Impressive thread was done by the @Black_BirdGroup about defenses in the south. In relation to this subject, I'd like to add additional insights and context. My intention is not to critique their presented report, but to emphasize crucial details that need to be added. 🧵Thread
2/ Frequently, I see analysts focusing on visible defenses. This could foster the perception that the first defensive line is where fortifications are visible through satellite imagery, based on the presence of features like dragon's teeth, trenches, or anti-tank ditches.
3/ In my perspective, this tendency can be attributed to the Streetlight effect - an observational bias wherein people exclusively search where it's easiest to look. In the context of satellite imagery, this translates to focusing on only visible defense structures.
4/ However, considering on-ground reporting, it's worth noting that virtually every tree line has been fortified to some extent. These fortifications range from concealed positions for ATGM and machinegunner teams to discreet well-protected individual positions
5/ In this short timelapse video spanning from May to August, I've highlighted fortified zones that mappers often chart. However, by looking at damages it's evident that the true theater of combat was across all tree lines visible in the area.
6/ Which brings me to the point where I contest the definition of the first defense line by looking at anti-tank trench with pyramids, considering that there were dozens and dozens of manned tree lines with defense positions which were already destroyed or captured by our forces
7/ This distinction holds significant weight, as statements such as "Ukrainian forces haven't reached the first line of defense" could be misleading. In reality, our forces have gained control over numerous tree lines that constitute major defensive formations.
8/ Ultimately, the destruction of enemy forces and assets positioned within these tree lines carries greater significance than obstacles like dragon's teeth and AT ditches, which can be circumvented in under 20 minutes when the enemy is suppressed or lacks the resources to resist
9/ In this final clip north of Robotyne, most tree lines have been heavily shelled due to intense battles fought over each one, making this hidden defensive formation more important than the widely discussed mapped lines.
I'd like to fix my earlier statement. Saying "20 minutes" might sound dismissive due to the battle's complexity, so it's inaccurate. I aimed to show that poorly manned or unguarded positions aren’t the biggest issue, but "20 mins" is incorrect statement.
10/ P.S.: I believe the main battle is ongoing, leading to the deployment of russian strategic reserves. This implies we should avoid statements like "Ukraine hasn't reached the first defense line," even though they might eventually retreat to the "Surovikin line."
11/ I'd like to retract my comment about 20 minutes. Using "20 minutes" might come across as dismissive considering the complexity of the battle. My intention was to highlight that unmanned or undermanned positions aren’t the biggest issue, but "20 mins" is incorrect statement.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization
🧵Thread with key findings from Frontelligence Insight analysis on Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Groups: structure, tactics, training, equipment, battlefield performance, and the conditions that enabled them
2/ Though called “assault” groups, Motorcycle Assault Groups serve diverse roles beyond direct assaults - handling diversion, reconnaissance, behind-the-lines infiltration, logistics, and flanking support in larger operations.
3/ More importantly, motorcycles act mainly as rapid transport, ferrying troops to their objectives rather than acting as combat platforms. As analysts @KofmanMichael and B.A. Friedman note, a better analogy is “dragoons” - mounted infantry who rode into battle but fought on foot