In light of further attacks on a Crimean based S-400 battery near Yevpatoria, I'm going to revisit by 'hot take' on the Sevastopol dry dock attack and try to put both into wider Ukrainian operational campaign context.
An AFU Shaping Operations & Black Sea A2AD Strategy 🧵 1/
When I wrote the earlier thread I thought some combination of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG, 5V28/S-200 and Neptune were involved.
It turned out that I was two out of three on my guesses & a further two missiles that I missed.
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There were 3 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG impacts at the dry dock. The landing ship Minsk caught a missile in the engine room, the Kilo class sub Rostov-on-the-Don got a missile through the torpedo room, & a 3rd took down a dry dock crane
H/T to @front_ukrainian lft, @SmartUACat, rt 3/
Three Storm Shadow means at least two Ukrainian PSU (Air Force) Su-24 light bombers were used in this strike.
PSU doctrine is usually 1-2 precision guided rounds per DMPI (Desired Mean Aim Point) for important targets.
So, 3 Storm Shadow hit 3 DMPI & RuAF made claims of 7 of 10 cruise missiles, then later S-200 missiles shot down, for "NATO crossed a Russian red-line" propaganda reasons.🙄
The "Reporting from Ukraine" YouTube channel stated SCALP-EG, HARM & S-200 5/
...missiles were used at Sevastopol with S-200 to activate VKS SAM's for HARM to kill & USV to distract Black Sea corvettes from air defense duties via naval close quarters battle (CQB).
It is the use of HARM missiles that tells us a lot about the PSU strike force, the missiles used and how far back Ukrainian shaping operations have gone in setting up this strike.
HARM missiles in "Pre-Briefed" mode reach 150 km, that is, PSU shot them from the Black Sea.
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Both PSU Mig-29 & Su-27 have been shooting HARM missiles for months.
Given the distances & operational simplicity necessary for reduced radio transmissions. PSU used a pair each of Su-27 and Su-24 from a single base & flew out low over the Black Sea. 11/
This has changed due to AFU 'Shaping Operations' in the western Black Sea to change it from a Russian lake to an anti-access area denial (A2AD) zone for the Black Sea Fleet & the VKS.
Most date it to the 23/24 Aug 2023 attacks at Cape Tarkhankut...
...in Western Crimea, destroying a 48Ya6-K1 Podlet K1 radar and S-400 SAM battery using a newly revealed 400 km range class land attack derivative of the Neptune anti-ship missile, plus a synchronised SOF commando raid killing a 55Zh6ME Nebo M radar. 16/
The AFU reoccupation of Zmiyinyy (Snake) island & the destruction of Russian occupied natural gas platforms watching Odesa with surface search radars via Harpoon missiles were the 1st steps to Sevastopol, via pushing back Russia's A2AD bubble.
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Next were repeated waves of drone swarm attacks with Ukrainian converted Chinese commercial UAVs Mugin-5 drones and occasional 5V28/S-200 missiles to map Crimea's air defense grid.
Then, in the 2nd week of September after the Cape Tarkhankut attacks, the recapture of the "Boyko towers" - the three gas production platforms Russia captured in 2014 - put the final A2AD piece in place for the Sevastopol dry dock attack.
And the hole in VKS SAM defenses opened by the Sevastopol attack set up the destruction of the Crimean based S-400 battery near Yevpatoria with the Neptune missile I thought was used at Sevastopol.
As is usual for @sambendett, he has a crackerjack translation thread of how the Russians view drone warfare.
This one is a description of how drones hunted an AFU Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the backwardness of Western mechanized fighting doctrine in the age of armed drones. 1/
This is a useful video clip with which to compare a GMLRS M30A1 tungsten pellet round performance in terms of lethality and area of coverage to a 155mm cluster munition round.
The Grad rocket truck was killed and the crew ran away from a M30A1 AW tungsten pellet round.
A GMLRS with 400(+) DPICM grenades, compared to the 64 of a 155mm shell, would have had far superior weapons effects and none of the Russian soldiers you saw running away from a GMLRS M30A1 AW tungsten ball munition would have survived to kill more Ukrainians.
The inability of the Biden Administration to pull in the scrap process M2 Bradley fighting vehicles and armored HMMWV from scrap contractors outside Red River Army Depot in Texas is just🤯
The 5th Amendment of the US Constitution has the takings clause which empowers "Eminent domain".
Eminent domain in the United States refers to the power of a state or the federal government to take private property for public use while requiring just compensation to be
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...given to the original owner.
Because of all the requirements to demilitarize US Army armored combat vehicles. Bradley's, M113's and armored HMMWV are sold for a token one dollar each to demilitarization contractors.
For the latest on how Russian infowar works, please see this recent thread of mine that includes links to both of Timothy Thomas excellent 2004 and 2019 papers on how Russian "Reflexive Control" works in the American/Western information spaces.