Thread by @Divsallar

THREAD- How do foreign policy institutions of Iran operate?
 
In my new book chapter, I took a deep dive into the structure and rationale behind institutional development, & decision-making models of Iran's foreign policy establishments. /1

The chapter is part of very interesting book edited by @MehranKamrava with contribution of @KeshavarzianA @S_Akbarzadeh @mpargoo @AlirezaEshraghi @HamidehDorzadeh, Shirin Hunter, and others, that looks at how various institutions after the 1979 Islamic revolution evolved./2

The chapter begins by exploring the most influential factors that impacted the evolution of foreign policy institutions in the Islamic Republic. /3

I argue that a privileged access of elites to resources, legal rights, and information, combined with the country’s constant state of emergency due to its strategic environment are what should be seen as the context in which foreign policy institutions evolved. /4

To break down the complexity of foreign policy institutions, I used a role-based analysis, identifying different roles that institutions have evolved around them. Studying roles can tell which foreign policy institutions are more influential in a certain domains./5

Five group of institutions can be distinguished. First group is institutions of coordination and arbitration which are the most powerful among others, and act as a higher-level coordination and arbitration bodies. /6

Iran’s key foreign policy decisions emerges from the interaction among these institutions including Supreme Leader, Office of Supreme Leader, the president and Supreme National security Council. /7

Second group is executive institutions. In the Islamic Republic foreign policy decisions remain vague, with few implementation details, since the leadership leaves it to subordinates to battle over the details. Executive institutions benefit from a bounded level of autonomy. /8

But the SL may personally engage in a public or private messaging to audit policy implementations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IRGC’s Quds Forces, Majles, and Supreme National security Council are key members of executive institutions. /9

Third group is institutions of propagation which is perhaps the largest network of organizations in Iran’s foreign policy domain and are those dealing with propagating cultural and Islamic issues. /10

These organizations are symbols for institutionalization of the “revolutionary missions” under the umbrella of religious foundations, they are securitized institutions as well. /11

The Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, the Ahlul Bayt World Assembly, the Al-Mustafa International University are the most influential among the vast number of religious entities involved in foreign policy. /12

Fourth group is institutions of agenda setting which is among the least observed institutions in Iran’s foreign policy establishment. They have consistently expanded in agency & include diverse organizations from various echelons of power. /13

They are instruments for mobilizing support and shaping elite and public debate in foreign policy, among them: the Expediency Council’s Directorate (Dabirkhaneh-e Majma), various parliament committees, the Islamic  Republic of Iran Broadcasting Network (IRIBN)… /14

…the leader’s regional representatives, and think tanks. According to their political background, these institutions support different foreign policy objective and act as foreign policy voices for political factions./15

Fifth group is institutions of guardianship which is a powerful network of legislative, intelligence, and military organizations to protect decisions from foreign influence and transformation of revolution through foreign policy choices. /16

The Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, the Quds Force, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the OSL are principal players in this group. /17

They are responsible to (a) make sure that decisions and actions are in compliance with revolutionary principles; (b) guarantee that the Khamenei’s perspectives are followed; (c) prevent leaks and perform counter-espionage operations inside in the foreign policy arena. /18

Who Decides? The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy establishment is a crowded and mostly unregulated domain. Despite Khamenei’s dominance, foreign policy decisions are not simple manifestations of his personal determinations. /19

The revolutionary principles set broad boundaries of foreign policy directions, but the decision making process might change from subject to subject depending on its sensitivity. /20

The nature of a specific foreign policy issue, such as its ideological sensitivity, level of securitization, & its status in the leadership’s threat perception are determining which decision-making process applies. I identified three decision cycles based on subject matters./21

While sensitive decisions find their final form through intense bargaining inside the circle of elites – the leader, the president, their advisors, the SNSC, and the military-security complex – there are more autonomy for less sensitive subjects at the executive levels. /22

The leader’s arbitrating role is certainly a crucial factor in forging a consensus in favour of a specific decision. Many occasions this process has been unsuccessful in forming a sustainable consensus and thus resulted in indecisive decisions. /23

Last point, foreign policy institutions developed in a way that has prevented the formation of strong institutions. Being judged by their potential in solving immediate crises, the role and status of foreign policy institutions are in constant state of change. /24