France used to be the "China of Europe"—1 in 25 people globally was French and 1 in 5 Europeans was French.
Now, France is smaller than Germany and virtually identical in population to Britain
Why?
Thanks to some wonderful new work, we probably know the answer!🧵
The answer has to do with secularization: if your faith says to be fruitful and multiply while its secular replacement does not, it's reasonable to expect fertility to fall.
We can observe this secularization through the rapid decline of religious wills and perpetual masses.
As this secularization spread, fertility declined.
And we know it was secularization that drove the dates in which areas began the demographic transition, not increased human capital, population density, or urbanization.
More tests support this.
For example, it stands to reason that more religious people need more clergymen.
Well, the greater the population-weighted share of clergymen in an area, the greater its fertility, but only after secularization set in and religiosity variance emerged.
And we know part of why secularization kicked off, too.
Consider this: as in America with tea, France also had a horribly unpopular tax on foodstuffs: the gabelle, a tax on salt.
This tax was actually a part of the cahiers de doléance during the French Revolution.
This tax varied wildly, so its extent can be used to assess how extractive institutions were.
To understand how, we need one more piece of history: the Counter Reformation.
See the dashed lines in France?
Those were disputed during the French Wars of Religion.
In those places where the Counter Reformation was dominant during the French Wars of Religion, there's more modern Easter mass attendance.
But, there's actually *less* if there was evidence that the counter-reformers led extractive institutions, as indicated by the gabelle.
Secularization was likely partly a backlash against cruel, absolutist, "divine right" monarchy.
You know, the sort that inspired this image of the Third Estate bearing the nation's tax burdens.
This matters!
In this time period, Britain grew their economy and population simultaneously, catching up to France in population.
France instead enriched its population through constraining its size.
The per capita GDPs in each country became virtually identical.
In other words, Britain became rich by growing the numerator more than the denominator; France just constrained the denominator.
The convergence of France and Britain is truly remarkable.
Imagine the world where French growth during the Industrial Revolution mirrors Britain's.
In such a world, the lingua franca might still be "Franca".
Roughly one-third of all of Japan's urban building was done through a process of replotting land parcels and reconstructing homes to increase local density while making way for new infrastructure🧵
Conceptually, it's like this:
In that diagram, you see an area of low-density homes that has undergone land rights conversion, where, when two-thirds of the area’s existing homeowners agree, everyone’s right to their land is converted to the rights to an equivalent part of a new building.
This works well to generate substantial, dense amounts of housing, and it's, crucially, democratic.
All the decision-making power was held by those who were directly affected, and not outsiders to the situation.
If 2/3 wanted to upzone, they could, and they did!
I've seen a lot of people recently claim that the prevalence of vitiligo is 0.5-2%.
This is just not true. In the U.S. today, it's closer to a sixth of a percent, with some notable age- and race-related differences.
But where did the 0.5-2% claim come from?🧵
The claim of a 0.5-2% prevalence emerged on here because Google's Gemini cited a 2020 review in the journal Dermatology which proclaimed as much in the abstract.
Simple enough, right? They must have a source that supports this estimate in the review somewhere.
They cite four studies for the 0.5-2% claim, so let's look into those studies.
Relationships between class and fertility and IQ and fertility used to routinely be negative in the not-so-distant past.
But across the developed world, they're increasingly positive, albeit only slightly. In this Swedish birth cohort (1951-67), the transition came early:
In this example, there's also some interesting confounding: between families, IQ isn't monotonically associated with fertility, but within families, it is.
Something seems to suppress the IQ-fertility relationship between families!
Sweden's positive IQ-fertility gradient (which, above, is just for males, since it's draftee data), has been around for quite a while (but has varied, too), whereas in countries like France, Japan, and the U.S., the gradient shift towards being slightly positive is more recent.