NVIDIA $NVDA filed its last quarter's Form 10-Q today. If you have been as surprised by the share price action and the (unaudited) published financials as I have been, this thread is for you.
Let's get into it🧵
First, what's up with the wild revenue beat ($13.51 bn reported vs $11 bn forecast)?
And how did the company achieve this without a corresponding increase in cost?
To answer these questions, we need to understand the company's revenue recognition policy.
The highlighted part, taken from last year's Form 10-K, is key.
$NVDA recognizes revenue from product sales only after the product has been shipped (transfer of control).
However, license and services revenue is recognized as and when the company incurs its cost. The huge jump in revenue is almost entirely data center driven. Because that's classified as a service, the company recognizes revenue regardless of the contract's payment terms.
When revenue is booked but the payment has not been received from the client, the company records this as 'accounts receivable' on the balance sheet. If my hypothesis is correct, there should be a jump in receivables correlating with the revenue increase.
Unsurprisingly, that's exactly what we see. Receivables went up from $4080 mn to $7066 mn. From Q1 to Q2, receivables went up by $2986 mn as revenues increased by $6315 mn. That's 73% growth in receivables for 88% growth in "revenues".
And the growth in receivables would have been even higher if not for a $1.25 bn pre-payment. Adjusting for that prepayment, receivables would have grown 104%.
This clears up two mysteries. Costs didn't rise commensurate with revenue because the revenue isn't hard dollars but an accounting fiction. And cash didn't come in because from the clients' side, the services haven't been rendered yet and the bill isn't due.
There's another red flag here, and that's the concentration of revenue.
“Our estimated Compute & Networking end customer demand is concentrated among several large CSPs and consumer internet companies. Most of these large companies do not purchase directly from us but often
purchase through multiple system integrators, distributors, and channel partners. We expect this concentration trend will continue”.
The company isn't kidding when it mentions this as a risk factor.
“A large cloud service provider, or CSP, which primarily purchases indirectly through multiple system integrators and distributors, is estimated to represent approximately 22% and 19% of total revenue for the second quarter ($2971.54 million) and first half ($3932.81 million) of
fiscal year 2024, respectively, and was attributable to our Compute & Networking segment”.
This customer sure loaded up on NVDA products, working up from $961.27 million in Q1 to $2971.54 million in Q2, an increase of 209% q-o-q.
“One data center distributor customer represented approximately 17% and 13% of total revenue for the second quarter and first half of fiscal year 2024, respectively, and was attributable to the Compute & Networking segment. There were no customers with 10% or more of
total revenue for the second quarter and first half of fiscal year 2023”.
39% of Q2 revenue and 32% of first half revenue came from just two customers, of which one is a distributor.
In effect, the company pulled forward demand from future quarters. Not to mention the
concentration risk as well.
Then there's the very creative "sale" of goods with the express intent of inflating revenues.
To what avail? These financial shenanigans might be legal, but one has to wonder what $NVDA gets out of it. Probably it was forced to do so by significant shareholders looking for exit liquidity.
And here again, we can find clues if we dig into the 10-Q. Specifically, the very weird approach to share buyback.
After no buybacks in Q1, the company went on a rampage, vacuuming up supply and fueling the short squeeze that began after its Q1 earnings release.
Maybe I'm reading too much into it? It could just be normal buyback activity after all. Well then, is this also normal?
"From July 31, 2023 through August 24, 2023, we repurchased 2 million shares for $998 million ($499 per share avg) pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan".
From July 31 to Aug 24, the ONLY time shares traded at $499 was on Aug 24, when it traded as high as $520 pre-market. For the company to average that price, all the buying must have been concentrated on August 24.
The company released results after the close on 24th. Make of it what you will.
I have been in finance since 2016 and I've analyzed thousands of companies. I've literally never seen financial shenanigans on this scale by a trillion dollar company. Heck, nobody has!
The $NVDA bubble appears to have been cleverly orchestrated to fool algos trading off headlines, suck in unwary traders, and create massive exit liquidity for significant shareholders.
John Law couldn't have done this any better.
I've never felt better about my short position.
"Across nearly 330 mutual funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 or a similar index, only 15% held an above-index weight in Nvidia, according to a Morningstar analysis of the funds' most recent regulatory filings. Among those funds that held a below-average weight in Nvidia, 85% underperformed the index so far this year, Morningstar's data showed".
Now the benchmark isn't even the SPX, it's $NVDA. They say the markets don't ring a bell at the top, but I can sure hear it clanging loudly.
$NVDA is a bargain at a 2024 forward PE of just 28. So $60 bn in sales and $44 bn in net income? You can't make this stuff up.
$NVDA CFO Colette Kress sold $2.3 mn worth of stock on Monday. This is on top of the $2.5 mn sold on May 30. Those were the only two sales this year. I must admit, I think she's as good as Nancy Pelosi in her market timing.
Jen-Hsun "A New Computing Era Has Begun" Huang exercised a big wad of stock options on Friday and immediately proceeded to cash out for approx. $117.2 million. Nothing to see here folks.
In May 2022, the company settled charges with the SEC related to inadequate disclosure about crypto mining revenue. sec.gov/news/press-rel…
But the trend continued, with the SEC commenting on inadequate disclosures yet again, in their financial statements filed for the very same year. sec.gov/Archives/edgar…
The reason there's so much discussion on NVDA revenues, customers, cost of goods sold, etc is because the company hasn't disclosed enough to put these arguments to rest.
I've answered numerous [real] questions providing more clarity on everything I've outlined in this thread.
Plus, I spent 40 minutes going over my reasoning in this video interview.
Unlike the sell-side analysts schmoozing with management, I'm NOT PAID to do this. Something to ponder while reading their pathetic straw man rebuttals and snide comments.
Update: The US govt has shut $NVDA off from the Chinese market, including through intermediaries that route sales via the Middle East and Vietnam (but not Israel). The rule went into effect on Oct 23, which means Nvidia gets to inflate sales numbers for yet another quarter and fool the algos.
CoreWeave founders have cashed out, sticking Fidelity and JPM wealth clients with the losses from the unravelling of their exit scam. The sell-side analysts who helped hype the stock will get a big fat Christmas bonus for their efforts. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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There are 4 illegitimate ways a company can grow revenue and maintain margins the way Nvidia has.
The first, subtle way, is by offering something similar to a sales rebate but booking it separately so it doesn't impact net revenue.
Perhaps you pay your customer when you ship the product, but in return for future services and not as a rebate. That would show up under the balance sheet item "Prepaid expenses and other current assets".
Then you have the option of booking revenue but not collecting cash. The corporate equivalent of buy now pay later.
Why does this week's move in the yen matter so much?
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The Bank of Japan implemented QE and zero interest rate policy in the 1990s, in response to the implosion of a mega bubble. Since then, Japan has had a deflationary economy, i.e. the opposite of the post-Covid US economy.
Rather than get eaten away by inflation, money in the bank was able to purchase more goods and services in the future.
Because of which, the yen kept strengthening against all other fiat currencies which were on a race to the bottom.
Post-2008, the Fed followed the BoJ's lead and implemented QE and ZIRP. The commodity bull market took off. Capital was borrowed for cheap in US dollars and invested in far off places like Mongolia and Kenya, in search of oil, copper and gold.
There is a reason Fed officials and MSM want you to focus on rates - it works to their advantage. The Fed gets to say it is doing its job in controlling inflation by keeping rates higher for longer. MSM reports rates are restrictive, hoping that repeating the message will lower inflation expectations.
This is the magician's trick - getting people to look one way while the science-y stuff behind the trick happens elsewhere.
I wrote about this in my December macro outlook. Time for an update 🧵
First off, banks are lending again. Note how borrowing started to take off just after the Nov FOMC, when the Fed hinted at changes to the SEP.
Non-farm payrolls never even blipped. Labor conditions are tight. Higher rates are hurting a lot of people but that doesn't show up in the payroll numbers.
The dot com bubble peaked on March 10, 2000. Is history about to repeat itself?
The up tick rule rarely gets triggered even on big red days like March 5th. That's a clear sign short sellers have completely disappeared from the market. When the degen gamblers on max leverage try to exit their positions, it's going to be crickets all the way down.
Punching the biggest bully in the yard might seem cool in the movies, but when it comes to short selling I'd rather pick on the old, the weak, and the lame.
The stocks which have witnessed technical damage.
The ones showing poor relative strength to $QQQ.
The stocks with no obvious buyers on the way down.
My current watchlist, organized by market cap👇
Buffet's selling, falling out of the Mag 7, and the failure of Apple Vison Pro, $AAPL should see a trendline break soon.
I bought into Africa Oil $AOI.TO on 4th December at C$2.55.
It is a value stock and as a rule, I hate value stocks because you need to get so many things right in order to make money. Here's why I bought -
🧵
Bank robber Willie Sutton is supposed to have said that he robbed banks because that’s where the money is.
In this environment, I have to buy value – because that’s where the money is.
I have been buying a lot of value stocks of late.
In January 2020, Africa Oil revamped itself from a struggling Kenyan oil play which lost money to a Nigerian deepwater oil play which gushed cash. The company acquired a 50% interest in Prime for $519.5 million, an investment that has since been fully recovered as dividends alone
I’m gratified by the response I received on my previous thread highlighting Nvidia’s $NVDA accounting tricks and buyback shenanigans.
Q3 was more of the same. Let's get into it.
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Rather than re-hashing the previous arguments, which the bulls will willfully ignore and the skeptics already know, I’ll leave you with 8 points to ponder.
(1) If demand is so strong the product is flying off the shelves, why is the company unable to collect cash from customers?
Over the last 10 quarters, revenue has increased by $12.46 billion while accounts receivable has increased by $5.28 billion. 42.4% of the incremental revenue has not (yet) translated into actual cash received from customers.