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2/ Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.
2/ Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. 
2/ isw.pub/UkraineFactshe…
2/ Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion."
2/ The PLAN ships circumnavigated the southern tip of Taiwan and Japan’s Sakishima islands before entering the strait, which is located between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain.
2/ Unspecified sources reportedly told Syria-based al Khabour News that the YPG threatened to cut off bread supplies to Hasakah if the people did not demonstrate in support of the group.
2/ Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus. 
2/ Blinken in the Middle East: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi officials on December 12 and 13. Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on December 12 and 13, respectively, to try to persuade Turkey “not to press [its] advantage” against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.
2/ At Khmeimim, @Maxar imagery shows two An-124 heavy transport aircraft at the airfield—both with their nose cones lifted and prepared to load equipment/cargo. 
2/ Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. This advance places Russian forces about 6km south of Pokrovsk. 
2/ @MT_Anderson identified 4 Russian ships within this radius as of Dec. 10—the Adm. Golovko Gorshkov-class frigate, the Adm. Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Improved Kilo-class submarine, & the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler.
2/ Russia has leveraged its Tartus naval base to project power in the Mediterranean Sea, threaten NATO's southern flank, and link its Black Sea assets to the Mediterranean Sea. 
2/ The US Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3 that states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's deportation program.
2/ Satellite imagery from December 3 via @MT_Anderson showed that Russia removed three frigates, a submarine, and two unnamed auxiliary vessels from the base — amounting to all of the vessels that Russia had stationed at Tartus.
2/ Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev told the Financial Times that Putin will likely reject any plan for peace negotiations that US President-elect Donald Trump puts forth unless the plan accounts for Russia's "security concerns."
2/ Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin claimed on November 26 that Russia is open to negotiations but stated that Russia "categorically rejects" any "freezing" of the current frontline or the creation of a demilitarized zone.
2/ The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
2/ Ukrainian military officials denied claims of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean "technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol. 
2/ Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21. The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
2/ The Houthis are undeterred and have collected significant insight into US defenses against their attack systems of all varieties. The Houthis will almost certainly exploit this insight to improve the efficacy of their own attacks and provide it to other US adversaries.
2/ Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.