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2/ Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension of US assistance in Fall 2023. 
2/ Zelensky said during an interview that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale exacerbated by delays in staffing & equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders necessary rest/rotation.
2/ Putin originally introduced the policy offering all wounded Russian servicemen three million rubles to incentivize military recruitment after he had decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022.
2/ The notion that the Ukraine war is unwinnable because of Russia’s dominance is a Russian information operation, which gives us a glimpse of the Kremlin’s real strategy and only real hope of success. The Kremlin must get the United States to the sidelines, allowing Russia to fight Ukraine in isolation and then proceed to Moscow’s next targets, which Russia will also seek to isolate.
2/ Putin stated during his November 7 Valdai Club address that he is open to discussions meant to "restore" US-Russia relations but that the United States must initiate these negotiations...
2/ Putin addressed the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on November 7 and advocated for a reset of US–Russia relations. Putin implied that Trump’s presidential campaign expressed a "desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis" and later noted that Russia is open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the United States."
2/ Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
2/ Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ 370 times in October. The PRC increased ADIZ incursions significantly after Lai’s inauguration in May, with over 300 incursions every month since.
2/ Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
2/ Kharkiv/Luhansk: Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 4 and 5. Geolocated footage published on November 4 and 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Novoselivske (southeast of Kupyansk) and to a windbreak in northern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).
2/ The Kremlin has been incessant in its claims that it set out to negotiate in March 2022 (after illegally invading Ukraine) but that it was Ukraine and the collective West that destroyed the prospect of negotiations.
2/ Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
2/ The Kremlin is likely to leverage North Korean manpower to support its ongoing offensive efforts and offset requirements of Russia's domestic force generation capacity.
2/ @CNN, citing two unspecified Western intelligence officials, reported on October 30 that a small number of North Korean personnel are in occupied Ukraine but did not specify their location — the first such confirmation from Western sources.
2/ Recent Western reporting linking the Russian rate of advance in September 2024 with Russian advances at the start of the war is highly misleading.
2/ Unspecified Iranian sources told Israeli media that Israel also targeted and breached Iranian radar systems in Syria before launching its attack on Iran. The sources noted that the radar screens in Iran’s defense systems “froze“ before the IDF strikes. CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF likely targeted Iran’s early detection network in Syria and Iraq which would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack.
2/ The IDF struck three or four S-300 sites, including one at the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran.[2] Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times that the IDF strikes have caused major alarm among Iranian leaders.
2/ The Russian invasion of Ukraine is supporting Russian hybrid warfare efforts in former Soviet states, particularly Moldova and Georgia, as pro-Russian local political leaders and influencers benefit from the implicit threat of Russian aggression against their states.