1/ As of September 7, 2023, based on satellite imagery from September 6th shared in this thread and comparative analysis, it is clear that Ukrainian forces are inflicting significant damage on russian fortified defenses in the vicinity of Verbove and Novoprokopivka.
🧵Thread:
2/ While I cannot definitively confirm troop control from imagery alone, it's clear that the russian forces are encountering intense artillery fire. The obliterated positions behind the 'Surovikin line' near Verbove suggest they may be struggling to defend the area.
3/ This image, captured a week ago, can serve as a valuable point of comparison, indicating that the pressure on russian defenses has been consistently maintained.
4/ An additional image from September 6th corroborates earlier reports regarding the sustained pressure and ongoing combat in the northeastern area of Novoprokopivka. This confirmation is evident when comparing the shelling and scorched earth patterns.
5/ It's worth noting that russia claims that it conducts counter-attacks in the southwestern sector of Robotyne. Satellite imagery reveals minor changes in the area, suggesting some activity, but russia has not provided any evidence to showcase any success
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Ukraine is likely approaching the final stages of the active phase of the war. I suggest taking a look at my assessment, which draws on General Budanov’s overlooked speech at the Yalta Conference, along with insights from other reports and assessments
🧵Thread:
2/ Any war of attrition tests endurance, economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war continues, these issues intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point. Production and the capacity to replace losses are tangible factors that can be projected
3/ One notable point from Budanov’s speech was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024.
Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tank models from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is no longer in production.
After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
An alleged drone strike has targeted the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, according to early reports. The depot, closely monitored by Frontelligence Insight for its role in artillery ammo logistics, gained international attention in 2023 following the arrival of North Korean ammo.
🧵Thread
2/ Krasnodar Governor Veniamin Kondratyev reported that two UAVs targeting Tikhoretsk were "suppressed", with debris causing a fire and detonation of flammable materials. Videos on social media suggest a large denotation
Screenshot from the video posted by @war_monitor_ua
3/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot was expanded in 2023 to store North Korean munitions. Most ammo arrived by train in containers, unloaded and stored in revetments - essentially pits in the ground under open sky. Civilian trucks then transported the munitions to frontlines
As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
Ukrainian MFA stated that Belarusian armed forces are concentrating a significant number of personnel, weapons, and equipment near Ukraine's northern border under the guise of exercises
🧵It's still early to draw any definitive conclusions, but a few points should be considered:
2/ In February 2024, Frontelligence Insight and Rochan Consulting released an analysis of the Belarusian military's readiness, concluding that its combat units are typically manned at only 30-40% capacity, relying heavily on mobilization, with the rest filled during mobilization
3/ This suggests that if Belarus was seriously preparing for a major invasion, significant mobilization efforts would be seen. For fairness, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of an attack; it's more about the potential scale of attack if ever happens
Joe Lonsdale, founder of 8VC and employer of the son of sanctioned Russian oligarch Vadim Moshkovich, has brushed off allegations of Moshkovich's involvement in drone production. For clarity, let's focus on the facts, documents, and records.
🧵Thread:
2/ First, let’s examine the rule issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Industry and Security. It clearly states that Assistagro and Geomiragro are contributing to the development of military-grade drones in Russia.
3/ Vadim Moshkovich is the founder of several companies, including AssistAgro. His role as both founder and investor in this company can be confirmed through various sources, including public company databases, official records, and media reports. Sources in the next tweet