"The officers who had officer ranks on February 24, 22 in platoons and companies basically finished Volnovakha, so it was mostly sergeants who were leading in Mariupol...
...In Mariupol, the sergeants ran out; in the summer, most often the most experienced fighter was the squad lead.
When in Mariupol the heavily battered infantry began to be "diluted" with mobilised, the "diluted" groups on the battlefield became unproductive - due to the...
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...high percentage of "mobilised" in the group, more or less experienced fighters spent all the time and energy to prevent panic / not allow these mobilised ones to wander around."
Russia committed its instructor cadre to Ukraine in April of 2022. What happened to DPR troops
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...has also happened to the vast majority of mobilized Russians.
I think the sole exception to this reality is the Russian VDV. Which has reportedly been using Belarus Army training infrastructure.
This means things.
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The @james_rands account has a 🧵that summarizes what has been going on with Russian troops strengths inside Ukraine nicely.
Russia has created deep WW2 scale minefields with trenchworks to stop Ukraine from moving their HIMARS into GMLRS range of the M-14 highway supplying RuAF.
This is why 60% of Russian defensive efforts was in the covering area and 1st "Surovikin Line"
Ukraine has simply paid the blood price of sending sappers at night to clear minefields and has chewed through the 1st "Surovikin Line" with significant available reserves.
Unengaged Ukrainian reserves with brigades of Western equipment.😉
The desperate situation Russia finds itself in is seeing the 76th VDV Air Assault Division (at 1/3 strength) thrown into an area that doesn't have the ground logistics to support it.
And the cherry on top is with the Russian destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam.
There is now a huge area of the former reservoir which is going to freeze solid when winter arrives to add a tremendous undefended gap in Russian lines.
The obstacles and fortifications downstream of the Nova Kakhovka dam were swept away without replacement because of the defense priority elsewhere, like the 1st Surovikin line.
I want people to look at this @PStyle0ne1 post video closely and remember were are looking at a, at most, low five figure - a little over $10,000 - drone munition with a ~120 km range.
This is a 1980's photo set of a $4,000,000 Tomahawk doing the same thing as that cardboard drone.
Yes, the Tomahawk does it better with a bigger bang out to 1,200 km.
At ~$15,000 a cardboard drone, you can buy 266 for a single Tomahawk.
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SAM's have been under performing their marketing for 65 plus years because the world is not flat.🤦♂️
The USAF & USN have had mission planning software that pre-plans air routes through enemy radar coverage to minimize engagement times for going on 30-years.🤷♂️
Small, cheap, low & slow drones are a b*tch of a target for modern integrated air defenses (IADS) in the age of satellite radar interference tracking of IADS radars.
Tracking the orbital elements of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites so you know they are overhead will become survival level military procedures for Patriot, SAMP/T and NASAM missile batteries.
I've been meaning to do a thread on this @PStyle0ne1 post below for several weeks because of the cost/price point implications for 21st century drone versus post WW2 conventional warfare.
There are huge cost/attrition warfare implications for an FPV drone reaching 17 km.
X accounts like @DefMon3 below are reporting that the RuAF have repositioned the VDV 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Kreminna Luhansk to the Robotyne area in Southern Ukraine.
Moving 6,000-to-8,000 VDV troopers to Robotyne on a priority basis, with the Kerch & other Crimea rail bridges closed, means they went by semi-tractor trailer from Rostov-on-the-Don to Melitopol, then by AFV to Robotyne.
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Putting that VDV 76th Air Assault Division "pig" through the RuAF logistical "python" on an emergency basis has opportunity costs.
Moving the 76th means RuAF is not moving fuel, ammo, beans and bullets to the troops that are on the Robotyne axis.
Those Pentagon or US Military officials saying Ukraine should use fewer drones and more ground patrols are as divorced from 21st century reality as Major General John Knowles Herr, the last branch chief of US Army horse cavalry, was from 20th century warfare.
The previous strikes on Crimean rail bridges, the more recent ones on the Henichesk, Chonhar, & Kerch bridges, interwoven with the systematic destruction of ammo/fuel depots in Southern Ukrainian and Dzhankoy Crimea, means that the "land bridge" that goes through Rostov-on-the 2/
...Don, Taganrog (Russia), Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Melitopol on the M-14 highway is the primary ground line of communications (GLOC) logistical artery for the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) in Southern Ukraine.