Thread by @shashj

🧵 Whenever a Western government makes a contentious intelligence-based claim there is always a chorus of “WMD in Iraq!” Its worth taking a moment to reflect on how meaningless this usually is.

All intelligence is imperfect. That’s why intelligence assessments use probabilistic language. Uncertainty is unavoidable. Claims that are reflect this should generally be seen as more reliable than those than don’t (“slam dunk”).

There were a series of specific pathologies around Iraq intel. Some of them were addressed in things like the Butler review () & led to changes in assessment methods. That said, political leaders can always misrepresent intelligence claims if they want to.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl…

The point is to ask why & how that misrepresentation might occur. Last Jan/Feb the “but WMD” crowd had egg on their faces because they didn’t grasp that US & allies did not want Russia to invade & had no incentive to claim publicly that it would do so if intel suggested otherwise

You can ask a similar q for Canada today. It’s possible to argue Trudeau is using this to pander to Sikh voters. But it’s notable that he went public because the story was about to break publicly. Intel implicating India & causing a bitter public dispute is not in his interest.

All of this is without prejudice to the strength and reliability of the intelligence that has led Canada to make these claims. Canada’s conclusions may be right or wrong. But if they’re wrong it’s not because “Iraq WMD” is a useful heuristic to apply to any & every situation.

Also lol at everyone who thinks this thread is about exculpating Iraq failures. It’s the opposite. It’s about identifying the nature of that catastrophic *intel & policy* failure to understand when & why intel might be misrepresented - and also when those conditions don’t apply.