Jason Furman Profile picture
Sep 13 13 tweets 4 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
We had 2 consecutive unqualifiedly good CPI reports. I was hoping for a 3rd but this one is only qualifiedly good. Not a huge concern but some.

I'm focused on core CPI which grew at a 3.4% annual rate after 2 months <2%. Image
Note, I'm not worried about headline inflation. It was very high in August and the 12-month rate rose from 3.2% to 3.7%.

IS a good measure of how August was a difficult month for households with an 11% (sa) increase in gasoline.

But IS NOT a good predictor of future inflation. Image
Back to core. When you see a number like this you like to look for special factor "excuses". The go-to has been shelter which is lagged but was the slowest growth in 2 years. Yes can slow more but probably not a lot more. Image
Also core goods prices fell again in August. Maybe they could fall more but this was, if anything, possibly unusually low. (New car prices increased a decent amount.) Image
If you exclude shelter & used cars what some people call "supercore" jumped up a lot in August--about as bad as anything earlier this year.

Is because we had a transitory? fall in used cars in August.

Will be further upward pressure in Oct when medical services resets. Image
And core services ex shelter, which the Fed has says it tracks (but I'm ambivalent about because such a small %age of the basket) was way up in August. Image
And here is swapping new rents instead of all rents for core. The most reassuring of the bunch because new rents are actually falling. Is a useful gut check but I would not actually assume that we're going to see substantial falls in all rents anytime soon. Image
BTW here are average hourly earnings (overall private and production and non-supervisory which excludes managers) relative to their immediate pre-pandemic trend (the pace they were on in 2018 and 2019).
Image
Image
Almost everything in my write-up above is about inflation within the month of August. That is one month of data. One month is noisy so would not read too much into it.

BUT a lot of the previous reassurance was based on just two months of data. Which is also noisy.
Overall I still feel better than I did a few months ago about the possibility of a soft landing. But I feel a bit worse than I did yesterday.

And if you over-updated based on the noisy June and July data you should probably be over-updating back again based on the August data.
P.S. One month of data will not and should not change what the Fed does next week. But if we get two more months like this then I would hope they hike again at the December meeting.
P.P.S. Here are all the numbers. Image
P.P.P.S. There were some volatile things that boosted core this month that will go away that I didn’t note above like the 4.9% increase in airfares. But overall stand by the view that not much more shelter slowdown left and some volatile good news in August that will go away.

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More from @jasonfurman

Sep 14
The breathless debates over whether real wages are up since pre-COVID (& not sure why it's a debate--they are up) are all missing a key point: households/workers are mostly getting bigger pay increases than the data suggests.

🧵on repeated cross sections vs. longitudinal data.
The average data people cite is for a different group over time. And the groups are, to a first approximation, the same in in terms of age/experience/seniority.

If you followed the same group of people they would get a bigger raise because their age/experience/seniority rises.
Eg, average inflation-adjusted wages for production and non-supervisory workers were $28.38/hr in Feb 2020 and $29.00/hr in Aug 2023, a 2.2% increase.

But the 2023 group includes often lower-paid young people who were not working in 2020 while dropping higher-paid retirees.
Read 8 tweets
Sep 3
A nice write-up of the stunning increase/level of the deficit by @JStein_WaPo. In fact the increase is so stunning that you have to think that at least some of it is transitory noise. But some of it probably is not just transitory noise.

A 🧵. washingtonpost.com/business/2023/…
Note: My numbers below depart from the official numbers in that they do not count a ~$400b cost in FY 2022 for student loan debt relief that never happened nor do they count a similar-sized saving that will likely show up in the FY 2023 numbers as a result of the SCOTUS decision.
Based on the latest CBO rough estimate the deficit will rise from about 4.0% of GDP in FY 2022 to ~7.8% of GDP in FY 2023. (In nominal dollars is more than doubling from a bit less than $1 trillion to a bit more than $2 trillion.)
cbo.gov/publication/59…
Read 15 tweets
Aug 29
The immaculate loosening of the labor market continues as the quits rate hits a landmark 2.3% in July, which is where it was prior to COVID.

The quits rate is a good predictor of inflation--and a good benchmark for how workers are perceiving the labor market. Image
The job openings rate also has fallen from a peak of 7.4% in March 2022 to 5.3% in July. It is still 1.4 standard deviations above pre-COVID (although some argument that it was trending up prior to COVID so may be less tight then it seems). Image
Remarkably both of these have happened without any increase in the unemployment rate. That is why it is an "immaculate loosening," somehow labor market demand has cooled without jobs being lost. Image
Read 9 tweets
Aug 21
My @WSJopinion argues that the Fed should make a "hawkish pivot" to a higher inflation target. Specifically get inflation <3.0%. Then shift to a 2-3% range, stick with that, and re-emphasize the price stability side of the mandate.

A 🧵 summarizes.
wsj.com/articles/the-f…
1st: What is the right blank slate inflation target? Inflation is costly & inconvenient. But it also plays a useful stabilizing role that minimizes the severity of business cycles by making it easier for businesses to cut real wages, sectoral adjustments & negative real rates.
In the late 1990s the Fed, like many other central banks, decided that 2% struck the right balance. It's not obvious that was right then. And regardless changes since then suggest that IF 2% was right then it is too low now.
Read 19 tweets
Aug 10
The CPI came in basically just as expected--the second unambiguously good month in a row (following a few months that most likely should be interpreted as improvements as well).

Core CPI at an annual rate:

1 month: 1.9%
3 months: 3.1%
6 months: 4.1%
12 months: 4.7% Image
As expected 12-month CPI rose from 3.0% in June to 3.2% in July. Tells you less about July 2023 (when inflation was low, 0.2% m/m) than about July 2022 dropping out of the sample (when inflation was even lower, 0.0% m/m).

On 3-month basis is slowing.

https://t.co/hPrXFiOLNH
Image
Also dropping shelter (which is slowing but still growing more than normal) & used cars (which fell a lot in July) you get "supercore" inflation. Was flat again in July.

One big caution: heavily lagged health services prices, which are falling, has a big weight in this. Image
Read 10 tweets
Jul 29
Rough view of what the Fed should do this year based on core PCE in 2023-H2:

1. Above 3.5%: Hike more than once.

2. At 3.5%: Hike once.

3. Below 3.5% & UR < 4%: No more hikes.

4. Below 3.5% & UR > 4%: Cut rates.
This is roughly consistent with the reaction function implicit in the June FOMC Summary of Economic Projections (note full-year core PCE of 3.9% means ~3.5% in H2). So to the degree real activity and inflation deviate from what they expected they should react accordingly. Image
(Note my rough recommendation focuses on unemployment shortfalls not unemployment deviations. That is to say, would not raise rates more just because the unemployment rate is below the Fed's 4.1% forecast or 4.0% implicit NAIRU. Would only raise more if inflation above forecast.)
Read 7 tweets

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