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@solonko1648

Sep 24

Дифузія. Це те явище з фізики, яке віддалено нагадує стан поля бою зараз. Проникнення атомів однієї речовини між атомів іншої. Проникнення бойових одиниць одного противника в порядки іншого і навпаки. Взаємний процес. 1/

Всі звикли до того, що хтось, маючи відповідну інформацію про розташування українських та російських сил на полі бою, може намалювати лінію на карті і ми всі чітко будемо бачити ситуацію. На деяких ділянках фронту це втратило актуальність. 2/

Подекуди це цілі зони, де перемішалися позиції СОУ та позиції росіян. Звісно це стан справ, який навʼязав противник. Йому потрібно дезорганізувати нашу оборону, ускладнивши цей процес для нас. 3/

Read 19 tweets

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@solonko1648

Sep 17

Pressure and Chaosization.
The russian offensive in Donetsk region has become an indicator of how the enemy applies its accumulated experience, compensates for its own weaknesses, and skillfully exploits ours.
Photo: settlement of Zorya, after an airstrike on one of the AFV UAV positions. 1/

For me personally and for our unit, the russian spring push in the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka area coincided in time with a change of unit (though not of sector), style, and structure of work. 2/

A very short pause before re-entering the sector between Myrnohrad and Kostiantynivka—where we had previously worked with mixed success and, in breaks between battles, further west—turned out to be a time of abrupt changes. For the worse. 3/

Read 21 tweets

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@solonko1648

Aug 31

Натиск і хаосизація.
російський наступ в Донецькій області став показником того, як противник втілює накопичений досвід, компенсує власні проблеми та вдало використовує наші.
Фото: н.п. Зоря, декілька діб після авіаудару по одній з позицій БПЛА СОУ. 1/

Особисто для мене і нашого підрозділу весняний ривок росіян в районі Покровська-Костянтинівки збігся в часі зі зміною підрозділу (але не сектору), стилю та побудови роботи тощо. 2/

Дуже коротка пауза перед повторним заходом у сектор між Мирноградом і Костянтинівкою, де ми до цього працювали з перемінним успіхом і у перервах між боями західніше, виявилася часом різких змін. На гірше. 3/

Read 24 tweets

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@solonko1648

Aug 17

One of the biggest mistakes made by those who cover the topic of the tussian–Ukrainian war is the attempt to squeeze the issue into narrow content and time frames. Focusing exclusively on what preceded the full-scale war a few weeks or months before, and on what happened after the invasion, while refusing to examine deeper preconditions, leads to the oversimplification of any material.
Of course, limiting research to the period of Ukraine’s independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union creates a similar trap. Still, it allows one to broaden the perspective and demonstrate how primitive many theses are, and how easily people fall for russia’s semantic tricks. So, let me talk about how the russians tried to pressure Ukraine after it gained independence and up until they were ready to start the war.
Already in 1992, the president of the so-called russia, Yeltsin, signed a decree transferring the entire Black Sea Fleet under russian jurisdiction, including the part stationed in Ukraine and under Ukrainian jurisdiction.
Yeltsin’s vice president, Rutskoy, declared that Ukraine was a “temporarily lost territory.” Moreover, he visited Ukraine and publicly called for the annexation of Crimea back then. Regarding both events, the Ukrainian parliament issued a statement in April 1992:
zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2267…
1/

Thus, practically right after the proclamation of independence, and also after the referendum on December 1, 1991, at which Ukrainians firmly chose to restore our statehood, the tussians actively began interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs and attacking its sovereignty, questioning territorial integrity and calling for the annexation of Ukrainian lands.
Of course, at that time there was no talk of NATO in Ukraine, which today the Kremlin cites as a pretext for its attack. Ukrainian statehood was still in its formative stage, with many issues that needed resolution.
By the way, Rutskoy – an honorary citizen of Kursk – supported russia’s attacks on Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022. Consistent, like the entire russian elite, in seeking Ukraine’s destruction. He threatened to revise Ukraine’s borders by force on August 28, 1991 – just days after the Act of Proclamation of Independence of Ukraine.
And to make it clear that this was not political freelancing by a former Su-25 pilot, two days earlier, on August 26, 1991 – just two days after Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Act of Proclamation of Independence – Voshchanov, the press secretary of President Yeltsin, announced russia’s official position regarding relations with “union republics”: “The RSFSR reserves the right to raise the issue of border revision.” 2/

On May 21, 1992, the Supreme Council of the russian federation passed a resolution canceling the 1954 act of transferring Crimea to Ukraine and demanded that the “issue of Crimea be resolved through intergovernmental negotiations between russia and Ukraine, with the participation of Crimea and based on the will of its people.” The Soviet Union no longer existed, and legally this document was an example of interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs within its internationally recognized borders.
On July 9, 1993, the russian parliament adopted a resolution “On the Status of the City of Sevastopol,” recognizing it as part of russia. On August 23, deputies of the Sevastopol City Council voted for the city’s russian status. On December 5, 1996, the Federation Council declared that Ukraine “contrary to objective reality does not wish to discuss in negotiations the issue of the russian status of Sevastopol.”
Thus, legally, as early as 1993 russia had annexed part of Ukrainian territory within its own legislation – simply without carrying out a military occupation as it would in 2014. In 1992, an active “oath war” was underway in Crimea within the Black Sea Fleet. The russians did everything to push Ukrainians out of the fleet and gain de facto control over it. They forcefully seized ships and administrative buildings, expelling those who had sworn allegiance to Ukraine from the barracks.
On July 21, 1992, russians opened fire and tried to ram the SKR-112 ship, which was sailing under the Ukrainian flag toward Odesa. The agreement that the countries eventually signed merely formalized what russia had already seized by force. More than 80% of ships and assets remained in Russian hands. The russian fleet stayed in Sevastopol and always served as a tool of pressure on Ukraine. 3/

Read 7 tweets

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@solonko1648

Aug 12

Тема "обміну територіями" (насправді спроби змусити віддати ще частину української землі росіянам) виникла звісно недарма. хуйло звіно дуже хотів би отримати дві агломерації в Донецькій області без бою. 1/

Попри всі наші нинішні проблеми, про які тут не пише тільки лінивий або мертвий, захопленя Покровської і Краматорської агломерацій обійдеться росіянам значними втратами. В тому числі під посилення тиску противник, як сказав ВГК, перекидає частини з Курщини. 2/

Звісно ніхто добровільно не віддасть жодного метра. Як би цього хто не вимагав. Як би сильно трамп і компанія не викручували б Україні руки. Це буде постріл собі в обидві ноги, або і в голову. Натуральне самогубство. Все це москалям доведеться взяти з боєм. 3/

Read 12 tweets

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@solonko1648

Aug 2

It's no secret to anyone that the russians aim to gain an advantage on the left flank of the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad defensive line. After managing to push forward in the Koptieve area and crossing the Kazennyi Torets near Razine, they began expanding their breakthrough, attempting to capture Shakhove and Rodynske. 1/

https://x.com/solonko1648/status/1950499093517672829?t=11ucfZF_NHIjU0aZuRLXZg&s=19

If you look at the image (link) above, the road between Novyi Shakhove and Shakhove is marked in red. The russians need to take control of it to facilitate the capture of Shakhove. The road is located on higher ground above the village itself. I also marked in red the section of the railway from Rodynske, which leads to both Dobropillia and Novodonetske. 2/

To establish firm control over this area, they need to take over the railway station at Dorozhne. The yellow arrows indicate the possible logic of their attempts to advance—not a certainty. From Dorozhne, they may launch their usual motorcycle assaults toward Bilytske. 3/

Read 8 tweets

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