Recently, the Russians released a manual outlining tactics to counter Ukrainian assaults. This guide draws from recent encounters with the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in June and July 2023, particularly during their liberation of Novodarivka and Levadne. 🧵Thread:
2/ It's crucial to note that the Russians are presenting their perspective on Ukrainian units and their actions, based on their experience with a single Ukrainian mechanized brigade. This viewpoint should be carefully weighed before extrapolating it to the whole frontline.
3/ Russians describe the following configuration used by Ukrainian units:
Assault teams comprise 20 members, divided into four subgroups of five. Two groups are assault subgroups. The third serves as a consolidation subgroup. The fourth functions as a reserve subgroup.
4/ Each 'team of five' must include a machine gunner and a radio operator. The number of grenade launcher operators is determined based on the situation. The recommended intervals and distance between soldiers are 7 meters
5/ Primary functions of the assault subgroups (fives):
- 1st assault subgroup: advances forward covertly and engages with the enemy, contains the enemy upon detection, and secures positions once the task is accomplished;
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- 2nd assault maintains visual distance with the 1st group, reports passage of the first group's to others, and after 1st "five" initiates firefight, the subgroup performs flank maneuver or rear approach; If the first group retreats, it covers it;
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- 3rd (consolidation) subgroup maintains a distance of 50-150m from the 2nd subgroup, aiming to set up positions to consolidate gains. If initial assault fails, they dig in, to facilitate reinforcement for further assault or to cover the retreat of the leading groups;
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- The 4th (reserve) subgroup remains within 300m from the 3rd subgroup and forms a hypothetical rear for supply, evacuation, and fire support groups. Ready to serve as reserve, if advance succeeds - it exploit gains, if enemy reserves approach, it moves out to counter them.
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The russians underline the successes of this tactic, acknowledging its contribution to capturing russian positions. In response, they stress the efficacy of employing anti-personnel mines, citing the near-impossibility of clearing all mines in such scenarios.
10/ They also recommend establishing deceptive positions that appear genuine, intermittently engaging in fire from these false locations, and simulating activity there. They advise occasional communication device use from these positions.
11/ Russians note that units traveling by foot, particularly those carrying heavy equipment like AGS or mortars, experience rapid physical exhaustion. However, they don't elaborate on how this vulnerability can exploited.
12/ In summary, I'd like to highlight that their Anticipation-Action-Reflection time has notably shortened. This enables them to grasp and adjust to our tactics much faster compared to the past, when it used to take russians months to adapt
13/ Simultaneously, they didn't present an innovative approach to counter these tactics, apart from referencing already employed methods like deploying false positions and mines.
14/ As the war continues, we see fewer large formations and increasing use of small tactical units, which present less visible targets compared to mechanized units. The latter have become frequent targets for FPV drones, ATGM teams and AT mines.
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Impressive thread was done by the @Black_BirdGroup about defenses in the south. In relation to this subject, I'd like to add additional insights and context. My intention is not to critique their presented report, but to emphasize crucial details that need to be added. 🧵Thread
2/ Frequently, I see analysts focusing on visible defenses. This could foster the perception that the first defensive line is where fortifications are visible through satellite imagery, based on the presence of features like dragon's teeth, trenches, or anti-tank ditches.
3/ In my perspective, this tendency can be attributed to the Streetlight effect - an observational bias wherein people exclusively search where it's easiest to look. In the context of satellite imagery, this translates to focusing on only visible defense structures.
🧵I came across an article today in The Washington Post that discusses the counter-offensive. I usually refrain from criticizing leaks, recognizing the importance of journalistic work. Nevertheless, in light of the statement in the article, I want to provide some counterpoints:
2/ It is challenging to ascertain the credibility of the official giving the commentary. It remains unclear whether the statement accurately reflects Pentagon's stance, if it was a journalist's interpretation of an official's words, or it was an actual statement
3/ Should we accept this statement at face value, it is arguably one of the worst statements I have encountered recently. The statement raises doubts regarding the authenticity of the statement itself. Drones play a pivotal role in minimizing the risk to servicememebers lives
1/ Yesterday, I discussed Russian reinforcements and reserves in the South, but didn't mention them specifically. Today, it's safe to say that I was referring to the movement of units from the 76th Guards Air Assault Division from the North-East
2/ I anticipated that it would take a few days for the OSINT community to detect and identify them, hence I waited until today. According to russian military doctrine, at least on paper, 76th division is a part of their strategic reserves, underscoring the seriousness of the move
3/ As of now, refraining from additional statements, it's crucial to acknowledge the twofold implications. On one hand, this strengthens russian operational capacities. On the other, their failure will critically impair of combat-ready reserves for rapid deployment.
As this war has now extended beyond a year and a half, the issue of cost efficiency becomes even more important. Using the illustration of a russian logistical facility located in Yakymivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, I will explain this challenge in a straightforward manner.
🧵Thread:
2/ Since 2022, this logistical node has operated as a russian vehicle repair facility, primarily focusing on armored vehicles. Through a comparative analysis of imagery, it becomes evident that the facility is operational, although its capacity remains somewhat limited.
3/ This leads us to the subsequent question: can we dismiss this facility as insignificant in terms of targeting? Simultaneously, is it truly justifiable to deploy 2-3 million dollar Stormshadow missile, limited in supply, against a relatively basic repair shop setup?
Quick overview of the Russian "wunderwaffe" mine known as "PTKM-1R" - an AT mine designed to engage vehicles through the top. In this thread, I will talk about this touted by russians mine, discussing its effectiveness and purported widespread use. 🧵Thread:
2/ Although the the mine's mechanism is quite complex, the activation process is comparably straightforward: through its sensors, the mine detects, discerns, and trails a target, subsequently deploying submunition into the air, targeting a vehicle's vulnerable roof section.
3/ From the recently surfaced video, it's clear that the mine is notably large, requiring a substantial amount of time for deployment, which must be done manually. Furthermore, the mine's functionality depends on sensors powered by batteries.
Expanding upon the ongoing dialogue about utilizing drones for mine detection, questions have emerged regarding the practicality of employing thermal imaging. In this thread, I will discuss this matter by referencing a specialized manual dedicated to this topic.🧵Thread:
2/ To begin, it's essential to consider a few key aspects. Mines aren't always placed on a top of soil - some remain hidden, making them invisible to drones. This distinction is important, emphasizing the need to refrain from regarding this method as panacea
3/ The parameters for this presentation are outlined as follows:
Temperature: Range of +18 to +20°C (64.4 to 68°F)
Vegetation: Moderate level
Time: 21:00 (9 PM) local time
Altitude: Varied and indicated for each scenario in the image.
Drone: DJI Mavic 3T
Deployment time: 11 AM