NEW: A prominent #Russian milblogger and front-line unit commander claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky “saved” the Russian 31st Guards VDV Brigade, which was fighting south of #Bakhmut, mirroring claims made by a much smaller milblogger about VDV units in western #Zaporizhia Oblast.
2/ Vostok Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky recalled a conversation with then-Commander of the 31st VDV Airborne Brigade Colonel Andrei Kondrashkin prior to Kondrashkin’s death around Bakhmut in mid-September, in which Kondrashkin revealed that his forces suffered personnel losses and that their motivation to fight dropped to a critical level.
3/ Kondrashkin reportedly stated that the Russian military command demanded that his forces undertake “decisive actions,” while he knew that his personnel were suffering a critical lack of motivation.
4/ Khodakovsky noted that Kondrashkin refrained from raising his concerns to the military command and proceeded to blame his military failures on the lack of cohesion among Russian forces. Khodakovsky, in turn, noted that cohesion was not the problem, but rather that Kondrashkin needed to make a choice to either “waste” his troops in combat or protest the Russian military command’s order at the expense of his career.
5/ Khodakovsky observed that Kondrashkin never had a chance to make this choice because he sustained an injury in combat immediately after the conversation, and that Teplinsky “saved” the 31st VDV Brigade by taking the “remnants [of the brigade] under his wing” and giving them the opportunity to take a break from combat.
6/ A Telegram channel that advocates for Teplinsky also amplified Khodakovsky’s account, claiming that Russian VDV forces – namely elements of the Russian 7th and 76th VDV divisions – are facing similar issues in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
7/ The milblogger claimed that Teplinsky is no longer able to rescue these divisions, however, as he was quietly stripped of his responsibilities.
8/ ISW cannot confirm either Khodakovsky's or the pro-Teplinsky milblogger’s claims, but both narratives attempt to portray Teplinsky as a commander who values the wellbeing of his forces over his career – likely to advance political goals that could support changes in the Russian military command.
9/ Khodakovsky’s account of Kondrashkin’s dilemma prior to his death also supports ISW’s prior assessment that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations south of Bakhmut may be degrading Russian units defending and counterattacking the area. isw.pub/UkrWar100223
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NEW: Russian Defense Minister Sergei #Shoigu celebrated an odd group of Russian armed formations operating in the western #Zaporizhia Oblast direction during a conference call with Russian military leadership.
Shoigu’s choice of units could indicate he seeks to highlight Russian commanders who continue to follow Russian military leadership’s orders for relentless counterattacks.
2/ Shoigu attributed successful Russian defensive operations around #Robotyne and #Verbove to elements of several Russian formations but failed to highlight several other formations that are routinely credited for maintaining the Robotyne-Verbove line. isw.pub/UkrWar100323
3/ The MoD has routinely deliberately snubbed or amplified the achievements of certain commanders in order to achieve Shoigu or the Russian military command’s political objectives, & Shoigu could be snubbing units advocating for tactical retreats to prepared defensive positions.
2/ Russian President Vladimir #Putin didn’t invade #Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed & that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be easy.
3/ #Putin's aim was not to defend Russia against some non-existent threat but rather to expand #Russia’s power, eradicate #Ukraine’s statehood, and destroy NATO, goals he still pursues.
NEW: The Kremlin has seemingly not yet clarified what #Ukrainian territories it claims that #Russia has annexed, leading to continued confusion among Russian government and occupation officials a year after the illegal annexation of occupied territories.
30 SEP campaign assessment w/ @criticalthreats:
2/ Russian President Vladimir #Putin gave a speech in honor of the so-called “Day of Reunification of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts with #Russia” on September 30.
3/ Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev posted a map on his Telegram channel in honor of the holiday that showed the entirety of #Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as Russian territory.
🧵#Ukrainian forces may be able to achieve an operationally significant breakthrough in the southern frontline if several key assumptions hold. A significant Ukrainian success will be more likely if: isw.pub/UkrWar092423
2/ This hypothesis is invalid if any of these assumptions are invalidated, though there are indicators that these assumptions remain valid as of ISW's September 24, 2023 campaign assessment.
3/ ISW continues to assess that the Russian military does not have sufficient forces deployed to w. Zaporizhia to completely man its defenses in depth and that UKR forces should be able to operate through Russian field fortifications more rapidly if they are not properly manned.
“Ukrainian forces have adapted. #Ukraine’s military decision-making is sound. Now is not the time for Western doubt but for the West to embrace Ukraine’s way of war & commit to sustaining Ukraine on the battlefield.” More: isw.pub/UkrWayofWar
2/ "The summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive faced a major challenge after #Russia had months to build up its defenses in occupied #Ukraine...But the Ukrainian forces have done what successful militaries do — they have adapted and are now advancing."
3/ "#Ukraine’s way of war has yielded repeated successes against Russian forces. Ukrainian forces have, with Western support, defeated Russian objectives repeatedly: in Kyiv, in Kharkiv, in Kharkiv Oblast, in Kherson, and now, to a growing extent, in Ukraine’s south."
The Russian military command may be ordering these counterattacks to buy time, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use time bought at such a price.
🧵(1/8) isw.pub/UkrWar092423
2/ Russian forces appear to be unwilling to surrender tactical areas and are focusing instead on fighting for every meter instead of benefiting from the depth of their prepared defenses.
3/ The Russian sacrifice of combat power to hold every meter may alternatively be intended to support the #Kremlin’s informational and hybrid warfare objectives. isw.pub/UkrWar092423