Preliminary BDA assessment thread on successful Yevpatoria attack: tonight, videos surfaced, showing explosions in close vicinity to Yevpatoria. Satellite imagery confirms S-400 battery engagement, destroying at least one S-400 TEL near Zaozerne.
🧵Thread:
2/ Based on scorch marks and debris, it appears that at least one S-400 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) was destroyed. Typically, the S-400 complex includes a command and control center (a truck), two radar units for engagement and acquisition, and multiple TEL's
3/ It appears that other vehicles are in motion, having left their revetments, indicating an attempt to relocate. Notably, the absence of the all-altitude detector 96L6-1 suggests that it either wasn't originally present or was the first vehicle removed from the site
4/ An ideal scenario would have been the destruction of the rare radar system to blind all TELs, but the operation remains impressive and successful nonetheless. The successful engagement at such a distance using combined aerial means to target an AD system is remarkable.
5/ The deployed S-400 system, a cutting-edge air-defense system in russia, has been destroyed, revealing vulnerabilities to Ukrainian weaponry. This weakens their air-defense capabilities and creates new opportunities for deeper strikes.
6/ Thanks to your contributions via Buy Me A Coffee, I am able to purchase and publish satellite imagery. If you've found this thread useful, please like and repost the first message of the thread. You can also follow my Substack, as I plan to expand soon: tatarigami.substack.com
Made updates per @GuyPlopsky suggestion (removed E from the radar name, which is for export versions)
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While many experts have provided valuable assessments on the potential submarine damage in Sevastopol, I'd like to add some additional context. After further analyzing and comparing the latest images, I've identified a few noteworthy details. 🧵Thread
2/When comparing @BlackSky_Inc 's imagery from September 13th with Planet's from September 15th, I've noticed a green tarp on the submarine's rear section. While its exact purpose is unclear, its presence is unusual, hinting at alleged efforts to conceal something.
3/ A quite interesting detail is the appearance of objects resembling water cannons spraying water. Due to image quality limitations, I'll avoid speculations, as image quality prevents me from definitive conclusions, but it's worth noting as another unusual element in the imagery
While global attention is primarily on the counter-offensive in the South, there has been noteworthy yet often unnoticed progress in the southernmost part of Bakhmut's defenses. In this thread, I will provide the latest information about Kurdyumivka and its significance.🧵Thread:
2/ Kurdyumivka, a small town situated to the south of Bakhmut, holds a tactical advantage due to its elevated position. It offers crucial control over vital roadways connecting Horlivka and Bakhmut, encompassing both highways and railway lines.
3/ As illustrated in this image, maintaining control over Kurdyumivka and the eastern heights affords the ability to establish effective fire control and disrupt the enemy's logistical route from Horlivka and Svitlodarsk to Bakhmut, which passes in close proximity to Kurdyumivka
Preliminary BDA assessment thread on successful Yevpatoria attack: tonight, videos surfaced, showing explosions in close vicinity to Yevpatoria. Satellite imagery confirms S-400 battery engagement, destroying at least one S-400 TEL near Zaozerne. 🧵Thread:
2/ Based on scorch marks and debris, it appears that at least one S-400 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) was destroyed. Typically, the S-400 complex includes a command and control center (a truck), two radar units for engagement and acquisition, and multiple TEL's
3/ It appears that other vehicles are in motion, having left their revetments, indicating an attempt to relocate. Notably, the absence of the all-altitude detector 96L6E suggests that it either wasn't originally present or was the first vehicle removed from the site
1/ As of September 7, 2023, based on satellite imagery from September 6th shared in this thread and comparative analysis, it is clear that Ukrainian forces are inflicting significant damage on russian fortified defenses in the vicinity of Verbove and Novoprokopivka.
🧵Thread:
2/ While I cannot definitively confirm troop control from imagery alone, it's clear that the russian forces are encountering intense artillery fire. The obliterated positions behind the 'Surovikin line' near Verbove suggest they may be struggling to defend the area.
3/ This image, captured a week ago, can serve as a valuable point of comparison, indicating that the pressure on russian defenses has been consistently maintained.
To delve deeper into the topic of Russia's ability to refurbish and modernize their stored tanks, I would like to introduce further updates, images, data, and ultimately, share my conclusions on the subject.
But first, let's examine the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky facility. 🧵Thread:
2/ I'd like to emphasize that the scope of the conversation is not centered on tank storage bases but rather on refurbishing and modernization capabilities. I intend to provide an estimate of their capacities and track recent developments in the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky area
3/ It's probable that the 72nd factory operates or will operate within the confines of the 91st Central Reserve Base for Motor Vehicles or its immediate vicinity. In September 2022, Russian Prime Minister Mishustin announced:
Recently, the Russians released a manual outlining tactics to counter Ukrainian assaults. This guide draws from recent encounters with the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in June and July 2023, particularly during their liberation of Novodarivka and Levadne. 🧵Thread:
2/ It's crucial to note that the Russians are presenting their perspective on Ukrainian units and their actions, based on their experience with a single Ukrainian mechanized brigade. This viewpoint should be carefully weighed before extrapolating it to the whole frontline.
3/ Russians describe the following configuration used by Ukrainian units:
Assault teams comprise 20 members, divided into four subgroups of five. Two groups are assault subgroups. The third serves as a consolidation subgroup. The fourth functions as a reserve subgroup.