France used to be the "China of Europe"—1 in 25 people globally was French and 1 in 5 Europeans was French.
Now, France is smaller than Germany and virtually identical in population to Britain
Why?
Thanks to some wonderful new work, we probably know the answer!🧵
The answer has to do with secularization: if your faith says to be fruitful and multiply while its secular replacement does not, it's reasonable to expect fertility to fall.
We can observe this secularization through the rapid decline of religious wills and perpetual masses.
As this secularization spread, fertility declined.
And we know it was secularization that drove the dates in which areas began the demographic transition, not increased human capital, population density, or urbanization.
More tests support this.
For example, it stands to reason that more religious people need more clergymen.
Well, the greater the population-weighted share of clergymen in an area, the greater its fertility, but only after secularization set in and religiosity variance emerged.
And we know part of why secularization kicked off, too.
Consider this: as in America with tea, France also had a horribly unpopular tax on foodstuffs: the gabelle, a tax on salt.
This tax was actually a part of the cahiers de doléance during the French Revolution.
This tax varied wildly, so its extent can be used to assess how extractive institutions were.
To understand how, we need one more piece of history: the Counter Reformation.
See the dashed lines in France?
Those were disputed during the French Wars of Religion.
In those places where the Counter Reformation was dominant during the French Wars of Religion, there's more modern Easter mass attendance.
But, there's actually *less* if there was evidence that the counter-reformers led extractive institutions, as indicated by the gabelle.
Secularization was likely partly a backlash against cruel, absolutist, "divine right" monarchy.
You know, the sort that inspired this image of the Third Estate bearing the nation's tax burdens.
This matters!
In this time period, Britain grew their economy and population simultaneously, catching up to France in population.
France instead enriched its population through constraining its size.
The per capita GDPs in each country became virtually identical.
In other words, Britain became rich by growing the numerator more than the denominator; France just constrained the denominator.
The convergence of France and Britain is truly remarkable.
Imagine the world where French growth during the Industrial Revolution mirrors Britain's.
In such a world, the lingua franca might still be "Franca".
World War I devastated Britain and likely slowed down its technological progress🧵
The reason being, the youth are the engine of innovation.
Areas that saw more deaths saw larger declines in patenting in the years following the war.
To figure out the innovation effects of losing a large portion of a generation's young men who were just coming into the primes of their lives, the authors needed four pieces of data.
The first were the numbers and pre-war locations of soldiers who died.
The next components were the numbers and locations of patent filings.
If you look at both graphs, you see obvious total population effects. So, areas must be normalized.
You know how most books on Amazon are AI slop now? If you didn't, look at the publication numbers.
Compare those to the proportion Pangram flags as AI-generated. It's fully aligned with the implied numbers based on the rise over 2022 publication levels!
Similarly, the rise of pro se litigants has come with a rise in case filings detected as being AI-generated, and with virtually zero false-positives before AI was around.
Pierre Guillaume Frédéric le Play argued that France's early fertility decline was driven by its inheritance reforms, where estates had to be split up equally to all of the kids, including the girls.
There's likely something to this!🧵
For reference, the French Revolution ushered in a number of egalitarian laws.
A major example of these had to do with inheritance, and in particular with partibility.
In some areas of France, there was partible inheritance, and in others, it was impartible.
Partible inheritance refers to inheritance spread among all of a person's heirs, sometimes including girls, sometimes not.
Impartible inheritance on the other hands refers to the situation where the head of an estate can nominate a particular heir to get all or a select portion.
In terms of their employment, religion, and sex, people who joined the Nazi party started off incredibly distinct from the people in their communities.
It's only near the end of WWII when they started resembling everyday Germans.
Early on, a lot of this dissimilarity is due to hysteresis.
Even as the party was growing, people were selectively recruited because they were often recruited by their out-of-place friends, and they were themselves out-of-place.
It took huge growth to break that.
And you can see the decline of fervor based on the decline of Nazi imagery in people's portraits.
And while this is observed by-and-large, it's not observed among the SS, who had a consistently higher rate of symbolic fanaticism.
"Food deserts" are an example of social scientists getting causality backwards
They saw poor people eating unhealthy foods and blamed local supply
They should have blamed demand!
Using data from 13 years of supermarket entries, there's basically no effects on healthy eating🧵
The significant effects are probably not meaningful. They're more likely under the null with this gigantic dataset (p's of 0.003 and 0.005 with a total sample size of ~2.9m)
Entry did affect sales for new stores, but not existing ones. It also affected more local places more.
When new supermarkets open up, they do nab a share of local grocery sales, but the effect on healthy eating in total, among low-income households, and in food deserts, just isn't there.
I simulated 100,000 people to show how often people are "thrice-exceptional": Smart, stable, and exceptionally hard-working.
I've highlighted these people in red in this chart:
If you reorient the chart to a bird's eye view, it looks like this:
In short, there are not many people who are thrice-exceptional, in the sense of being at least +2 standard deviations in conscientiousness, emotional stability (i.e., inverse neuroticism), and intelligence.
To replicate this, use 42 as the seed and assume linearity and normality