I've been meaning to do a thread on this @PStyle0ne1 post below for several weeks because of the cost/price point implications for 21st century drone versus post WW2 conventional warfare.
There are huge cost/attrition warfare implications for an FPV drone reaching 17 km.
And Ukraine is adapting FPV drones into a reusable form for anti-personnel work and I've no doubt anti-tank versions of these "FPV Stuka's" will be showing up on both sides.
Ukraine has a lead on Russia, but the follower, but is closing.
From the cost point of view, this means a great deal.
German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall is producing 10k run of 155-mm L15 shells for 3,300 Euros each. 7/ technology.org/2023/01/05/how…
A $5,000 grenade dropping drone that completes three missions dropping nine $30 grenades will do more damage to Russian troops in trenches than a single $36,600/3,300 Euro L15 155mm shell because a grenade dropping drone is a flying cluster munition.
A flying cluster munition with man-in-the-loop aiming for each cluster munition that minimizes the dud cluster munition threat to civilians post-war.🤨🤔
That's bad enough for the "King of Battle", but it gets worse.
9/
At the 3,300 Euro/$36,030 L15 155mm shell price point, you can buy 12.1 antipersonnel one-way FPV drones or 6.1 anti-tank FPV drones for each or any combination between 6 and 12 FPV drones depending on the target set.
10/
And when they FPV's get reusable, the cost advantage goes asymptotic.
Assuming an additional $30/$100 per mission cost for grenades on a reusable FPV for three missions before loss.
That is 4.5 antitank FPV and 9.3 AP FPV's.
11/
But we are talking 12 anti-tank FPV missions and 27 AP FPV missions for less than the cost of a single L15 155mm shell built Rheinmetall in a lot of 10,000 shells.
Anyplace on a 21st century battlefield that can be reached by an FPV drone, will be, because it is cheaper.
12/
Yes, jammers are going to stop FPV's, sometimes.
The problem is jammers stopping Excalibur and GMLRS GPS signals are much cheaper per area covered because of line of site issues.
FPV Jamming signals are stopped by hills, buildings and forests.
13/
Line-of-sight requirements mean you needs thousands of small jammers for a divisional front, transmitting where you want things protected, in a world where jamming signals can be geolocated by drones outside jamming range.
14/
Artillery will certainly have a specialist mission in a FPV dominated world in dropping dumb proximity air burst and cluster munitions on jammers, but indirect fire killing will be by FPV drones.
The ability of FPV drone operators to become "ace" is already on the agenda.
15/
This Daniel Boffey article in the Guardian has an interview with the Ukrainian five time FPV ace Olexsandr.
X accounts like @DefMon3 below are reporting that the RuAF have repositioned the VDV 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Kreminna Luhansk to the Robotyne area in Southern Ukraine.
Moving 6,000-to-8,000 VDV troopers to Robotyne on a priority basis, with the Kerch & other Crimea rail bridges closed, means they went by semi-tractor trailer from Rostov-on-the-Don to Melitopol, then by AFV to Robotyne.
2/
Putting that VDV 76th Air Assault Division "pig" through the RuAF logistical "python" on an emergency basis has opportunity costs.
Moving the 76th means RuAF is not moving fuel, ammo, beans and bullets to the troops that are on the Robotyne axis.
Those Pentagon or US Military officials saying Ukraine should use fewer drones and more ground patrols are as divorced from 21st century reality as Major General John Knowles Herr, the last branch chief of US Army horse cavalry, was from 20th century warfare.
The previous strikes on Crimean rail bridges, the more recent ones on the Henichesk, Chonhar, & Kerch bridges, interwoven with the systematic destruction of ammo/fuel depots in Southern Ukrainian and Dzhankoy Crimea, means that the "land bridge" that goes through Rostov-on-the 2/
...Don, Taganrog (Russia), Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Melitopol on the M-14 highway is the primary ground line of communications (GLOC) logistical artery for the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) in Southern Ukraine.