1/ As of September 7, 2023, based on satellite imagery from September 6th shared in this thread and comparative analysis, it is clear that Ukrainian forces are inflicting significant damage on russian fortified defenses in the vicinity of Verbove and Novoprokopivka.
🧵Thread:
2/ While I cannot definitively confirm troop control from imagery alone, it's clear that the russian forces are encountering intense artillery fire. The obliterated positions behind the 'Surovikin line' near Verbove suggest they may be struggling to defend the area.
3/ This image, captured a week ago, can serve as a valuable point of comparison, indicating that the pressure on russian defenses has been consistently maintained.
4/ An additional image from September 6th corroborates earlier reports regarding the sustained pressure and ongoing combat in the northeastern area of Novoprokopivka. This confirmation is evident when comparing the shelling and scorched earth patterns.
5/ It's worth noting that russia claims that it conducts counter-attacks in the southwestern sector of Robotyne. Satellite imagery reveals minor changes in the area, suggesting some activity, but russia has not provided any evidence to showcase any success
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To delve deeper into the topic of Russia's ability to refurbish and modernize their stored tanks, I would like to introduce further updates, images, data, and ultimately, share my conclusions on the subject.
But first, let's examine the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky facility. 🧵Thread:
2/ I'd like to emphasize that the scope of the conversation is not centered on tank storage bases but rather on refurbishing and modernization capabilities. I intend to provide an estimate of their capacities and track recent developments in the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky area
3/ It's probable that the 72nd factory operates or will operate within the confines of the 91st Central Reserve Base for Motor Vehicles or its immediate vicinity. In September 2022, Russian Prime Minister Mishustin announced:
Recently, the Russians released a manual outlining tactics to counter Ukrainian assaults. This guide draws from recent encounters with the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in June and July 2023, particularly during their liberation of Novodarivka and Levadne. 🧵Thread:
2/ It's crucial to note that the Russians are presenting their perspective on Ukrainian units and their actions, based on their experience with a single Ukrainian mechanized brigade. This viewpoint should be carefully weighed before extrapolating it to the whole frontline.
3/ Russians describe the following configuration used by Ukrainian units:
Assault teams comprise 20 members, divided into four subgroups of five. Two groups are assault subgroups. The third serves as a consolidation subgroup. The fourth functions as a reserve subgroup.
Impressive thread was done by the @Black_BirdGroup about defenses in the south. In relation to this subject, I'd like to add additional insights and context. My intention is not to critique their presented report, but to emphasize crucial details that need to be added. 🧵Thread
2/ Frequently, I see analysts focusing on visible defenses. This could foster the perception that the first defensive line is where fortifications are visible through satellite imagery, based on the presence of features like dragon's teeth, trenches, or anti-tank ditches.
3/ In my perspective, this tendency can be attributed to the Streetlight effect - an observational bias wherein people exclusively search where it's easiest to look. In the context of satellite imagery, this translates to focusing on only visible defense structures.
🧵I came across an article today in The Washington Post that discusses the counter-offensive. I usually refrain from criticizing leaks, recognizing the importance of journalistic work. Nevertheless, in light of the statement in the article, I want to provide some counterpoints:
2/ It is challenging to ascertain the credibility of the official giving the commentary. It remains unclear whether the statement accurately reflects Pentagon's stance, if it was a journalist's interpretation of an official's words, or it was an actual statement
3/ Should we accept this statement at face value, it is arguably one of the worst statements I have encountered recently. The statement raises doubts regarding the authenticity of the statement itself. Drones play a pivotal role in minimizing the risk to servicememebers lives
1/ Yesterday, I discussed Russian reinforcements and reserves in the South, but didn't mention them specifically. Today, it's safe to say that I was referring to the movement of units from the 76th Guards Air Assault Division from the North-East
2/ I anticipated that it would take a few days for the OSINT community to detect and identify them, hence I waited until today. According to russian military doctrine, at least on paper, 76th division is a part of their strategic reserves, underscoring the seriousness of the move
3/ As of now, refraining from additional statements, it's crucial to acknowledge the twofold implications. On one hand, this strengthens russian operational capacities. On the other, their failure will critically impair of combat-ready reserves for rapid deployment.
As this war has now extended beyond a year and a half, the issue of cost efficiency becomes even more important. Using the illustration of a russian logistical facility located in Yakymivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, I will explain this challenge in a straightforward manner.
🧵Thread:
2/ Since 2022, this logistical node has operated as a russian vehicle repair facility, primarily focusing on armored vehicles. Through a comparative analysis of imagery, it becomes evident that the facility is operational, although its capacity remains somewhat limited.
3/ This leads us to the subsequent question: can we dismiss this facility as insignificant in terms of targeting? Simultaneously, is it truly justifiable to deploy 2-3 million dollar Stormshadow missile, limited in supply, against a relatively basic repair shop setup?