Upon my return to the United States from a trip to Japan, I was directed to a secondary inspection room where I was presented with a Grand Jury subpoena by officers from the IRS-CI and DHS. The subpoena required me to appear in New York to provide testimony for wire fraud. 🧵
For about an hour they asked me vague questions related to a "high profile phishing campaign" and how my IP address could've end up being "tagged" to a threat actor, showing me a manila folder with my own photo, my home IP address, and some random social media accounts of mine.
When I'd arrived at secondary I assumed it was just a random selection, so I'd given my unlocked device to the inspecting officer, but then watched as it was passed to the DHS and IRS-CI agents who were investigating the money laundering, conspiracy, and wire fraud charges.
After they'd questioned me, I was asked to leave the room while they sat and searched through my unlocked device for another hour. At this point I'd been given almost no information on whether or not I was a subject, witness, or anything related to the case at all.
Once they were finished, I was told that I could leave and immediately contacted a lawyer. Over the next few days, the lawyer spoke with the AUSA and also the IRS-CI and DHS agents. They learned that I was the target of the grand jury subpoena and for a really silly reason...
Back in December, 2022, I helped investigate a crypto phishing website that had stolen millions of dollars. In the JavaScript of the website, the scammer had accidentally published their Ethereum private key. Sadly, I'd found it 5 minutes too late and the stolen assets were gone.
During this process, I'd imported the private key into my MetaMask and navigated to OpenSea to check if there was anything left in the wallet. When I did this, I was on my home IP address and obviously not attempting to conceal my identity as I was simply investigating this.
The agents had requested the authorization logs of the account from OpenSea and saw that my IP. They subpoenaed the IP, found out who I was, then decided to use immigration as an excuse to ask for my device and summon me to a grand jury, rather than just email me or something.
After emailing back and forth for a few hours, the lawyer was able to get the subpoena completely dismissed and confirmation that all data from my device had been deleted. It's odd to me that they didn't see I work as a security engineer who responds to these things regularly.
I'm sharing this because I think it's something people should be aware of if they're doing similar work. It was widely shared that the private key was leaked and my background as a security researcher wasn't enough to dissuade using immigrations and a grand jury to intimidate me.
Thanks for reading, stay safe! 🤠
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Earlier this year, we were able to remotely unlock, start, locate, flash, and honk any remotely connected Honda, Nissan, Infiniti, and Acura vehicles, completely unauthorized, knowing only the VIN number of the car.
Here's how we found it, and how it works:
After finding individual vulnerabilities affecting different car companies, we became interested in finding out who exactly was providing the auto manufacturers telematic services.
We thought it was likely there was a company who provided multiple automakers telematic solutions.
While exploring this avenue, we kept seeing SiriusXM referenced in source code and documentation relating to vehicle telematics.
This was super interesting to us, because we didn't know SiriusXM offered any remote vehicle management functionality, but it turns out, they do!
We recently found a vulnerability affecting Hyundai and Genesis vehicles where we could remotely control the locks, engine, horn, headlights, and trunk of vehicles made after 2012.
To explain how it worked and how we found it, we have @_specters_ as our mock car thief:
Our finding began with @_specters_ reaching out to @bbuerhaus and myself to help explore potential security issues affecting vehicle telematics services.
Most car research we'd seen in the past involved really cool crypto attacks on physical keys, but what about the websites?
Both the Hyundai and Genesis mobile apps allow authenticated users to start/stop/lock/unlock their vehicle. Since we had access to a Hyundai, we began proxying all of the app traffic through Burp Suite and seeing what actual API calls were taking place.
Between July 7th to July 17th, 2022, we formed a small team of hackers and collectively hunted for vulnerabilities on John Deere’s security program.
During our 10 day engagement, we found 100 unique vulnerabilities with 50 rated critical, 32 high, 14 medium, and 4 low severity.
Throughout the process, our most impactful finding allowed us to provision, modify, impersonate, and delete all John Deere SSO and LDAP users across the entire organization with full access to hundreds of internal and employee-only services including…
Office 365 (full email, file, and spreadsheet access for everyone), NetScaler Gateway for SSL VPN (could grant ourselves full VPN access and login to all applications behind the VPN), Github Enterprise, Service Now, AWS, and many more.
Someone hacked an Uber employees HackerOne account and is commenting on all of the tickets. They likely have access to all of the Uber HackerOne reports.
The attacker is claiming to have completely compromised Uber showing screenshots where they’re full admin on AWS and GCP.
From an Uber employee:
Feel free to share but please don’t credit me: at Uber, we got an “URGENT” email from IT security saying to stop using Slack. Now anytime I request a website, I am taken to a REDACTED page with a pornographic image and the message “F*** you wankers.”
Over the last few months, we found a number of vulnerabilities in the largest Discord plugins (Dyno, MEE6, CollabLand) which would've allowed attackers to become administrators, send messages, and DM users.
The tagged hack happened a few days after we accidentally triggered /1
an "@Everyone" message to be sent in a large public server using the Dyno bot, and I'm wondering if the hackers noticed this and began looking themselves? These bots have a massive amount of trust (admin roles on >1mm servers, people click URLs willingly, etc), and for /2
crypto servers (where there really aren't too many points of trust), people only really know to check if the bot is the "official bot" before they'll click a link and sign a message to prove their identity (or whatever a hacker may modify the signing to do). /3
I think my router or ISP has been hacked, but it's the strangest thing of all time: every time I send an HTTP request to an IP address, a follow up HTTP request is sent to the exact same URL by a Digital Ocean box. I've confirmed that...
(1) All devices on my WiFi will have their HTTP request replayed if sent to an IP address (2) It doesn't matter what IP address it is (I've tested this on different IPs from different places) (3) I've factory reset my modem and the behavior is the exact same every time
This is what this looks like: I'll send an HTTP request (doesn't matter if from my computer, phone, or anything else) and another IP address will send the exact same HTTP request 10 seconds later.