Thread by @ProfPaulPoast

Let's talk about a slow counter-offensive that sowed public doubts about its ultimate success.

Of course, I'm referring to the allied western advance against Nazi Germany in 1944.

[THREAD]

The D-Day invasion by American, British, and Canadian troops on June 6, 1944 is well known. It was the largest amphibious assault in history and led to the liberation of France from occupation by Nazi Germany.

In short, it was a successful counter-offensive.

But what's less appreciated is that it was slow. Slower than the allies wanted.

Consider that June 6 is just when the invasion STARTED. It took until the end of July before the allied forces were in a position to even consider "breaking out" of the Normandy beachhead.

And it was slow despite the fact that Germany could not dedicate all of its forces to stopping the allied advance. Why? Because it was fighting on a second front against Soviet forces in the East.

Though German troops were falling back fast in the east, in the west there were public concerns by late July that the allied efforts could stall.

Below is from the New York Times on July 16, 1944. They describe the situation as "dangerously close to a stalemate".

Eventually, the allied forces would be in a position to "breakout" of the Normandy region and advance through France.

But that didn't happen until the beginning of August, nearly two months after the initial invasion of Normandy.

Progress in August was relatively fast, with Paris liberated on August 25.

That fast progress was mostly because Germany hadn't established staunch lines of defense throughout Northern France.

Instead, following the Normandy invasion, Hitler ordered German forces to reinforce the "West Wall" or Siegfried Line.

That line was the system of fortifications along the border between Germany and France. Breaking through it would not be trivial.

amazon.com/Hitlers-Fortre…

The "Siegfried Line Campaign" would take the entire autumn of 1944. Progress was slow, which was publicly acknowledged (consider this New York Times story from October 15 1944).

In hindsight, there is a tendency not to think of the autumn 1944 as "slow" progress.

Indeed, there is a tendency not to think about those four months at all, as General James Norell wrote in the Forward to the US Army's history of the Seigfried Campaign

That sentiment was echoed by the author of the history, Charles MacDonald, in the Preface.

BTW, you can access a PDF of the entire US Army history of the Seigfried Line Campaign here:

history.army.mil/html/books/007…

EVENTUALLY, the allied forces would break through the line and advance through Germany itself, meeting Soviet troops halfway.

Germany then surrendered on May 8, 1945, 11 months after the start of the Allied Western counter-offensive.

Those 11 months might seem "quick" today, but they weren't seen as such when it was happening.

Obviously, I'm writing all of this not to educate about the Allied Campaign during 1944, but to make a broader point about the current Ukrainian Counter-offensive against Russia forces.

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1697417914259755511

As US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley pointed out, "slow" should not be confused with "failure"

https://twitter.com/Heroiam_Slava/status/1695030580302221330

Consistent with Milley's comments, it seems that Ukraine is content with the slow approach.

https://twitter.com/amanpour/status/1696574485367845299

There is much more to say about Ukraine's counteroffensive: where is it headed? Why the conflicting reports? what comes afterwards?

Those are questions that can be address later.

In short, the allied powers in 1944 to 1945 conducted a highly effective counter-offensive against a weakened enemy. But it was slow.

Such is the nature of offensive warfare.

[END]

Addendum - Given some of the reactions to this 🧵, it seems I should offer an FAQ:

1) Why did I pick the 1944 example?

I picked this example b/c it is very well known (not just among experts)

2) Why did you pick just one example?

A single example can be useful if it serves as a counter point to a widely held view. In this case, the view I am pushing back against is "slow = failure" for counteroffensives.

3) Didn't the allies have big advantages over Germany?

Yes. The example shows how, even under “ideal” conditions (weakened enemy fighting two fronts, material advantage, air supremacy), progress can be slow & difficult.

4) Doesn't Ukraine lack the advantages of the allies?

It seems so, but despite conditions far from "ideal", Ukraine appears to also be making slow and difficult progress. This is a rebuttal to those who view the "slowness" of Ukraine's counteroffensive as equal to "failure".

5) The allies won, are you saying Ukraine will too?

I'm only saying that "slow =/= failure". Too many other factors will go into the ultimate outcome of the war (too much to cover in one 🧵)