Key Takeaways from our new report (🧵1/8):

The implications of a long-term alignment between Russia and North Korea extend far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine and may have long-term impacts on the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Asia-Pacific region. 2/ The war in Ukraine will change the character of all future wars, and Pyongyang has evidently identified this fact as a vital learning opportunity for its forces.

North Korea's military has not experienced large-scale conventional combat since 1953 and understands that its doctrine is unprepared to fight in a modern war, especially against a sophisticated adversary such as South Korea.

NEW REPORT: North Korea has deployed a contingent of troops to Russia in support of Russia's war in Ukraine —the latest development in intensified cooperation between the two countries since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. (🧵1/5) 2/ The Kremlin is likely to leverage North Korean manpower to support its ongoing offensive efforts and offset requirements of Russia's domestic force generation capacity.

The Ukraine war is demonstrating dramatic changes in the character of war in five main ways (🧵):

1) The effectiveness of integrated air/missile defense (IAMD) against even intensive and complex air/missile attack (a phenomenon also visible in Iranian attacks against Israel); 2) The ability of enormous masses of tactical drones—millions of drones used on both sides—to create partially transparent battlefields and constrain combat to positional forms;

NEW: Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in occupied Ukraine. 🧵(1/8)


2/ @CNN, citing two unspecified Western intelligence officials, reported on October 30 that a small number of North Korean personnel are in occupied Ukraine but did not specify their location — the first such confirmation from Western sources.

https://x.com/NatSecCNN/status/1851316647526650202

NEW: The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but remains slow and consistent w/ positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant Russian advances have been after over two and half years of war. 🧵(1/7)


2/ Recent Western reporting linking the Russian rate of advance in September 2024 with Russian advances at the start of the war is highly misleading.

MORE: Unspecified sources within the Israeli defense establishment reported that Israel’s attack destroyed all of Iran’s long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and long-range detection radars, leaving Iran with only domestically produced short-range defense batteries.

Western reporting has confirmed damage at a storage unit within the Abadan oil refinery in Khuzestan province and a TIECO oil and gas machinery factory in Tehran province, among others, following the IDF strikes. 🧵(1/4) 2/ Unspecified Iranian sources told Israeli media that Israel also targeted and breached Iranian radar systems in Syria before launching its attack on Iran. The sources noted that the radar screens in Iran’s defense systems “froze“ before the IDF strikes. CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF likely targeted Iran’s early detection network in Syria and Iraq which would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack.

NEW: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network during its strikes on Iran on October 25. 🧵(1/7) 2/ The IDF struck three or four S-300 sites, including one at the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran.[2] Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times that the IDF strikes have caused major alarm among Iranian leaders.

Special Report: Possible Russian Gains in Georgia & Moldova 🧵1/7

The Kremlin continues to pursue its longstanding hybrid warfare efforts to regain effective control of the territories of the former Soviet Union even as it seeks to gain control of Ukraine through military force.
2/ The Russian invasion of Ukraine is supporting Russian hybrid warfare efforts in former Soviet states, particularly Moldova and Georgia, as pro-Russian local political leaders and influencers benefit from the implicit threat of Russian aggression against their states.

🧵(1/11): Putin very likely assesses that calling another partial mobilization wave, or introducing general mobilization, will be too costly to his regime, and has therefore resorted to crypto-mobilization efforts that appear to be placing greater and greater strains on the Russian wartime economy. 2/ The Washington Post reported on October 27 that the Russian economy is "in danger of overheating," noting that Russia's excessively high military spending has fueled economic growth in a way that has forced Russian companies to artificially raise their salaries in order to fulfill labor demands by remaining competitive with Russia’s high military salaries.

Special Report: Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has likely won a simple majority in the Georgian parliamentary election held on October 26, 2024, according to preliminary results. Georgian Dream has adopted a very strongly pro-Russian platform. 🧵(1/4) 2/ A number of incidents have marred the elections suggesting a thus far undetermined magnitude of election fraud pending reports from election observers.

The election results are likely to lead to opposition mobilization and protests given initial reactions from opposition parties claiming that the elections were fraudulent.

Russian forces continued to prioritize offensive operations in Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) on October 24 at the expense of the northern flank of Pokrovsk. 🧵(1/5)

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1849613093745328317

2/ Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces advanced further into southern and central Selydove and in the fields north of the settlement. ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean military personnel in Russia on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North Korean military units arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23.

More key takeaways ⬇️(1/5)


2/ Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and appeared to question Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces into Russia's war against Ukraine in the process.

A parliamentary victory for the Russia-friendly Georgia Dream party would represent a significant soft power victory for Russia, showcasing its ability to coerce neighboring countries and deter them from pursuing Western integration paths in the long run. (🧵1/9)

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1848726553196204311

2/ A victory for the Georgian Dream would also show that the Kremlin is able to leverage the invasion and partial occupation of neighboring states to shape their political orientations.

NEW: Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military. 🧵(1/7)


2/ Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged distilleries in Yefremov and Luzhlovsky.

"[ISW] found that drone strikes on the Kherson region notably increased around mid-July 2024. That coincides with when Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from positions on the Russian-occupied eastern side of the river, in the village of Krynky, in early July 2024." @CNN 🧵(1/9) 2/ "Drone attacks on ordinary people living [in Kherson] have sharply increased since the beginning of fall, with residents reporting Russian drone attacks on pedestrians, cars, buses and even an ambulance, according to local officials."

NEW: South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea transferred roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly training before deploying to participate in Russia's war against Ukraine. 🧵(1/7)


2/ The NIS stated on October 18 that seven Russian Pacific Fleet ships transported roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces from Chongjin, Hamhung, and Musudan in North Korea to Vladivostok, Russia between October 8 and 13 and that North Korea will send a second batch of military personnel to Russia soon.

NEW: Moldova stands to advance its path towards European integration in the upcoming October 2024 presidential election and referendum, but will likely remain a battleground state into the 2030s as EU membership negotiations continue. (🧵1/6) 2/ The possible reelection of pro-Western Moldovan President Maia Sandu and passing of the pro-EU referendum in October 2024 will not set Moldova's EU path in stone.

NEW: Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean. (1/4)


2/ Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.

NEW: Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the evening of Oct. 10 and have recently advanced further into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion. (1/4) 2/ Russian forces reportedly simultaneously intensified counterattacks in Glushkovksy Raion, on the left flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Korenevsky Raion, and on the right flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Sudzhansky Raion on the evening of October 10.

NEW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar Krai and an ammunition warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10. 🧵(1/7)
2/ The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 9 that Ukrainian naval forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian Shahed drone storage facility near Oktyabrsky, Krasnodar Krai and that Russian forces stored around 400 Shahed drones at the facility

NEW: The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions this fall constrain mechanized maneuver. (1/3)


2/ Poor weather conditions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties.