Impressive thread was done by the @Black_BirdGroup about defenses in the south. In relation to this subject, I'd like to add additional insights and context. My intention is not to critique their presented report, but to emphasize crucial details that need to be added. 🧵Thread
2/ Frequently, I see analysts focusing on visible defenses. This could foster the perception that the first defensive line is where fortifications are visible through satellite imagery, based on the presence of features like dragon's teeth, trenches, or anti-tank ditches.
3/ In my perspective, this tendency can be attributed to the Streetlight effect - an observational bias wherein people exclusively search where it's easiest to look. In the context of satellite imagery, this translates to focusing on only visible defense structures.
4/ However, considering on-ground reporting, it's worth noting that virtually every tree line has been fortified to some extent. These fortifications range from concealed positions for ATGM and machinegunner teams to discreet well-protected individual positions
5/ In this short timelapse video spanning from May to August, I've highlighted fortified zones that mappers often chart. However, by looking at damages it's evident that the true theater of combat was across all tree lines visible in the area.
6/ Which brings me to the point where I contest the definition of the first defense line by looking at anti-tank trench with pyramids, considering that there were dozens and dozens of manned tree lines with defense positions which were already destroyed or captured by our forces
7/ This distinction holds significant weight, as statements such as "Ukrainian forces haven't reached the first line of defense" could be misleading. In reality, our forces have gained control over numerous tree lines that constitute major defensive formations.
8/ Ultimately, the destruction of enemy forces and assets positioned within these tree lines carries greater significance than obstacles like dragon's teeth and AT ditches, which can be circumvented in under 20 minutes when the enemy is suppressed or lacks the resources to resist
9/ In this final clip north of Robotyne, most tree lines have been heavily shelled due to intense battles fought over each one, making this hidden defensive formation more important than the widely discussed mapped lines.
I'd like to fix my earlier statement. Saying "20 minutes" might sound dismissive due to the battle's complexity, so it's inaccurate. I aimed to show that poorly manned or unguarded positions aren’t the biggest issue, but "20 mins" is incorrect statement.
10/ P.S.: I believe the main battle is ongoing, leading to the deployment of russian strategic reserves. This implies we should avoid statements like "Ukraine hasn't reached the first defense line," even though they might eventually retreat to the "Surovikin line."
11/ I'd like to retract my comment about 20 minutes. Using "20 minutes" might come across as dismissive considering the complexity of the battle. My intention was to highlight that unmanned or undermanned positions aren’t the biggest issue, but "20 mins" is incorrect statement.
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North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
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3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence
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2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
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2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1