very difficult today. But 2015 was the era in which Kuaidi & Didi and Qunar & Ctrip were allowed to merge, despite each merger creating near-monopolies for their respective segments. A different time...
Together they became Meituan-Dianping (later, just "Meituan"), operating two parallel but basically identical apps. Of course, Meituan today has become China's #3 consumer internet platform company, after Tencent and Alibaba, operating Meituan delivery, Xiaoxiang supermarkets, rideshare bikes, portable phone banks rentals, lifestyle booking platform aggregation, etc.
To date, both Dianping and Meituan's respsective app platforms have survived the merger, with a huge suite of offerings besides just listings and reviews. My experience has been that Dianping has more merchant listings and reviews in bigger cities, while Meituan has much more robust coverage of smaller cities and towns. But they are quite similar. You can use it to find restaurants, bars, hospitals, hair salons, massages, KTVs...anything. Today I'll just talk about F&B.
Dianping is one of my daily use apps - in fact it occupies one of the 5 spaces on my hotbar, together with email, wechat, chrome, and the camera.
Part 2: Comments About Restaurant Review Platforms in China
A lot of people believe you can pay your way to a high ranking in these apps, or that bad ratings are the result of refusing to pay extortion money to the app. I think this is often exaggerated. Bad ratings are most often the sign of a mediocre restaurant, while good ratings most often indicate a good restaurant. My impression is that this has gotten more reliable since ~ 2018/19 especially.
Historically, Dianping has been ok with restaurants encouraging customers to leave reviews, asking customers to save and "check-in" at the location, etc. At the same time, they disallow buying reviews (e.g. in exchange for discounts), using review farms, having employees pose as customers, etc. The platforms used to be a weak at enforcing this, but recently they've gotten more sophisticated and stricter.
I don't doubt it's still common, but I think Dianping is getting really good at sniffing it out and penalizing violators. It makes sense...they are highly incentivized to make sure their platform is a reliable indicator for quality. I've even seen individual restaurant listings deactivated with a note that says they were caught gaming reviews.
The accusations of platform extortion are trickier, and also harder to prove or disprove. Some restaurant owners will tell you that they feel they HAVE to buy marketing services from Dianping or Meituan just to maintain a normal algorithmic appearance in the directory listings, and that they will be buried if they don't. But it hasn't been conclusively demonstrated anywhere.
In 2021, Meituan was fined by Chinese regulators for pressuring restaurants into exclusivity agreements for its takeout delivery business (not the directory and review app) so that adds to the suspicion that they would do such a thing here too. But in this age of heightened regulator scrutiny over Chinese IT platforms, I actually doubt it.
I am pleased to introduce the Chinese Invisible Cities Index (CICI) - some Friday fun. 😏
These aren't the smallest or poorest cities. These are the cities with the least aura vs. their population.
They make you say: "wait, I've never heard of it and it has HOW many people?"🧵
My methodology for the CICI was as follows:
Start with a normalized value for their registered hukou population (户籍人口), not current inhabitants (常住人口). That's considering the entire prefecture population, not just the metro downtown, because anyone or any part of a prefecture can contribute to reputation creation.
After that, subtract for anything that gives the prefecture city aura, name-recognition, any kind of notability at all. That includes things like:
- being a provincial capital
- having famous tourist attractions (esp. 5A)
- having a national brand headquarters
- having historical or cultural significance
- famous cuisine/dishes
- any memes associated with the city
- being the site of a major disaster or scandal (negative reputation is still reputation)
- having anything else that people think of when you mention it
The highest scores after subtracting become the leaders on my CICI. This methodology allows me to find not just the small and obscure cities, but specifically *cities that are far less famous than their population suggests they should be.* The data part of this was AI-assisted.
I haven't been to most of the places on this top 15 list - because I'd typically travel to places that have notable economic or touristic activity - which by definition perform worse in the CICI. 🤔
And look, I know almost every city has a bit of *something*, or else there wouldn't be be a city there at all. It's all relative, and subjective, and for fun, so if you want to disagree with the list, just be nice about it.
A clean example of a low-aura city. Has a *bit* of stuff going on (natural gas, Han ruins, a canyon) but nothing at a national presence level. Population not enormous, but very little happening to associate with the name.
China's 15th Five Year Plan on Energy - Summary and Commentary Thread
On 25 June, the NDRC and NEA issued the 15th Five Year Plan (FYP) on Construction of a New Energy System. This is the key energy-related supplement to the main FYP released (in draft) back in March. 🧵
(LinkedIn repost btw)
The 15th Energy FYP lays out China’s energy objectives for 2026-2030, with emphasis on how the energy system will be structured around growth in end-user electrification, flexibility assets, and higher shares of clean energy before the 2030 carbon peak.
A few comments on the installed capacity numbers:
It looks like a big deal to add 1500 GW of capacity, but it's less stunning when you remember that most of it will be solar. In fact, the total wind + solar capacity growth needed to meet the targeted rise in wind + solar generation share is fairly modest, assuming annual power generation growth remains in the ~5% range annually.
It's notable to see hydropower projected to rise another 20-40 GW before 2030. There are no large-scale hydropower facilities under construction right now that will be complete before 2030, so this implies 10+ medium-small hydropower stations, which is remarkable considering the already high saturation level.
The planned expansion in flexibility assets is the most notable item here though. New-type battery storage is set for 4x growth (this will be mostly batteries but also a bit of CAES and thermal/gravity/other oddities) and pumped hydro is set to 3x (there are a stunning number of pumped hydro stations under construction across the country right now). Finally, VPPs are expected to grow from a negligible/pilot level of deployment in 2025 to 50 GW of flexible dispatchability by 2030, which looks like a big opportunity, but a very complicated one, for some bold developers and asset operators.
Finally, West-East transmission capacity set to grow by 80 GW...that means UHV lines - probably roughly 10 more of them, based on their average carrying capacity. I don't have a recent update to my UHV line database, unfortunately.
Had an educational conversation with a farmer last week in the Shanghai suburbs. He approached me while I was relaxing next to one of the canals and asked me if I had ridden my bicycle there (I had). We then started chatting about agriculture in SH.
"Where are you from?"🧵
"I'm from Anhui."
"Of course, Anhui. Maybe of the people working fields in the suburbs in Shanghai are from Anhui. I noticed before all of the strawberry greenhouses have Anhui people."
"It's not just strawberries. Almost all the agricultural work in Shanghai is done by outsiders. There are many of us from Anhui. Also some Henan, but mostly Anhui."
"So do you rent the land?"
"A big boss rents the land from the Shanghai people, then they divide it into smaller plots and rent it out to us."
"Where is the big boss from?"
"Also Anhui."
"Okay, so the big boss comes in, negotiates many land lease agreements with the Shanghai people here who don't want to farm the land anymore, and then makes a business renting that last back out to you. Do you live here all year round?"
"No, we go back between planting seasons."
"Do you still have fields back in your hometown?"
"We do, but most of them are rented out to big companies, to do large-scale farming."
"So you rent our your fields back home to big companies to do large-scale farming, and then you come here to the Shanghai suburbs to do small-scale farming?"
"Yes, that's right"
"Why?"
"Because the large-scale farming requires knowledge of modern machinery that we don't have. You have to learn how to fly drones, understand new technology. People like me, more than 50 years old with low education level, we can't learn those things fast enough, so the large-scale agricultural companies don't hire us. We can only come to Shanghai for this kind of small-scale farming."
"I heard something before...I don't know it it's true. Someone told me people like you people from other provinces farming for Shanghai residents like to maintain their own, secret vegetables?"
"Haha, that's true. We keep our own vegetable fields here, and don't put pesticides on them, for our own consumption."
"That's funny. Shanghai has these farming areas in the suburbs to ensure its vegetable supply, but except the elderly Shanghai locals, there's no one willing to work in the fields, so they have to bring farmers from Anhui. But those farmers prepare their own organic vegetables in Shanghai fields...for themselves."
"haha, it's ironic isn't it?"
This Economist article on China's solar industry has some problems.
I won't waste ink getting all hyperbolic about it. I'll just highlight the places where I think a healthy copy-edit could have helped the piece a lot. 🧵
It is a major oversimplification to say Chinese domestic demand for solar panels is falling "because the country's power grids have become overloaded with the things".
The real challenge right now is developers and banks still figuring out how to finance and build projects without policy-backed revenue guarantees.
Domestic demand was shored up in past years by a generous feed-in-tariff (FiT) scheme that ensured stable and predictable revenues. Following the the longstanding policy trend toward liberalization, last year solar generators were shifted out of FiTs and into a Contract-for-Difference (CfD) scheme. Guaranteed CfD volumes have quotas, with non-CfD volumes expected to find customers via open markets (i.e. merchant exposure). The piece acknowledges the policy change from last year, but doesn't seem to recognize the importance.
New solar capacity growth will likely be flat or even decline YoY in 2026 because generators and financiers are still inexperienced with merchant risk and renewable consumption quotas aren't quite high enough yet to drive more long-term renewable power contracting demand (which financiers rely on).
Yes, low prices in daytime spot power markets reflect temporal oversupply, but that's largely irrelevant for investment decisions, which are built around long-term contracts, not spot markets.
The cause-and-effect relationships in this paragraph are backwards.
If you're explicitly trying to build a low-carbon grid, solar curtailment is better seen as a problem of insufficient flexibility (via storage or conventional generators), not "too much solar."
Conventional coal typically can't ramp up or down quickly...in many cases in takes hours, sometimes the better part of a day for older plants. It is the lack of flexible coal plants that leads to curtailment of assets you ideally don't ever want to curtail like renewables.
When solar performance peaks at noon, you need other assets to be able to rapidly ramp down to make room. Not incidentally, the new Chinese coal plants being built these days are capable of flexible operations, and older plants are being retrofit to do the same.
Finally, there are no "shortages at night" because of solar only working during the day. System operators plan for the sun not shining...
This post got me thinking about the interesting way small Chinese cities self-identify vs. the city that governs them.
The Yangtze River Delta is full of small cities with strong cultural and economic identities that have weak or zero feeling of kinship with their parent... 🧵
I've mentioned before in other essays how discussions of Chinese cities are usually focused on prefecture-level cities (地级市).
There are 337 prefecture-level cities in China, but IMO it's more appropriate to mentally organize them as "prefectures" in English (that is, an administrative tier smaller than a province and larger than a city).
For ease of governance purposes, many cities and counties in China are grouped together into "prefectures" in ways that aren't linguistically, historically, or culturally coherent; often they are simply geographically adjacent.
In this example, Robert was visiting Fenghua, which until 2016 was a county-level city governed by Ningbo (it is now a full district of Ningbo).
If we look at the administrative map below, we can see the denser urban area of what most people would recognize as "downtown Ningbo" (Jiangbei and Zhenhai) along with a large halo of suburban and exurban regions also governed by Ningbo. This is why I prefer a word like "prefecture" to translate 地级市. These areas not continuous urban agglomerations.
This thread is a deliberately nerdy look at Chinese administrative geography, but I think the outcome is helpful for understanding why people from small cities like Yuyao might not answer a simple question the way outsiders expect, and how we can think about these cities from a development perspective when we visit.
The small city of Yuyao (population ~1.3 million) in the northern part of Ningbo prefecture, is a particularly vivid example of strong place-identity. Just south across Hangzhou Bay from Shanghai, Yuyao's downtown is physically separated from Ningbo proper by about 70 kilometers. So...it is "part of" Ningbo?
*deep breath*
The modern-day prefecture-level city immediately west of Ningbo is Shaoxing (best known today for Shaoxing cooking wine). In pre-modern times, Yuyao (余姚) was governed as a county under Shaoxing - whether as Shaoxing Prefecture or the Shaoxing Circuit, depending on the era - during the Song, Ming and Qing Dynasties. During the Republican era (1911-1949) it belonged to various Zhejiang provincial offices, but *never* to one headquartered in Ningbo.
After the Communist victory in 1949, Yuyao became part of Zhejiang’s Second Special District, which had its administrative seat in Ningbo. It held that status from 1949 to 1964, before once again being reassigned to Shaoxing, this time under the Shaoxing Special District. When modern administrative reform began in 1983, Yuyao was transferred to the newly established prefecture‑level city of Ningbo, arguably the first time in its history that it was formally "part of" Ningbo (or perhaps the second, if one counts 1949–1964).
Following the sustained economic growth in the area (Yuyao is one of the ten richest county-level cities in China) the county was upgraded in 1985 to county-level status, This concluded Yuyao's long historical evolution to its current position: a county-level city administered by Ningbo.
Compared to Ningbo, Yuyao maintains a distinct history, economy, culture, and even dialectal markers. Yuyao and Ningbo speak mutually intelligible varieties of Taihu Wu, but Yuyao's speech is considered by locals as being closer to Shaoxing than Ningbo.
All of that makes the answer to the next question more obvious: If you ask someone from Yuyao "are you from Ningbo?" what answer do you think you're going to get...?