Ok, Gaetz's House seat. Things I am certain about:

1. Gaetz may not come back to the 118th Congress. He has resigned his seat, and there are no backsies for Members who resign their seat. (h/t @ringwiss on precedent.) 1/
2. A Member-elect may resign their seat prior to being sworn-in to office. 2/

For all the talk about this & that & whatever with Trump, this is the real game/set/match for executive power: a SCOTUS ruling that the Impoundment Act is unconstitutional and that POTUS can refuse to spend appropriations. 1/

https://twitter.com/JStein_WaPo/status/1859324451063726378

The power of the purse is the last strong power of Congress, and to reduce it to a negative power--the ability to refuse to appropriate, but not the power to positively appropriate--would upend the separation powers as we know it. 2/

One other important thing to remember about parties that lose their House majority: they become more extreme, and often learn the wrong lesson. This is because it's the *moderates* who lose and cost them the majority; the remaining membership is far more ideologically pure. 1/ I always think about the Dems in 2010. They got crushed in the election, but the result was that the balance of power in the party swung in the progressive direction; the seats they lost were the Blue Dog seats. 2/

The strangest thing about progressives getting angry at @NateSilver538 is that he’s legitimately doing some of his best work ever right now at his core competency/contribution: trying to quantifying marginal election effects that previously were mostly just expert intuition. 1/ I just see a lot of otherwise smart people who disagree with Nate’s view of the election and decide he’s either a partisan hack. Or a paid operative. Or in a conspiracy to move the @Polymarket prices (!). Politics makes people lose their dang minds. 2/

I’m very uncomfortable with anyone as old as Biden or Trump being POTUS. I’m also pretty uncomfortable with someone as inexperienced as Vance being in national office. Which raises a good question: what the hell am I looking for in a presidential candidate? 1/ Now, great leaders can come from many different places, and an 80-something a 40 year old with little government experience could turn out to be a powerful statesman, an invaluable leader in crisis, and a dexterous operator of the bureaucracy.

But I wouldn’t bet on it. 2/

My view is still (a) Trump is corrupt and likely guilty of many crimes; (b) on balance, it's better to prosecute than not for serious charges; (c) prosecuting active opposition leaders is a least-worst option with lots of bad consequences; (d) this case was maybe not worth it. 1/ Some past thoughts here. I just disagree with people who think opposition political leaders shouldn't have *some* deference via prosecutorial discretion. The Jan 6 and classified doc stuff is beyond pale and needs t be prosecuted. This? Maybe pass. 2/

https://x.com/MattGlassman312/status/1541870606748098563

The 118th House of Representatives has featured an array of uncommon parliamentary procedures and situations, and more are on the horizon.

Since I'm sitting here waiting for my wisdom teeth to not hurt, I figured I'd compile a list. I'm sure I missed stuff. Please add. [1/?] Let's start with the stuff that has never happened before, or basically never happens.

1. A resolution to vacate the office of the Speaker was successfully moved.

In both the House and Senate, two things are required to force something to happen: the votes and the will. A lot of people concentrate on the votes, but often it's the will. 1/ We like to say "the majority rules in the House" or "218 can do whatever they want." Both of those things are true, but only if the majority/218 are *hellbent* on doing something. 2/

The resistance to expelling Santos, IMO, illustrates two general pathologies of the modern Congress: way too much deference to precedent, and *way* too much deference to the judiciary. Both reinforce the increasing lack of agency---and sense of responsibility---among Members. 1/ Maybe Santos shouldn't be expelled! But if that's the case, defend it on the merits. Stop telling me that past Congresses waited for judges to decide (honestly, in most expulsion cases they didn't), so your hands are tied. Give me a break.

A few quick thoughts about the legislative timeline that Speaker-designee @RepMikeJohnson laid out in his letter below. 1/

First, it's incredibly ambitious and I have a hard time seeing it all that action coming to pass within the horizon envisioned. That said, as an *aspirational* timeline blueprint, I applaud it. You can't start by giving up, and this plan at least aims for a productive House. 2/

Here's evidence that the House can move a resolution without a Speaker and before the election of a new one: they literally did it the very first time the Speakership went vacant mid-Congress, January 19, 1814. 1/ Note this is the *strongest* possible form of moving a resolution in the absence of a Speaker. Not only is there not a Speaker, there is not an elected Speaker pro tem, nor a designated Speaker pro tem, nor a Rule I, Clause 8(b)(3) Speaker pro tem. The *Clerk* is presiding. 2/

In my newsletter today, I wade into the debate over how much authority @PatrickMcHenry has right now in his position as Rule I, Clause 8(b)(3) Speaker pro tempore. Here's a quick tweetstorm covering the major points. 1/ When the House adopted H.Res.757 yesterday, the Office of the Speaker was vacant. That triggered Rule I, Clause 8(b)(3), designating a Speaker pro tempore until the election of a new Speaker, based on a list previously submitted by the Speaker. McHenry was McCarthy's choice. 2/

Quick bare-bones Motion to Vacate procedural explainer. 1/ A motion to vacate the Office of the Speaker would be brought in the form of a resolution. If the resolution was introduced in the normal manner, it would simply be referred to the Committee on Rules, as H.Res.395 was when Meadows introduced it in 2015. 2/

Why is defeating the Previous Question on a rule so much more powerful/dangerous than defeating the rule?

The answer is that defeating a rule is *negative* agenda setting, while defeating the PQ is *positive* agenda setting. 1/ When you defeat a rule, the leaders who brought the rule cannot set the agenda. But that's the end; you block them from doing something, but that's it. They go back to the side rooms and try to figure out what to do next. 2/

I agree w/ cons worried about indicting Trump. Not b/c he's a former POTUS---that's irrelevant---but b/c he's a leading *current* opposition candidate.

That's important! We should guard against abuses, erring on side of non-prosecution in close calls.

But this isn't close. 1/ My basic view differs from a lot of people. I don’t think opposition politicians should be treated like normal citizens. They should not be prosecuted in edge cases, or even in somewhat clear minor law-breaking cases, precisely to guard against government abuse. Old thread: 2/

https://twitter.com/mattglassman312/status/1541870606748098563

You lose me pretty fast when you assert that changing the name of a U.S. military base to something besides a general who helped lead an army that killed hundreds of thousands of U.S soldiers is "political correctness run amok."

https://twitter.com/desantiswarroom/status/1667306460236087303

"Iconic" is one way to describe the leaders of a rebellion in defense of slavery, who killed 300k+ U.S. soldiers rather than accept the results of an election they admitted they lost fair and square.

This is fine as far as it goes---Dem votes could obviously be used to fend off a motion to vacate coming from a small minority of GOP rebels---but it would never solve the bigger problem that you need an ongoing durable majority to govern the House. 1/

politico.com/news/2023/05/1… Much like the Speakership vote, a move to bring down McCarthy can't be solved by a one-time cross party coalition. Without a durable procedural majority in the House, you can't govern day-to-day. The majority doesn't have to be a partisan one, but it has to be an ongoing one. 2/

This OMB memo is a good explanation of why the $130B in unspecified discretionary appropriations cuts in the House debt limit bill are unlikely to ever come to pass; once you have to actually translate them to specific appropriations, you wont have a House majority for them. 1/ And that's fine. But the bottom line is that everyone (Members, press, DC observers) loves to talk in aggregate budget when discussing cuts, because it's easy. No one wants to talk at the appropriations account level, except when saying what they *don't* want to cut. 2/2

Here’s an odd trend a Hill nerd friend and I have seen during debt limit fight—journalistic nomenclature that makes “Big Four” and “Four Corners” synonymous, rather than Big Four referring to chamber leaders and Four Corners to committee leaders, respectively. Your view? Example, from Politico:

"TO UNDERSTAND WASHINGTON in the era of JOE BIDEN, there are no four people more important to understand than CHUCK SCHUMER, NANCY PELOSI, KEVIN MCCARTHY and MITCH MCCONNELL--the Big Four leaders, also known as The Four Corners."

politico.com/newsletters/pl…

I have long been a mild apologist for the Senate and it’s counter-majoritarian practices. But I’m ready to throw in the towel. Both parties took clear, active actions to make executive session majoritarian. Playing games in committee or with committee assignments is just folly. There’s no stable equilibrium here, and the legislative filibuster is doomed sooner rather than later IMO, but if you want any chance of maintaining it, you can’t use it to block majoritarianism on the executive business side of the ledger. That’s incoherent.

Gonna be people voting for president in 2024 who weren't alive the last time the GOP won the popular vote nationwide.

No requirement, of course, that you win the popular vote nationwide. But it's certainly helpful in securing legitimacy, especially under a populist philosophy. To me, this feels like the central dilemma of the GOP right now. A movement that desperately wants the philosophical mantle of popular legitimacy, but increasingly rests on counter-majoritarian systems for power.