France used to be the "China of Europe"—1 in 25 people globally was French and 1 in 5 Europeans was French.
Now, France is smaller than Germany and virtually identical in population to Britain
Why?
Thanks to some wonderful new work, we probably know the answer!🧵
The answer has to do with secularization: if your faith says to be fruitful and multiply while its secular replacement does not, it's reasonable to expect fertility to fall.
We can observe this secularization through the rapid decline of religious wills and perpetual masses.
As this secularization spread, fertility declined.
And we know it was secularization that drove the dates in which areas began the demographic transition, not increased human capital, population density, or urbanization.
More tests support this.
For example, it stands to reason that more religious people need more clergymen.
Well, the greater the population-weighted share of clergymen in an area, the greater its fertility, but only after secularization set in and religiosity variance emerged.
And we know part of why secularization kicked off, too.
Consider this: as in America with tea, France also had a horribly unpopular tax on foodstuffs: the gabelle, a tax on salt.
This tax was actually a part of the cahiers de doléance during the French Revolution.
This tax varied wildly, so its extent can be used to assess how extractive institutions were.
To understand how, we need one more piece of history: the Counter Reformation.
See the dashed lines in France?
Those were disputed during the French Wars of Religion.
In those places where the Counter Reformation was dominant during the French Wars of Religion, there's more modern Easter mass attendance.
But, there's actually *less* if there was evidence that the counter-reformers led extractive institutions, as indicated by the gabelle.
Secularization was likely partly a backlash against cruel, absolutist, "divine right" monarchy.
You know, the sort that inspired this image of the Third Estate bearing the nation's tax burdens.
This matters!
In this time period, Britain grew their economy and population simultaneously, catching up to France in population.
France instead enriched its population through constraining its size.
The per capita GDPs in each country became virtually identical.
In other words, Britain became rich by growing the numerator more than the denominator; France just constrained the denominator.
The convergence of France and Britain is truly remarkable.
Imagine the world where French growth during the Industrial Revolution mirrors Britain's.
In such a world, the lingua franca might still be "Franca".
After the Counter-Reformation began, Protestant Germany started producing more elites than Catholic Germany.
Protestant cities also attracted more of these elite individuals, but primarily to the places with the most progressive governments🧵
Q: What am I talking about?
A: Kirchenordnung, or Church Orders, otherwise known as Protestant Church Ordinances, a sort of governmental compact that started cropping up after the Reformation, in Protestant cities.
Q: Why these things?
A: Protestants wanted to establish political institutions in their domains that replaced those previously provided by the Catholics, or which otherwise departed from how things were done.
What predicts a successful educational intervention?
Unfortunately, the answer is not 'methodological propriety'; in fact, it's the opposite🧵
First up: home-made measures, a lack of randomization, and a study being published instead of unpublished predict larger effects.
It is *far* easier to cook the books with an in-house measure, and it's far harder for other researchers to evaluate what's going on because they definitionally cannot be familiar with it.
Additionally, smaller studies tend to have larger effects—a hallmark of publication bias!
Education, like many fields, clearly has a bias towards significant results.
Notice the extreme excess of results with p-values that are 'just significant'.
The pattern we see above should make you suspect if you realize this is happening.
Across five different large samples, the same pattern emerged:
Trans people tended to have multiple times higher rates of autism.
In addition to higher autism rates, when looking at non-autistic trans versus non-trans people, the trans people were consistently shifted towards showing more autistic traits.
In two of the available datasets, the autism result replicated across other psychiatric traits.
That is, trans people were also at an elevated risk of ADHD, bipolar disorder, depression, OCD, and schizophrenia, before and after making various adjustments.
Across 68,000 meta-analyses including over 700,000 effect size estimates, correcting for publication bias tended to:
- Markedly reduce effect sizes
- Markedly reduce the probability that there is an effect at all
Economics hardest hit:
Even this is perhaps too generous.
Recall that correcting for publication bias often produces effects that are still larger than the effects attained in subsequent large-scale replication studies.
A great example of this comes from priming studies.
Remember money priming, where simply seeing or handling money made people more selfish and better at business?
Those studies were stricken by publication bias, but preregistered studies totally failed to find a thing.
It argues that one of the reasons there was an East Asian growth miracle but not a South Asian one is human capital.
For centuries, South Asia has lagged on average human capital, whereas East Asia has done very well in all our records.
It's unsurprising when these things continue today.
We already know based on three separate instrumental variables strategies using quite old datapoints that human capital is causal for growth. That includes these numeracy measures from the distant past.
Where foreign visitors centuries ago thought China was remarkably equal and literate (both true!), they noticed that India had an elite upper crust accompanied by intense squalor.