After boneheaded comments by 'anonymous sources' & commentary by mostly uninformed who have never seen combat, there's been increasing back-and-forth about how @NATO shouldn't "lecture" Ukraine's army on anything re their offensive.
It might surprise most to hear that US Commanders in combat (& training) are also provided retired generals as "senior mentors" (we call them "gray beards") who contribute to the education of generals who are doing things for the first time. And they are extremely helpful. 3/
As a new Division Commander in 2007 I was given orders to deploy 30k US soldiers & link up with 5 Iraqi Army divisions (another 90K) to conduct a variety of missions. My senior mentors were 2 retired 4-stars. The info provided - in prep training & combat - was invaluable. 4/
BTW, most of their advice I took, some I didn't. But the mentoring shaped my decision-making.
While I had been a soldier for 30 years, commanding several times in battle, I had never been a Division Commander in combat with all the responsibilities of of that higher command. 5
When I hear "NATO armies haven't done these kinds of operations & Zaluzhnyi has" I smile.
Because truthfully, yes NATO has and no Z hasn't. That isn't meant to be contentious, or an insult to Zaluzhnyi.
NATO has conducted large scale targeting, intel gathering, .... 6/
movement of forces, RSOI, operational logistics, and headquarters staff planning and wargaming in training, exercises and in combat.
While GEN Zaluzhnyi is extremely talented, he has never before coordinated large scale offensive maneuver w/dozens of combat brigades. 7/
He is conducting kinetic operations (multiple deliberate attacks requiring intense combined arms breaches), while also synchronizing intel gathering/targeting, operational logistics for multi-domain operations of conventional, SOF, territorials, rear area insurgents,... 8/
...while moving reserves to the right place, integrating newly mobilized & trained forces, overseeing humanitarian relief and movement of non-combatants out of operational areas, etc, etc, etc.
While executing multiple large scale deliberate attacks with breaches on...9/
...different axes over a 400-600 km front is tough enough, it's just one of his tasks. It's the other things that are a combat commander's real headaches.
Commanders don't need nitpicking from cheap seats (the 1000-mile screwdriver), but he does needs advice & mentoring. 10/
And, frankly (and perhaps most importantly), when you're the person in charge...you need some friends who are like-minded in your profession of arms.
Friends who know what you're going through, who you can throw ideas at, who will give you a shot of whiskey. 11/
While I don't know Admiral Sir Tony Radakin (see this insightful article, below), I personally know General Chris Cavoli.
Those who know GEN Cavoli (& his background) agree he is the perfect person to command @NATO and @US_EUCOM right now. 12/
Some countered the early reports of a "slow start" of the UAF offensive with "this is expected for this kind of operation" (I was one of those). That offensive is now gaining momentum.
Those now stoking "UAF shouldn't pay attention to NATO/US advice" may want to reconsider.13/13
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The Marshall Center’s @andrewmichta is absolutely correct on this.
The “pivot to Asia” commentary was a mistake made during the Obama admin, and we should avoid it at all costs. It not only gives options to our foes/competitors, it confuses our allies & partners. 1/4
I happened to be in Tblisi for a visit with my Georgian counterpart in 2012 when @StateDept first messaged that term. The 🇬🇪 President called me to his office and asked what “pivot” from Europe meant.
It was a tense conversation. 2/
Saakashvili believed the term alone would further embolden Putin & he wanted me to message his thoughts to my superiors. He also suggested it would resonate globally in ways we hadn’t considered.
I agreed with him on Putin, but didn’t understand his other point. 3/
Since the start of the Russia invasion, I believed Ukraine would persevere. That hasn’t changed, though the battlefield conditions have.
Recently, many have reported “slow movement,” “stumbling,” “lack of success,” of UAF, from those unfamiliar with operational details. 1/
By “operational details,” I mean conditions of the battlefield…those things that affect gaining ground or achieving success by a force.
Often times in combat, units take 3 steps forward, 2 back.
I know this from personal experience. 2/
“Operational details” also describes the synchronization of soldiers, equipment, the terrain, the leadership.
Putting x equipment (new or old) with y soldiers (rookie or experienced) under z leaders (great or good) on any given terrain will result in different outcomes. 3/
On @CNN today, @VictorBlackwell surprisingly asked about the state of the Peace Conference being held in KSA.
This conference hasn't received much coverage but it is important to Ukraine's future...it should guide those offering thoughts on what will bring peace to UKR. 1/
Over 40 countries participated (Russia wasn't invited). Unlike most "peace conferences" this gathering allowed @ZelenskyyUa to inform and garner support for his 10- point plan while addressing issues of global order.
While @oleksiireznikov described the UKR 10-pt plan in November, not many know the details. Here are the 10 points Ukraine's government sees as necessary:
1. Restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity w/ RU affirming according to UN Charter. 3/
After @biden's tough call to provide Ukraine with 100s of 1000's of rounds of cluster munitions, Ukrainian MOD @oleksiireznikov provides rationale & assurances (in 5 statements) of how they will be used.
But the debate continues, as some US senators now question that call. 1/8
Reznikov's 5 principles:
-only used for "deoccupation" of UKR territory
-won't use in urban areas (unlike Russians)
-UAF will keep records of where rounds are fired
-those areas will be "prioritized" for de-mining after the war
-UKR will report effectiveness to allies. 2/
There are pros & cons to providing cluster munitions.
It was a tough moral call by @POTUS to decide to provide this ammo now...primarily based on UAF running low of arty ammo they need today.
The DPICM rounds will bridge a gap while more precision rounds are built. 3/