While global attention is primarily on the counter-offensive in the South, there has been noteworthy yet often unnoticed progress in the southernmost part of Bakhmut's defenses. In this thread, I will provide the latest information about Kurdyumivka and its significance.🧵Thread:
2/ Kurdyumivka, a small town situated to the south of Bakhmut, holds a tactical advantage due to its elevated position. It offers crucial control over vital roadways connecting Horlivka and Bakhmut, encompassing both highways and railway lines.
3/ As illustrated in this image, maintaining control over Kurdyumivka and the eastern heights affords the ability to establish effective fire control and disrupt the enemy's logistical route from Horlivka and Svitlodarsk to Bakhmut, which passes in close proximity to Kurdyumivka
4/ Kurdyumivka presents a formidable challenge as a target due to its elevated position in relation to advancing Ukrainian forces, as well as its separation by bodies of water, including this channel, with a restricted number of bridges available for crossing
5/ During June and July 2023, the 28th brigade exerted substantial pressure, forcing russian retreat across the channel and setting the stage for further advances towards Kurdyumivka. This time-lapse video documents the progress
6/ In a successful June operation, the 28th brigade's mechanized battalion destroyed the enemy battalion and captured fortified positions, bolstering security for the advancing northern sector forces.
7/ Upon seizing fortified positions, navigating minefields, and crossing a water channel, the 28th brigade faced formidable resistance from the 1428th Rgt, the 57th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Bde, and elements of the Akhmat-North Rgt and St. George Reconnaissance Assault Bde
8/ The area north of Kurdyumivka has transformed into a fierce battleground, with the russians heavily fortifying their defenses to halt any northern advances. The vivid imagery highlights the intense combat that unfolded, with every meter of land fiercely contested.
9/ The stark comparison between August and September reveals the extent of destruction in the area, which was liberated from the russians despite their numerical advantage and the support of Lancets, FPV drones, artillery, and Ka-52 helicopters providing cover.
10/ This brief video offers a general overview of the 28th's summer campaign, starting with the clearance of defensive lines along the eastern side of the channel, which forced elements from multiple brigades and regiments to retreat. It then secured a land route into Kurdyumivka
11/ The second phase involved a northern push, with support from neighboring brigades. This enabled the 28th to engage the enemy from both the northern and eastern flanks simultaneously, forcing the enemy to abandon their positions and retreat beyond the railroad to higher ground
12/ Lancets, as well as the Ka-52 helicopters, located around 105km from Kurdyumivka, pose a significant threat due to the absence of good AD cover. With a substantial supply of Vikhr AT-missiles at their disposal, these Ka-52s compel our units to heavily rely on infantry on foot
13/ Despite adversity and against all odds, the 28th Brigade forced the 1428th Rgt and units from the 51st, 31st, and 7th (assault-recon) brigades to retreat across the railroad, abandoning their positions north of Kurdyumivka. The brigade still controls the dam in Kurdyumivka.
14/ Naturally, the 28th brigade does not operate in isolation; it receives support from other units. These forward advances often come with losses. However, in comparison, russian forces bear an even heavier burden of losses and continue to retreat
15/ While artillery remains crucial, drones are vital for fire correction, reconnaissance, assaults, defense, and maneuvers. Given the high drone casualty rate in this war, brigades rely on a constant supply from civilian organizations
16/ This is an excellent example fundraiser currently raising money to assist the 32nd and 28th brigades with drones. Feel free to check and contribute to support them:
17/ Thank you for reading. If you found this thread interesting, please assist by liking and sharing the first message of the thread, as it greatly contributes to improving the post's visibility via the algorithm.
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Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all
Financial Times reports that, under the draft plan, Ukraine would be required to cede full control of the Donbas region and halve the size of its armed forces. The plan would also require Ukraine to give up certain types of weaponry:
2/ The plan would also require Ukraine to recognize Russian as an official state language and grant official status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, provisions that echo long-standing Kremlin political objectives.
3/ Officials in Kyiv briefed on the plan said it closely aligns with the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and would be a non-starter for Ukraine without significant changes, according to @ChristopherJM with @FT
A clear video showing a Kh-family cruise missile descending, releasing flares and striking a residential building in Ternopil this morning indicates the attack was deliberate, contradicting claims by Russian propaganda and bot networks that it resulted from air-defense.🧵Thread:
2/ In the first second of the video, the sound of the cruise missile is clearly audible, and flares can be seen deploying before impact. Russians started to use flares on their missiles as countermeasures against air-defence systems, including MANPADS around 2023.
3/ The missile’s silhouette, with its relatively short, swept-back wings and boat-shaped fuselage, closely matches the Kh-series of cruise missiles
In November, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that 44 Indian nationals were serving in the Russian army. Frontelligence Insight obtained and reviewed data that shows the real number is higher. At least 146 Indian citizens have signed contracts. 🧵Thread:
2/ Thanks to data provided by @hochuzhit_com and our own investigation, we found that Russia, working through local recruiters in India, actively targeting Indian nationals and pulling them into military service despite the Indian government’s attempts to reduce such activities.
3/ We identified more than a dozen ongoing or recently concluded advertising campaigns targeting Indian citizens. In the image below, you can see examples from Facebook, YouTube, and other social-media platforms promotions. Notably, some advertisements directly mention Alabuga
A year and a half ago, in April 2024, I warned (the section is highlighted in the auto-translated text) that aid to Ukraine would continue to dwindle, and that without proper changes we would find ourselves in a poor position. What we’re seeing now was set in motion a while ago.
2/ Besides Europe, which I was mostly addressing in that post, Ukraine has also fallen short, mainly in strategic-level organization, despite several successes such as expanding and deploying unmanned forces and improving long-range strikes that have hurt the Russian economy.
3/ The winning strategy, as my team outlined after the 2023 counteroffensive, can be summed up as “stall the enemy while destroying the rear,” meaning inflict maximum socio-economic damage while preventing the enemy from making real gains and making the war plainly too costly.