MORE: Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev suggested that Russia will occupy most of Ukraine if the West continues to aid Ukraine.

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1/ Medvedev called for Russian control over a buffer zone encompassing nearly all of Ukraine, apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland’s border, on his English-language social media accounts on May 25 and threatened that Russia will seize virtually all of Ukraine as a buffer zone if the West continues to supply Ukraine with military aid.

Medvedev and other Russian officials have repeatedly called for Russia to establish buffer zones in northern Ukraine, and Medvedev himself previously called for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a "buffer zone" in order to place Russian cities out of the range of Ukraine's Western-provided long-range strike systems.

Russian officials routinely issue demands for Ukraine to concede significant swaths of occupied and unoccupied territory to Russia and have used Russia's illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the Kremlin-generated concept of "Novorossiya" — an invented region of Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all southern and eastern Ukraine — to justify these claims.

Medvedev's statements are part of a long-term Kremlin strategy to use prominent voices in the information space and weaponized versions of history to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the long-term occupation of Ukrainian territory. 2/ The Kremlin is attempting to leverage large strike packages and increasingly aggressive rhetorical efforts to distract from the Russian military's poor performance during this current stage of the war. ⬇️

Putin may assess that significant strikes against Ukrainian cities and aggressive Russian rhetoric against NATO and Eastern European states will draw sufficient attention away from Russia's slow, grinding advances in eastern Ukraine.

Putin likely intends long-range strikes and aggressive rhetoric to generate feelings of hopelessness in Ukraine and the West and dissuade European capitals and the US from further aiding Ukraine by falsely portraying Russian victory as inevitable.

Russian officials are attempting to obfuscate the reality of Russia's compounding economic and materiel constraints, which are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to achieve significant battlefield gains.

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war. ⬇️(1/3)

Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18 and "want[s] to see if [he and Putin] can bring the war to an end." Trump added that he and Putin will "be talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets."

The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and concurrent implementation." The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement.

Putin rejected the temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal negotiations to end the war.

The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or assets.

Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.


2/ Putin is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims.

MORE: Reuters reported on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address [Russia's] concerns."

▪️ Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account."

▪️ A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire but did not specify whether such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select countries.

▪️ Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree. 2/ Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.

NEW: Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Details⬇️(1/3)

▪️ Putin stated in his February 27 address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia.

▪️ Putin and other Russian officials have previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian ultranationalists.

▪️ Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.

▪️ Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts.

Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial concessions. 2/ Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.

NEW: Ukraine Fact Sheet - February 21, 2025

Link to PDF w/ full details and references⬇️ 2/ isw.pub/UkraineFactshe…

NEW: The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. (1/3)


2/ Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion."

NEW: Sources close to the Japanese government assess that the PLAN and CCG likely conducted a joint maritime blockade drill in the Miyako Strait for the first time on December 22. The drill involved three PLAN vessels and three CCG vessels. (1/7) 2/ The PLAN ships circumnavigated the southern tip of Taiwan and Japan’s Sakishima islands before entering the strait, which is located between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain.

NEW: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defended against Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attempts to recapture SDF-held ground on the west bank of the Euphrates River near the Tishreen Dam and Qere Qozak Bridge.

Syria Key Takeaways 🧵(1/6):
2/ Unspecified sources reportedly told Syria-based al Khabour News that the YPG threatened to cut off bread supplies to Hasakah if the people did not demonstrate in support of the group.

Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. 🧵(1/8)

(📸: @Maxar)

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1867766433096380516

2/ Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.

NEW: The Iranian regime is still coming to terms with the fall of the Assad regime and reflecting on its former Syria policy.

Key Takeaways + Full Report ⬇️🧵(1/7)


2/ Blinken in the Middle East: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.

.@Maxar collected new satellite imagery this morning (December 13th) of the two primary Russian military bases in Syria—Khmeimim airbase near Latakia and the port/naval base at Tartus. Details ⬇️🧵(1/4)


2/ At Khmeimim, @Maxar imagery shows two An-124 heavy transport aircraft at the airfield—both with their nose cones lifted and prepared to load equipment/cargo.

NEW: Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.🧵(1/X)

2/ Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. This advance places Russian forces about 6km south of Pokrovsk.

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Sentinel-2 imagery from Dec. 10 collected by @kromark shows that Russian ships have still not returned to Syria's Port of Tartus and that the Russian Mediterranean Sea Flotilla is still in a holding pattern about eight to 15km away from Tartus. x.com/kromark/status… x.com/TheStudyofWar/… 2/ @MT_Anderson identified 4 Russian ships within this radius as of Dec. 10—the Adm. Golovko Gorshkov-class frigate, the Adm. Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Improved Kilo-class submarine, & the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler.

https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1866506906170237070

The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s global military footprint and ability to operate in Africa. 🧵(1/5)

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1865965846008631525

2/ Russia has leveraged its Tartus naval base to project power in the Mediterranean Sea, threaten NATO's southern flank, and link its Black Sea assets to the Mediterranean Sea.

NEW | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024: Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia. 1/6


2/ The US Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3 that states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's deportation program.

Tonight's Report: isw.pub/UkrWar120424

NEW: Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the near term.🧵(1/7)


2/ Satellite imagery from December 3 via @MT_Anderson showed that Russia removed three frigates, a submarine, and two unnamed auxiliary vessels from the base — amounting to all of the vessels that Russia had stationed at Tartus.

https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1863961047335338225

NEW: Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation. (🧵1/5)


2/ Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev told the Financial Times that Putin will likely reject any plan for peace negotiations that US President-elect Donald Trump puts forth unless the plan accounts for Russia's "security concerns."

NEW: Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good-faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. 🧵(1/5)


2/ Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin claimed on November 26 that Russia is open to negotiations but stated that Russia "categorically rejects" any "freezing" of the current frontline or the creation of a demilitarized zone.

NEW: Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024. 🧵(1/7) 2/ The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.

NEW: The Russian MoD likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors. (1/4)


2/ Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol.

NEW: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. (🧵1/7) 2/ Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21. The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.