For those who are unfamiliar with HIMARS, the cab of the launcher in the photo below is of one of the early DARPA paid for Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) chassis that I was responsible for accepting at the Sealy Texas TVSLP plant.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the small numbers of early HIMARS launcher trucks were operating out of "Special forces theme parks" within Iraq complete with C-130 strips and helicopters.
The idea of many of these "theme parks" was to project SF boots on the ground combined with a fast reaction 300km range strike capability to prevent launches/destroy Iraqi mobile Scud launcher infrastructure.
The full story of all the special forces involved is little told.
For instance, U.S. Navy SEa-Air-Land (SEAL) and Special Boat Teams, supported by AFSOD-S, UK Royal Marine commandos, and Polish SOF troops from their GROM unit were all active. 6/ defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operat…
There were also a number of US Special forces operating out of Turkey to protect the Kurdish populations north of the Green Line...
...and to keep and eye on the Kurdish and Peshmerga insurgents so Turkey didn't cut them off from that 1st mission.🙄
Given how Ukrainian Special Forces have used thermobaric armed Tochka-U and SMERCH launchers, the special forces training Royal Marines have given them, and potentially ATACMS in the near term.
I have to wonder if we will be seeing the Ukrainians... 8/
This Russian behavior in replacing Elite VDV combat manpower was seen in 2014-2015.⬇️
Unlike the Soviets, who husbanded the Guards formations, and used the trash troops for "myaso" or cannon-fodder human wave attacks, the Putin regime has played the opposite game, with no...
I mean, the data was there for anyone to see if the DC yo-yo's in question ever bothered to pay attention to reality as opposed to their secular religious dogma.🙄
The underperformance of the US DoD in it's core contract administration function upstream from the Defense Contract Management Agency is strictly due to the politics of the executive branch.
I lived the low signature armored cap (LSAC) & the mine resistant armor protected...
I have dealt with three MRAPs professionally: the Force Protection Cougar, the BAE/TVSLP Caiman and the failed Textron Armored Security Vehicle (ASV M1117) variant.
The ASV was an armored vehicle and it failed on cost and production 2/
...schedule grounds. The Cougar and Caiman were two ends of the South African armored anti-mine truck technological spectrum.
I saw DCMA contract officers cutting half a billion dollar orders in days, when they were turned loose from the DOD comptroller...
3/
This is why you have seen the RuAF playing the Imperial Japanese games at Saipan and Iwo in Zaporozhzhiye.
The Russian suicides to prevent capture, attacks under surrender and the Russian wounded trying to use grenades on AFU soldiers are all the result of decades long
2/
...cultural conditioning that @sumlenny laid out.
The so-called "Realists/Escalation Management"clique controlling Ukraine policy in the Biden Administration simply pretends such loser behavior does not exist in the world.
3/
For the $4.15 million price and weight (29,000kg or 63,600lb) of a single M109A7 SP gun, ammo, and crew, you can have several light wheeled vehicles and over a thousand precision FPV munitions reaching up to 20 km, with each of the M109A7 crew being drone operator. 2/
The two orders of magnitude (100 times) increase in the density of indirect fire sensor/shooter complexes on the battlefield means indirect drone firepower will be the dominant firepower.
This is something a lot of people have forgotten about Ukraine's "Death of a Thousand Cuts" logistical strategy aimed at Russia's ground lines of communications.
Coherent Change Detection software sees patterns of Russian tire tracks by satellite very easily
And Ukraine has had almost year to train similar artificial intelligence tools for its drones -- which Radio Free Europe told us all about in October 2022 -- to better detect RuAF trucks traffic & ammo depots.
This is a useful thread on the ground lines of communications (GLOC) in Southern Ukraine and what Ukraine getting into GMLRS range of them means for Russia⬇️