Dir. of Global Macro @Fidelity. Student of history, chart maker, cyclist, cook. Helping investors break thru the clutter. Views are mine. https://t.co/9Pn7wGwMzp
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Dec 13 • 9 tweets • 3 min read
How far is too far for the Mag 7? When we consider the market weight of the Mag 7, we see that we are approaching the extremes set by tech/telecom in 2000 and energy/materials in 1980. And that’s for only seven stocks!🧵
Why does it matter what the Mag 7 does? Because they are so big that if they ever go down in absolute terms, the major indices will likely follow, even if the majority of stocks keep going. /2
Dec 12 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
My sense is that we are in the 7th inning of a secular bull market which began in 2009. I know many technicians (including my esteemed colleagues) use a later start date (2013), and they may well be right. But I like my method in that it uses multiple approaches that yield the same conclusion.🧵
Per the chart below, I use the deviation from the 150-year trendline as the guide to start the clock. On that basis the current regime began in 2009 (and was confirmed in 2013), and the previous three started in 1982, 1949, and 1920. /2
Dec 12 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
At 3.5%, the iERP sits at the 90thpercentile of historical valuations (going back to 1900). Valuations are notoriously ineffective in predicting short-term returns, but at extremes they matter (0-10th percentile and 90-100th percentile)🧵
Below we can see that the 10-year forward return (CAGR) has a right tail (very low valuations produce above-average returns) and left tail (very high valuations produce below-average returns). In between those tails, it’s all noise./2
Nov 15 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
With more growth, ongoing deficits and a Fed that is no longer funding the trillions in deficits that the Treasury is financing, the term premium is understandably rising. It’s been suppressed by QE (quantitative easing) and zero interest rates for the past decade-plus, but those days appear to be over🧵
A rising term premium is likely to cause occasional rate tantrums that push yields to 5%, as we have already seen repeatedly since 2022. When I adjust my bond model for a more normal term premium (100-150 bps), it’s easy to see 5% becoming the new 4%. /2
Nov 8 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
If there is one thesis that I have high conviction in for the coming years, is that the US is on a path towards fiscal dominance. With the Fed and other central banks no longer the buyer of first and last resort, it seems plausible that the term premium might rise in the months and years ahead.🧵
If you are skeptical of that view, take a look at the chart below and tell me what compensation investors might demand to fill the $10 trillion gap between the federal debt and the Fed’s balance sheet. As of last week, the term premium was 22 bps. It’s higher than it has been, but it still seems low to me. /2
Oct 24 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
One of the reasons for this restrictive stance (presumably) is that the banking system remains awash in reserves, at a time when fiscal policy is expansive and the central banks around the world are cutting rates.🧵
In the US, bank reserves are down from their COVID peak of $4.19 trillion, but remain higher than before the pandemic. /2
Sep 10 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
The narrative is clearly evolving from focusing on the inflation side of the Fed’s mandate to the growth side, and this comes at a time when the seasonals are reaching their weakest point and the mega growers continue to wobble.🧵
The next easing cycle is only a week or so away, and the main question is whether the Fed goes with jumbo (50 bps) cuts or the garden variety 25 bps. /2
Jul 31 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
In absolute terms, the market is in decent shape, with 78% of stocks in uptrends. That’s higher than a few weeks ago, even though the index is lower.🧵
The comparison to the narrow leadership of the late 1990’s is inevitable, but that cycle was much narrower than this one. This gives me some comfort that the current rotation doesn’t have to end in tears the way it did two decades ago. That was a bubble, but this one is not. /2
Jul 23 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Put this in the “I thought I’d seen everything” department: the 13 week correlation between the S&P 500 cap-weighted index and the S&P 500 equal-weighted index is now 36%. That’s between two indices that have exactly the same constituents. It’s normally 99%, as one would expect🧵
It’s a good illustration of just how bifurcated the market has become, and what can happen when that inevitable mean reversion finally kicks in. /2
Jul 10 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
For the markets, it was more of the same last week: the winners won while the rest of the market spun its wheels. 🧵
This continues to be a tale of two markets, with the mega growers breaking away from the pack to such a degree that it becomes nearly impossible for the rest of the market to keep up, let alone outperform. It’s making me rethink the bullish broadening thesis. Perhaps the broadening can only happen in a down market, at least in relative terms. /2
Jun 28 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
With the debt dynamic worsening around the world, and central banks no longer funding that debt (at least for now), the direction of the term premium for bonds remains a question mark. With the correlation between stocks and bonds now positive, what role do bonds play in a diversified portfolio? 🧵
There are certainly reasons to own them: real yields are now positive and the math of owning bonds is far better now than it was a few years ago. But since 2022 they have not provided the relative balance that the 60/40 paradigm had generally provided since the late 1990’s. /2
Jun 27 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
We are now in an era of fiscal dominance, with deficits running at 7% of GDP with no end in sight. The US is now spending more than a trillion dollars on debt service, and projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) give little reason to expect this to improve. The big question is what role the Fed will play in this new regime.🧵
For now, the Fed is on the other side of fiscal policy, keeping monetary policy restrictive while fiscal policy is loose. Debt levels are high, although relative to GDP they are below the 2020 extreme. /2
Jun 13 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
In my view, bitcoin is exponential gold and an aspiring player on the store of value team. My work suggests that the price of bitcoin is driven primarily by the growth in its network, which is in turn driven by bitcoin’s unique scarcity feature, as well as the monetary and fiscal policy cycle, and of course sentiment.🧵
As the chart shows below, Bitcoin and Ethereum’s S-curve have followed the path of many technological developments throughout history. It’s all about the network. /2
Jun 6 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
What’s behind the secular bull market of the past 25 years? Several factors, including falling interest rates, rising margins, and de-equitization via M&A and share buybacks. 🧵
The buyback era started in the mid-2000’s and has been a powerful driver of valuations. Buybacks lead to a higher payout ratio for earnings. Like a bird in the hand, a higher payout ratio commands a higher P/E. /2
May 31 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
In terms of the secular trend, I think we are in the 7thinning. Secular bull markets are prolonged super-cycles spanning a decade or more and producing above-trend returns.🧵
In my view we’ve been in a secular bull market since ‘09, not unlike the ‘49-‘68 and ‘82-‘00 regimes. Here we see how closely the current super-cycle has tracked those two. There was also the ‘20-‘29 secular bull market, but it went too far too fast, and like Icarus it got its wings burned prematurely. /2
May 22 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
It’s been a while since we have seen the reflation playbook in action. For those unfamiliar, it involves a monetary pivot, a weaker dollar, and a rally in risk assets led by commodities and EM equities.🧵
We had several episodes of this in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and they were typically sparked when the Fed capitulated on rate hikes or QT (quantitative tightening), while China was stimulating its economy. /2
May 17 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
My sense is that we are in the 7th inning of a cyclical bull market, and that the 1966-68 analog is a possible guide for where we are in the soft landing recovery. In terms of the secular context, I think we are also in the 7thinning. 🧵
While other chartists may disagree with my approach, in my view this secular bull market started in 2009, when the deviation from the central trend was at its steepest. In that sense, we continue to closely track both the 1982-2000 and 1949-1968 super-cycle. /2
Apr 24 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
After the 6% drawdown since March 28, the forward P/E ratio on the S&P 500 has declined from 21.2x to 19.9x. Valuations were high, so this is good to see. Price should decline less than valuations during this correction since earnings estimates are rising 12%. Pass the baton.🧵
Trailing earnings are now growing at 4% year-over-year, after falling 2.6% in 2023. /2
Apr 18 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
If the secular regime has transitioned from the Great Moderation of the past few decades to one of fiscal dominance, perhaps the most seismic change to the investing paradigm that most of us grew up in is the changing influence of bonds in a 60/40 portfolio.🧵
During the Great Moderation era (defined as disinflation and low volatility of inflation), the correlation between stocks and bonds was negative. That meant that if there was a shock to the 60 side of the portfolio, the 40 side would offer a counterbalance. /2
Apr 12 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
If the fiscal picture in the US is deteriorating per the new era of fiscal dominance, and gold is rallying sharply as a result, wouldn’t it make sense for the dollar to be declining? That’s what the chart below suggests.🧵
Why is the dollar holding up so well? I think the answer is the Fed. While fiscal dominance should be pressuring the dollar, the Fed’s restrictive policy is providing a counterbalance. /2
Apr 11 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Several unusual things are happening in the markets, which in my view are most likely explained through the lens of fiscal dominance. 🧵
We are all painfully aware of the $11 trillion increase in the Federal debt since the pandemic in 2020, and we also know that the Fed has been shrinking its balance sheet (and therefore stopped being the buyer of first or last resort). /2