Thread by @WarintheFuture

While I have explored the impact of autonomous systems previously (in my 2018 CSBA report and in "War Transformed"), I wanted to provide some updated observations on their employment in #Ukraine and beyond. My latest at @abcnews 1/14 🧵
abc.net.au/news/2023-08-2…

2/ It comes in the context of this recent Washington Post piece where, allegedly, "Pentagon officials urged Ukraine to rely less on drones for recon." If accurate, it is probably one of the dumber observations from cubicle-based 'officials'. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/…

3/ For we are seeing a Cambrian Explosion in their use in the air, at sea and increasingly on the land in Ukraine, as well as within Russia and the Black Sea. The war in #Ukraine has spawned an intense period of evolution in these machines. What does this mean?

4/ First, activity on the battlefield (& beyond) is now more likely to be detected because of pervasive observation by drones. When the data provided by these drones is "meshed" with other military and civilian sensor technologies, this results in a huge increase in awareness.

5/ However, more transparency does not always mean more wisdom about what is transpiring. This means drone recon must be one of several layers in a meshed civil-military sensor network.

6/ A 2nd observation is that the information provided by drones, and shared on new digital battle command networks, greatly increases the potential speed of decision and action. This impacts tempo, and also aids force preservation.

7/ It also means the time between when a target is detected & when it can be engaged is reduced. This has many implications for the mobility of combat & support systems. It must drive improvements in deception, camouflage, operational security, communications & network security.

8/ A 3rd observation is that drones have increased the precision of engagements on the battlefield. On the battlefield, FPV drones allow for very precise targeting of equipment, individuals & headquarters, and at a cost orders of magnitude cheaper than older precision munitions.

9/ A 4th observation is that drones are democratising combat and procurement of equipment. While many drones are operated by soldiers, some are operated by other government agencies or even civilian organisations.

10/ Another aspect of this democratisation of combat is that many drones used in this war are procured using crowdfunding among civil populations. There are a variety of Ukrainian & Russian efforts, but perhaps the best known is Army of Drones. u24.gov.ua/dronation

11/ A 5th and final observation is that while drones are transforming warfare, they are not an invincible silver bullet. Drones alone will not, cannot, win wars or battles. Human creatitivity and counter-autonomy ops increasingly degrade drone operations.

12/ In "Wired for War", Peter Singer notes that: "The revolution in robotics is forcing us to re-examine what is possible, probable, and proper in war and politics". Ukraine and Russia have rapidly learned many hard lessons about the employment and impact of drones.

13/ Combining these observations into useful force design insights will pay off for military institutions, if done cleverly. I also want to acknowledge a couple of great researchers on this topic worth following: @sambendett and @elisabethmalom1.
abc.net.au/news/2023-08-2…

14/ Finally, another good commentary on that Washington Post assertion about using drones less for recon can be found here from @Tatarigami_UA, who is well worth following for insights on the war. End

https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1695867428247396359?s=20