Using cars as strategic logistical transportation to Mariupol represents a fleet wide level of operational attrition affecting both tactical trucks like the Kamaz and Semi-Tractor trailer rigs.
To use civilian cars in the long haul strategic transport role to Mariupol from Rostov-on-the-Don means a horrific level of operational attrition representing the 'de-motorization' of the Russian Economy is happening in real time.
The use of the term "Ukrainian Nazi Azov Battalion" by @LauraLoomer indicates her complete capture by Russian reflexive control information warfare methods.
The Russians have spent decades playing this game and they have gotten into the heads of many Americans on the left, right, and center including not a few DC defense analysts who always overestimate Russian strength.
Russia's peacetime Reflexive control infowar have mapped & fed to each specific US tribal & professional demographic the data to get the message Russian wants those groups to believe.
"The officers who had officer ranks on February 24, 22 in platoons and companies basically finished Volnovakha, so it was mostly sergeants who were leading in Mariupol...
...In Mariupol, the sergeants ran out; in the summer, most often the most experienced fighter was the squad lead.
When in Mariupol the heavily battered infantry began to be "diluted" with mobilised, the "diluted" groups on the battlefield became unproductive - due to the...
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I want people to look at this @PStyle0ne1 post video closely and remember were are looking at a, at most, low five figure - a little over $10,000 - drone munition with a ~120 km range.
This is a 1980's photo set of a $4,000,000 Tomahawk doing the same thing as that cardboard drone.
Yes, the Tomahawk does it better with a bigger bang out to 1,200 km.
At ~$15,000 a cardboard drone, you can buy 266 for a single Tomahawk.
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SAM's have been under performing their marketing for 65 plus years because the world is not flat.🤦♂️
The USAF & USN have had mission planning software that pre-plans air routes through enemy radar coverage to minimize engagement times for going on 30-years.🤷♂️
Small, cheap, low & slow drones are a b*tch of a target for modern integrated air defenses (IADS) in the age of satellite radar interference tracking of IADS radars.
Tracking the orbital elements of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites so you know they are overhead will become survival level military procedures for Patriot, SAMP/T and NASAM missile batteries.
I've been meaning to do a thread on this @PStyle0ne1 post below for several weeks because of the cost/price point implications for 21st century drone versus post WW2 conventional warfare.
There are huge cost/attrition warfare implications for an FPV drone reaching 17 km.
X accounts like @DefMon3 below are reporting that the RuAF have repositioned the VDV 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Kreminna Luhansk to the Robotyne area in Southern Ukraine.
Moving 6,000-to-8,000 VDV troopers to Robotyne on a priority basis, with the Kerch & other Crimea rail bridges closed, means they went by semi-tractor trailer from Rostov-on-the-Don to Melitopol, then by AFV to Robotyne.
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Putting that VDV 76th Air Assault Division "pig" through the RuAF logistical "python" on an emergency basis has opportunity costs.
Moving the 76th means RuAF is not moving fuel, ammo, beans and bullets to the troops that are on the Robotyne axis.