Thread by @Tatarigami_UA

To delve deeper into the topic of Russia's ability to refurbish and modernize their stored tanks, I would like to introduce further updates, images, data, and ultimately, share my conclusions on the subject.

But first, let's examine the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky facility. 🧵Thread:

2/ I'd like to emphasize that the scope of the conversation is not centered on tank storage bases but rather on refurbishing and modernization capabilities. I intend to provide an estimate of their capacities and track recent developments in the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky area

3/ It's probable that the 72nd factory operates or will operate within the confines of the 91st Central Reserve Base for Motor Vehicles or its immediate vicinity. In September 2022, Russian Prime Minister Mishustin announced:

4/ "In Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, we will construct the Armored Vehicle Repair Plant No. 72. The workforce at the plant in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky will consist of 227 individuals. A land area of 25.7 hectares has been allocated for it in proximity to the Shahta-17"

5/ Analysis of imagery reveals a new hangar-like structure within the base. Its status as the previously announced "new plant" is unclear. The absence of external new facilities indicates that construction may not have commenced, or it might have been confined to this hangar.

6/ As per available public reports, this specific section (on the image) is allocated for T-62M and T-64 tanks. Nevertheless, based on on-site imagery and other satellite data, it appears that other tank variants, modifications, and IFVs are also present within the same area.

7/ Comparative satellite imagery reveals a reduction of over 50% in tanks and IFVs between May and August. The frequent presence of tank-transporting trailers suggests active utilization of the facility.

8/ Regrettably, these figures, on their own, do not offer a comprehensive perspective and cannot address inquiries such as the monthly tank upgrading capacity. Nonetheless, it remains crucial to contextualize it within the framework of publicly accessible data

9/ According to the recent report by the "Institut Action Resilience," it is estimated that russia's storage inventory comprises nearly 6,000 tanks. An essential point to emphasize is that this figure encompasses all tanks, irrespective of their condition.

10/ While providing a precise estimate can be challenging, their calculations rely on manual assessments of imagery and estimations regarding the potential storage capacity within hangar facilities.

11/ According to Oryx estimates, russian tank losses currently stand at approximately 2,289 tanks and continue to rise, which forces russians to take tanks from their reserves, undergo refurbishment, and carry out modernization processes. This usually takes at least 30 days.

12/ While the exact figure remains speculative, my estimate for russia's modernization and refurbishment capabilities, considering the contribution of 5 facilities and data from the "Institut Action Resilience," falls within the range of approximately 200-290 tanks per year.

13/ This situation suggests that Russia is notably lagging in terms of tank refurbishment and modernization of older tanks. While this is positive news for Ukraine, it's essential to recognize that every tank on the battlefield, regardless of its age, poses a potential threat.

14/ Tanks continue to be a vital component of assaults, although their traditional role has been reduced due to heavy minefields and abundance of anti-tank means. This dynamic often forces tanks to engage in a hit-and-run tactics or use indirect fire from concealed positions.

15/ Older, modernized tanks still require efforts and means for neutralization. It's a vital reminder that Ukraine requires a steady supply of not only advanced weapons but also regular munitions and ammo to maintain its capabilities for protecting and liberating territories

Thanks to your contributions via Buy Me A Coffee, I was able to purchase and publish this satellite imagery. If you've found this thread useful, please like and repost the first message of the thread. You can also follow my Substack, as I plan to expand: tatarigami.substack.com