What's next for Bitcoin? It continues to track a combination of network growth and real rates, which makes sense given that it’s a network asset with an adoption curve affected by the macro. 🧵
Bitcoin's adoption curve continues to grow—the number of non-zero addresses reached a new high last week. /2
What will keep driving it? First, the macro narrative needs to change from restrictive to accommodative. Below is a regression model that lays out a price band based on a typical adoption curve and a range of real rates (from -2% to +2%). /3
If and when that long-elusive recession finally hits, and the Fed pivots for real, Bitcoin and gold could be viewed as high-powered hedges. /4
Bitcoin has become less correlated to equities, and less volatile. Its annual vol has declined from 85 in 2021 to 55 (which is still high), and its 12-mo correlation has fallen from 65% to only 7%. So Bitcoin might provide uncorrelated returns in the next market cycle. /5
Bitcoin bulls need the money printers to go to work again. The money supply exploded in 2020-21, a scenario in which gold bugs and Bitcoin bulls thrived. When the money supply grows faster than its long-term growth rate, gold’s market share has gone up. /6
In 2022, central banks slammed on the brakes as hard as they had stomped the gas pedal the year before, and M2 has now declined to $20.9 trillion. This suggests that, unlike the 1970s, the money-printing party of 2020-21 probably was not the start of a sustained trend. /7
Bitcoin's biggest bulls hold to a “de-dollarization” view, but there is really no evidence they're right. Yes, the dollar’s share of global FX reserves has fallen in recent years, but the dollar itself has been firm. /8
Bitcoin needs important pieces of the macro puzzle to fall into place, from real rates to the money supply to the dollar. Until then, like gold, it looks like a solution waiting for a problem. /END
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It’s worth asking: what are the attributes that have produced this secular bull market, and how likely are they to reverse? Let’s review.🧵
The most obvious attribute is the concentration risk from the mega growers. While history has shown that the top 10 or 50 stocks can dominate for a very long time, it’s also true that if these stocks go down, so will the major indices. Such is the math of capitalization-weighted indices. I’m not prepared to conclude that the Mag 7 have ended their reign as market leaders, but if they have it seems likely that the market as a whole will produce only modest (if any) beta for some time to come. /2
Related to the Mag 7 concentration story are margins and valuation. The operating margin for the S&P 500 was a mere 5.9% when the secular bull market began out of the ashes of the financial crisis in 2009. It now stands at 12.9%. Higher margins deserve higher valuations, and the 5-year cyclically adjusted P/E ratio has expanded from 9.0x in 2009 to 32.9x at the February 2025 high. /3
We often look to the bond market for clues when it comes to equity risk. Credit analysts focus on balance sheets, and they often sense trouble before the equity folks do.🧵
Today, there is a sense in the market that credit spreads are not confirming the correction in equities (i.e., they are not widening). That suggests that this is merely a “non-recession correction” and not something worse. What can history teach us? /2
Using the same 10% equity correction study I showed earlier, the chart below shows the change in investment grade credit spreads during equity drawdowns. Spreads have widened only 20 bps so far, and from a historically very low starting point (110 bps last month). /3
While I wouldn’t put too much weight on this indicator, the iteration of the Presidential cycle in which the mid-term year (2022) is down, continues to play out nicely. We are now in “year 5” (if that makes any sense), and that year has been down on average for the first six months. It suggests a modest but multi-month corrective period.🧵
Given how few observations there are for this indicator and that we are now three years beyond the mid-term, I would take it with a grain of salt. However, one of the occurrences was the 1966 mid-term, which is interesting because the 1966-1968 soft landing remains a relevant analog to the soft landing of 2022-2024. /2
While circumstances and valuations were different back then, the length and magnitude of that soft landing recovery has been a spitting image of the current cycle, as the next chart illustrates. Both the earnings recovery and the P/E expansion have been similar. The 1966-1968 rally peaked around now, which is something to keep in mind as we ponder the next phase of this cycle. /3
The bullish price action of gold and #bitcoin has sparked a lot of conversation about monetary inflation. In that conversation, the difference between the quantity of money (money supply) and the price of money (price inflation) often gets conflated. Let’s unpack this a little.🧵
It’s true that when the money supply grows faster than GDP, price inflation often follows. Not always, but often, as the chart below shows. /2
But just because M2 grows over time doesn’t mean that the price of stuff is getting debased at the same rate. The chart below shows a near-perfect long-term correlation between nominal GDP and nominal M2, with a slope of 1. Half of that is inflation and the other half is wealth creation, which is what happens when the economy grows. Per the previous chart, going back to 1900 the CAGR of nominal M2 is 6.5% and the real CAGR is 3.6%. /3
At what point do we have a legit bubble on our hands and does this all end in tears? Nobody knows, of course, but in my experience, excessive valuations only play a role after an earnings catalyst has been triggered.🧵
If the trade is crowded (as I’m sure this one is), even the slightest hint that the second or third derivative of estimates starts to falter could cause a shakeout. Based on the chart, we don’t seem to be there yet, but on a price-to-free-cashflow (FCF) basis (below), valuations are getting up there. /2
The FCF yield is now down to 2.8%, which is a far cry from the 12.6% in 2009 and even the 4.8% yield in 2022. Valuations are stretched. /3
How far is too far for the Mag 7? When we consider the market weight of the Mag 7, we see that we are approaching the extremes set by tech/telecom in 2000 and energy/materials in 1980. And that’s for only seven stocks!🧵
Why does it matter what the Mag 7 does? Because they are so big that if they ever go down in absolute terms, the major indices will likely follow, even if the majority of stocks keep going. /2
The chart below shows that the absolute return of mega caps is highly correlated to the overall market (left panel), which means that if the mega caps underperform and also decline in absolute terms, the market will likely not be spared (bottom left quadrant on the right). That’s the nature of concentration risk. /3