What's next for Bitcoin? It continues to track a combination of network growth and real rates, which makes sense given that it’s a network asset with an adoption curve affected by the macro. 🧵
Bitcoin's adoption curve continues to grow—the number of non-zero addresses reached a new high last week. /2
What will keep driving it? First, the macro narrative needs to change from restrictive to accommodative. Below is a regression model that lays out a price band based on a typical adoption curve and a range of real rates (from -2% to +2%). /3
If and when that long-elusive recession finally hits, and the Fed pivots for real, Bitcoin and gold could be viewed as high-powered hedges. /4
Bitcoin has become less correlated to equities, and less volatile. Its annual vol has declined from 85 in 2021 to 55 (which is still high), and its 12-mo correlation has fallen from 65% to only 7%. So Bitcoin might provide uncorrelated returns in the next market cycle. /5
Bitcoin bulls need the money printers to go to work again. The money supply exploded in 2020-21, a scenario in which gold bugs and Bitcoin bulls thrived. When the money supply grows faster than its long-term growth rate, gold’s market share has gone up. /6
In 2022, central banks slammed on the brakes as hard as they had stomped the gas pedal the year before, and M2 has now declined to $20.9 trillion. This suggests that, unlike the 1970s, the money-printing party of 2020-21 probably was not the start of a sustained trend. /7
Bitcoin's biggest bulls hold to a “de-dollarization” view, but there is really no evidence they're right. Yes, the dollar’s share of global FX reserves has fallen in recent years, but the dollar itself has been firm. /8
Bitcoin needs important pieces of the macro puzzle to fall into place, from real rates to the money supply to the dollar. Until then, like gold, it looks like a solution waiting for a problem. /END
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At what point do we have a legit bubble on our hands and does this all end in tears? Nobody knows, of course, but in my experience, excessive valuations only play a role after an earnings catalyst has been triggered.🧵
If the trade is crowded (as I’m sure this one is), even the slightest hint that the second or third derivative of estimates starts to falter could cause a shakeout. Based on the chart, we don’t seem to be there yet, but on a price-to-free-cashflow (FCF) basis (below), valuations are getting up there. /2
The FCF yield is now down to 2.8%, which is a far cry from the 12.6% in 2009 and even the 4.8% yield in 2022. Valuations are stretched. /3
How far is too far for the Mag 7? When we consider the market weight of the Mag 7, we see that we are approaching the extremes set by tech/telecom in 2000 and energy/materials in 1980. And that’s for only seven stocks!🧵
Why does it matter what the Mag 7 does? Because they are so big that if they ever go down in absolute terms, the major indices will likely follow, even if the majority of stocks keep going. /2
The chart below shows that the absolute return of mega caps is highly correlated to the overall market (left panel), which means that if the mega caps underperform and also decline in absolute terms, the market will likely not be spared (bottom left quadrant on the right). That’s the nature of concentration risk. /3
My sense is that we are in the 7th inning of a secular bull market which began in 2009. I know many technicians (including my esteemed colleagues) use a later start date (2013), and they may well be right. But I like my method in that it uses multiple approaches that yield the same conclusion.🧵
Per the chart below, I use the deviation from the 150-year trendline as the guide to start the clock. On that basis the current regime began in 2009 (and was confirmed in 2013), and the previous three started in 1982, 1949, and 1920. /2
This approach is further supported by the CAPE model, which also pegs the start in 2009. The CAPE model states that the 10-year trailing P/E ratio (or in the case below the 5-year price/cash ratio) is strongly predictive of the forward 10-year return (CAGR). The CAPE model bottomed in 2009 and peaked in 2019. /3
At 3.5%, the iERP sits at the 90thpercentile of historical valuations (going back to 1900). Valuations are notoriously ineffective in predicting short-term returns, but at extremes they matter (0-10th percentile and 90-100th percentile)🧵
Below we can see that the 10-year forward return (CAGR) has a right tail (very low valuations produce above-average returns) and left tail (very high valuations produce below-average returns). In between those tails, it’s all noise./2
We can see the same thing in this scatter plot. The grey dots are the 1-year forward returns and the blue dots are the 10-year CAGRs. The R2 of the former is zero, and even the latter produces an R2 of only 0.24. It shows that high valuation regimes can persist for quite some time. /3
With more growth, ongoing deficits and a Fed that is no longer funding the trillions in deficits that the Treasury is financing, the term premium is understandably rising. It’s been suppressed by QE (quantitative easing) and zero interest rates for the past decade-plus, but those days appear to be over🧵
A rising term premium is likely to cause occasional rate tantrums that push yields to 5%, as we have already seen repeatedly since 2022. When I adjust my bond model for a more normal term premium (100-150 bps), it’s easy to see 5% becoming the new 4%. /2
More growth and fiscal stimulus are also likely to keep the Fed from cutting rates below 4%. Indeed, the forward curve continues to walk back its expectations for rate cuts, and the curve is now at the top end of the dot plot. It’s a far cry from how the year started. /3
If there is one thesis that I have high conviction in for the coming years, is that the US is on a path towards fiscal dominance. With the Fed and other central banks no longer the buyer of first and last resort, it seems plausible that the term premium might rise in the months and years ahead.🧵
If you are skeptical of that view, take a look at the chart below and tell me what compensation investors might demand to fill the $10 trillion gap between the federal debt and the Fed’s balance sheet. As of last week, the term premium was 22 bps. It’s higher than it has been, but it still seems low to me. /2
Rising term premia mean rising real yields. In a regime of positive correlations (between stocks and bonds), rising rates can and will cause wobbles in the stock market. /3