Ukraine has expanded its control of the areas west of Verbove, and armoured vehicles are operating beyond the first Surovikin line. At the same time, the villages of Andriivka and Klishchiivka were liberated south of Bakhmut.
Are we seeing a breakthrough? Time for a thread. 1/
In September, Ukraine advanced a couple of kilometres in the fields west of Verbove, beyond the main defensive line. They also captured fortified positions south of Robotyne and continued further south. Russian counterattacks have not been able to recapture lost positions. 2/
Ukraine is also now able to operate various armoured vehicles on the other side of the Surovikin line. Even though immediate Russian anti-tank capabilities are likely somewhat suppressed, larger Ukrainian troop concentrations and movements can still be seen from the air. 3/
Even though Ukraine is slowly making progress every month, we haven’t seen an actual breakthrough.
In a breakthrough, an attack not only penetrates the enemy lines, but contributes to a more significant collapse of enemy defences in a certain area. 4/
In a breakthrough, there should be exploitable and reinforceable success, which brings the defender into a reactive state, unable to carry out the original defensive plans. In this situation, the defender should be disorganized, either forced to retreat or risk heavy losses. 5/
Manoeuvres with mechanised units should also be possible, as speed is a central element for keeping the momentum up. If the enemy can decisively limit or even totally prevent all such operations, a breakthrough isn’t really happening. 6/
Even though Ukraine has not achieved a breakthrough during this counteroffensive in any direction, we have seen a breach. Ukrainians have captured multiple forward fighting positions and control a section of the first main defence line, also known as the first Surovikin line. 7/
The Russians are still able to conduct an organized defence. Their lines are bending, but not breaking. The salient at the Robotyne-Verbove area is of course a problem for them, but they seem to have enough resources to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control. 8/
Can we still see a breakthrough during this year?
I find it unlikely, if the Russians keep using their troops in a sensible manner and focus on repelling the Ukrainian attacks. However, incompetence is a big factor which can have significant effects, at least locally. 9/
One important variable is Russia's losses. It is not clearly known how challenging the situation actually is for them.
At some point, Putin likely has to mobilize again. Delaying this decision can have serious consequences for the Russians, positive for the Ukrainians. 10/
Breakthroughs have been generally rare in this war after the first weeks. Ukrainians managed to do one in Kharkiv last autumn with significant consequences. A smaller one was achieved by the Russians, when they captured Lysychansk in summer 2022. 11/
Our team at the @Black_BirdGroup continues to monitor the situation. Our interactive map is updated (almost) daily. Remember to click the “Russian Defence Lines” layer on from the side panel, it helps you understand the situation better. 12/12
Russia has five active air bases near northern Finland and Norway. In this thread, I will go through the bases and their recent changes in activity and infrastructure, and how the war in Ukraine has affected them.
There have been some surprising developments. 1/
The five air bases are located in Murmansk oblast: Severomorsk-1, -2 and -3, Monchegorsk and Olenya. There are more air bases near Finland further south in Karelia and St. Petersburg, but currently most of the largest and militarily active ones are in the north. 2/
In June 2022 Russia announced plans to repair several of the northern air bases. The work has begun. In Severomorsk-1, fighter shelters on the eastern side of the field were repaired somewhere between 2023-24. However, in Severomorsk-2, there are more surprising changes. 3/
Russia is developing its military infrastructure and conducting organizational reforms near Nato’s northern flank, especially near Finland. News agencies from different countries have asked me about the topic, and in this thread I will share some recent observations. 1/
Firstly, a brief overview of the organisational level. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District (LMD) as a part of a larger reform of the military districts. The LMD covers the north-western Russia, including Baltic and arctic directions. 2/
At the same time, Russia is expanding its existing brigades into divisions and bringing entirely new troops into Finland's neighboring regions. For example, the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kamenka was recently transformed into the 69th Motor Rifle Division. 3/
Putin declared a temporary ceasefire. What can be expected?
Firstly, Russia only makes such an announcement if it benefits Russia's diplomatic or military goals. Russia isn't suddenly seeking a quick peace, this is most likely a measure related to ongoing negotiations. 1/
Putin says that Russian forces must be ready to repel potential ceasefire violations and provocations.
It's possible Russia will try to accuse Ukraine of breaking the ceasefire, which could then be used as evidence of Ukraine's unwillingness to reach a peace settlement. 2/
Russia may be trying to show the Trump administration that it has some desire for peace. A minimal gesture of goodwill may buy political points from the United States, although its actual impact on the war is likely to be small. 3/
In the Russian-Ukrainian border region, both parties have continued offensive operations since the Ukrainian defense in Kursk collapsed.
While Russia is pushing Ukrainians out of Kursk and its own soldiers into Ukrainian territory in Sumy, Ukraine has again attacked Belgorod. 1/
In Kursk, the Ukrainian-controlled territory had been shrinking for months. It was a slow grind that hit a breaking point in March. The Ukrainian logistical situation had become increasingly difficult, and the Russians conducted a successful operation against the salient. 2/
After a hasty retreat earlier this month, Ukraine is still hanging onto a narrow strip of Russian land in Kursk with 2-3 small villages. This is not a militarily or politically relevant area, but the Russians will likely continue to push Ukrainians back. 3/
Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Pataljoona tai kaksi Ukrainaan tulitaukoa takaamaan toisi Suomeen myös arvokasta oppia ja osaamista, josta nimenomaan on kriisitilanteessa hyötyä. Reserviläisiä löytyy kyllä, ei jää vapaaehtoisista kiinni. Tämä olisi investointi, joka tuottaisi turvallisuutta myös Suomeen. 3/
Ukraine has been fighting for three years in increasingly difficult conditions. Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries announced that they will “pledge to provide equipment and training for a scalable brigade-sized unit”. It’s a textbook example of too little, too late. 1/
As far as I understand from this statement, there will be a new Ukrainian brigade based on Nordic & Baltic training and equipment. In theory, this is positive news. This could, at its best, produce a highly capable unit, trained by some of the best militaries in Europe. 2/
But here’s the catch: this brigade is being formed at a time when Ukraine faces a chronic manpower shortage. Simply put, Ukraine doesn’t lack brigades, it lacks men. Depending on its structure, this Nordic-Baltic-trained brigade could be somewhere between 3000-5000 soldiers. 3/