Why is defeating the Previous Question on a rule so much more powerful/dangerous than defeating the rule?
The answer is that defeating a rule is *negative* agenda setting, while defeating the PQ is *positive* agenda setting. 1/
When you defeat a rule, the leaders who brought the rule cannot set the agenda. But that's the end; you block them from doing something, but that's it. They go back to the side rooms and try to figure out what to do next. 2/
When you defeat the PQ on a rule, you block a *vote* on the rule and leave it live on the floor, open to amendment. You can then propose an amendment to it, and if your coalition that defeated the PQ holds together, you can pass your amendment.
In effect, YOU set the agenda. 3/
This is why it terrifies leaders so much more than a rule defeat, and why it's truly a declaration of war against the leadership. You aren't just saying no to their agenda, you are seeking to substitute *your* agenda. 4/
Basically, here's the simple moderate floor defection chart in order of how much it roils leadership:
Vote against their bill <<<<<<Vote against their rule<<<<<<<<<<<< <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Defeat their PQ
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I agree w/ cons worried about indicting Trump. Not b/c he's a former POTUS---that's irrelevant---but b/c he's a leading *current* opposition candidate.
That's important! We should guard against abuses, erring on side of non-prosecution in close calls.
But this isn't close. 1/
My basic view differs from a lot of people. I don’t think opposition politicians should be treated like normal citizens. They should not be prosecuted in edge cases, or even in somewhat clear minor law-breaking cases, precisely to guard against government abuse. Old thread: 2/
But that’s not what his going on in this Trump case. He was *already* given a ton of latitude and difference; any average citizen would have been in jail long ago on these charges, and no average citizen would have gotten their case removed to a special prosecutor at DOJ. 3/
You lose me pretty fast when you assert that changing the name of a U.S. military base to something besides a general who helped lead an army that killed hundreds of thousands of U.S soldiers is "political correctness run amok."
"Iconic" is one way to describe the leaders of a rebellion in defense of slavery, who killed 300k+ U.S. soldiers rather than accept the results of an election they admitted they lost fair and square.
Holding a positive view of the Confederacy and its leaders as a present-day American is dumb beyond belief, but pandering to that crowd as a modern-day politician is just pathetic.
This is fine as far as it goes---Dem votes could obviously be used to fend off a motion to vacate coming from a small minority of GOP rebels---but it would never solve the bigger problem that you need an ongoing durable majority to govern the House. 1/
Much like the Speakership vote, a move to bring down McCarthy can't be solved by a one-time cross party coalition. Without a durable procedural majority in the House, you can't govern day-to-day. The majority doesn't have to be a partisan one, but it has to be an ongoing one. 2/
A rebel faction could use the motion to vacate to force a vote on the Speakership. But they could also simply withdraw their support for the GOP procedural majority, by voting down the previous question on rules resolutions. At any time. 3/
This OMB memo is a good explanation of why the $130B in unspecified discretionary appropriations cuts in the House debt limit bill are unlikely to ever come to pass; once you have to actually translate them to specific appropriations, you wont have a House majority for them. 1/
And that's fine. But the bottom line is that everyone (Members, press, DC observers) loves to talk in aggregate budget when discussing cuts, because it's easy. No one wants to talk at the appropriations account level, except when saying what they *don't* want to cut. 2/2
And, to be clear, it doesn't even matter if you *could* get a House majority for specific cuts, since the Senate and/or WH would never agree to them.
Whatever debt limit deal is ultimately agreed, cuts will likely be closer to a haircut than -$130B in discretionary approps. 3/
Here’s an odd trend a Hill nerd friend and I have seen during debt limit fight—journalistic nomenclature that makes “Big Four” and “Four Corners” synonymous, rather than Big Four referring to chamber leaders and Four Corners to committee leaders, respectively. Your view?
Example, from Politico:
"TO UNDERSTAND WASHINGTON in the era of JOE BIDEN, there are no four people more important to understand than CHUCK SCHUMER, NANCY PELOSI, KEVIN MCCARTHY and MITCH MCCONNELL--the Big Four leaders, also known as The Four Corners."
To me, “Big Four” has always referred to chamber leaders, while ‘Four Corners” typically referred to House and Senate chairs/rankings of a committee or subcommittee, usually in reference to appropriations negotiations.
I have long been a mild apologist for the Senate and it’s counter-majoritarian practices. But I’m ready to throw in the towel. Both parties took clear, active actions to make executive session majoritarian. Playing games in committee or with committee assignments is just folly.
There’s no stable equilibrium here, and the legislative filibuster is doomed sooner rather than later IMO, but if you want any chance of maintaining it, you can’t use it to block majoritarianism on the executive business side of the ledger. That’s incoherent.
But the deeper point is that the collegial, deliberative, and productive values of the filibuster are toast, and we’re not getting benefits in any proportion to cost at this point.
Again, I’m an apologist: I liked the Senate as operating in the 90s and 00s. But it’s gone.