While global attention is primarily on the counter-offensive in the South, there has been noteworthy yet often unnoticed progress in the southernmost part of Bakhmut's defenses. In this thread, I will provide the latest information about Kurdyumivka and its significance.🧵Thread:
2/ Kurdyumivka, a small town situated to the south of Bakhmut, holds a tactical advantage due to its elevated position. It offers crucial control over vital roadways connecting Horlivka and Bakhmut, encompassing both highways and railway lines.
3/ As illustrated in this image, maintaining control over Kurdyumivka and the eastern heights affords the ability to establish effective fire control and disrupt the enemy's logistical route from Horlivka and Svitlodarsk to Bakhmut, which passes in close proximity to Kurdyumivka
4/ Kurdyumivka presents a formidable challenge as a target due to its elevated position in relation to advancing Ukrainian forces, as well as its separation by bodies of water, including this channel, with a restricted number of bridges available for crossing
5/ During June and July 2023, the 28th brigade exerted substantial pressure, forcing russian retreat across the channel and setting the stage for further advances towards Kurdyumivka. This time-lapse video documents the progress
6/ In a successful June operation, the 28th brigade's mechanized battalion destroyed the enemy battalion and captured fortified positions, bolstering security for the advancing northern sector forces.
7/ Upon seizing fortified positions, navigating minefields, and crossing a water channel, the 28th brigade faced formidable resistance from the 1428th Rgt, the 57th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Bde, and elements of the Akhmat-North Rgt and St. George Reconnaissance Assault Bde
8/ The area north of Kurdyumivka has transformed into a fierce battleground, with the russians heavily fortifying their defenses to halt any northern advances. The vivid imagery highlights the intense combat that unfolded, with every meter of land fiercely contested.
9/ The stark comparison between August and September reveals the extent of destruction in the area, which was liberated from the russians despite their numerical advantage and the support of Lancets, FPV drones, artillery, and Ka-52 helicopters providing cover.
10/ This brief video offers a general overview of the 28th's summer campaign, starting with the clearance of defensive lines along the eastern side of the channel, which forced elements from multiple brigades and regiments to retreat. It then secured a land route into Kurdyumivka
11/ The second phase involved a northern push, with support from neighboring brigades. This enabled the 28th to engage the enemy from both the northern and eastern flanks simultaneously, forcing the enemy to abandon their positions and retreat beyond the railroad to higher ground
12/ Lancets, as well as the Ka-52 helicopters, located around 105km from Kurdyumivka, pose a significant threat due to the absence of good AD cover. With a substantial supply of Vikhr AT-missiles at their disposal, these Ka-52s compel our units to heavily rely on infantry on foot
13/ Despite adversity and against all odds, the 28th Brigade forced the 1428th Rgt and units from the 51st, 31st, and 7th (assault-recon) brigades to retreat across the railroad, abandoning their positions north of Kurdyumivka. The brigade still controls the dam in Kurdyumivka.
14/ Naturally, the 28th brigade does not operate in isolation; it receives support from other units. These forward advances often come with losses. However, in comparison, russian forces bear an even heavier burden of losses and continue to retreat
15/ While artillery remains crucial, drones are vital for fire correction, reconnaissance, assaults, defense, and maneuvers. Given the high drone casualty rate in this war, brigades rely on a constant supply from civilian organizations
16/ This is an excellent example fundraiser currently raising money to assist the 32nd and 28th brigades with drones. Feel free to check and contribute to support them:
17/ Thank you for reading. If you found this thread interesting, please assist by liking and sharing the first message of the thread, as it greatly contributes to improving the post's visibility via the algorithm.
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As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
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2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.
Analysis: New Data Suggests Russia Is Sustaining Mi-8 Output Despite Wartime Losses
According to non-public Russian procurement documents obtained and analyzed by the Frontelligence Insight team, current Mi-8 production appears sufficient to offset wartime losses. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the Soviet era, more than 12,000 Mi-8 helicopters of all types have been produced. It’s a versatile military transport platform that can move troops, cargo, serve as a flying hospital or EW asset, and conduct attack missions with unguided rockets and 100–500 kg bombs.
3/ Correspondence between Aviafarm and ZOMZ the Defense Ministry and ZOMZ show a request for 40 IS-264A thermometers: 20 for Kazan and 20 for Ulan-Ude, where Mi-8s are produced.
Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all