🇪🇺 - EU will publish list of critical technologies today - a key step to kickstart Europe's de-risking efforts vis à vis China
• A short thread with graphs on why this list matters, what we can expect, and what's next for EU de-risking plans 👇🧵 [1/8]
• Publication of EU list of critical tech will be signal of bloc's willingness/ability to pursue de-risking
• List will provide concrete insights into EU thinking about what risk of doing business with China really is – a key question to answer before de-risking [2/8]
• By selecting only few flagship, priority sectors, EU will be keen to reiterate message that it is willing to de-risk, not decouple, from China
• EU also wants to show that it is carving its own, European, de-risking strategy, instead of following US lead in the field [3/8]
• List will almost certainly include tech related to green energy transition - a key area for EU de-risking
• EU wants to ensure safety of supplies for critical raw materials (lithium), tech (EV batteries) and equipment (solar panels) that are vital for net-zero economy [4/8]
• List will also likely include know-how related to semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and quantum computing
• EU's efforts to mitigate risks associated with these technologies stem from their dual nature: these tech have both civilian and military applications [5/8]
• List will be of critical importance to private firms: document will likely define which sectors could fall under remit of potential EU tool to screen outbound investment, notably to China
• Adoption of such a tool would signal greater EU-US alignment on de-risking [6/8]
• Discussions on outbound FDI screening show how Western countries are willing to enforce intrusive measures that were previously unthinkable
• Yet getting companies on board with de-risking will be difficult: two-thirds of EU firms have no plans to shift away from China [7/8]
• Overall, bridging gap between de-risking rhetoric and practice will remain hard for EU
• Politically, de-risking plans have created divisions among EU member states
• In particular, Germany's economy remains far more exposed to China than other European economies
[8/8 - END]
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
- Sanctions on Russian oil exports - in the form of the EU embargo on Russian oil and the G7/EU price cap - are weighing heavily on Moscow's finances.
- The first quarter of 2023 marked the full implementation of the oil price cap and the EU embargo. [2/9]
- In the first quarter of 2023 Moscow's receipts from oil exports (crude oil and oil products) fell by US$15.6bn year on year (or a drop of 29%).
- Almost 75% of that drop is due to Western sanctions: US$6.1bn from lower volumes and US$5.2bn from discounts on Russian oil. [3/9]
Must-read study from @BOFITresearch's Heli Simola on Russian trade - here's a quick thread with graphs and key takeaways [1/8]
(spoiler - official Russian trade data have become unreliable, and Beijing is not helping Moscow) 👇🧵 publications.bof.fi/handle/10024/5…
- In 2022 Western sanctions on Russia mostly hit the country's imports.
- Russian goods imports were down by about 20% year on year in February 2023 - highlighting the combined impact of sanctions, Russia's recession and company self-sanctioning [2/8]
- Russian imports data (from the Central Bank of Russia) appear unreliable.
- Building a proxy indicator with customs data from Russian trade partners paints a bleaker picture than official data [3/8]
TRADE
1 - Since a record-high US$83bn in the second quarter of 2022, Russia's trade balance has narrowed considerably – to US$29bn in January - March 2023.
- This reflects sanctions on Russia's energy exports, lower energy prices and pressures on production. [2/13]
2 - As a result, in the first quarter of 2023 the current account surplus came in at only US$18.6bn – a 75% decline from a year ago.
- This matters (a lot), given the current-account surplus is the key flow of funds for Russia's foreign-exchange reserves. [3/13]
Must-read paper from @IFRI_ on Russia's mining sector (and why it matters for the rest of the world) - a quick thread with notes, and lots of parallels with Russia's energy sector 👇🧵[1/9] ifri.org/en/publication…
⛏️ - Russia produces 14% of the world's mining output, giving the country significant global leverage.
💎 - Russia has a leading position for palladium (38%), diamonds (30%), potash (20%), titanium (13%), nickel (11%) and gold (9%). [2/9]
- Crucially, Russia holds the world's third largest reserves of nickel and copper.
🔌🔋 - Both minerals will be crucial for the green energy transition. [3/9]
• Russia's current-account surplus stood at its lowest level in December since the pandemic year of 2020 - highlighting a rapid deterioration of external environment
• This mostly reflects a steep rebound in imports after their collapse in March-June [2/7]
• In December (after EU ban & G7 price cap on Russian oil took effect), average price for Russian oil exports was US$74/barrel - well above G7 price cap of US$60/b
• The real discount between Russian oil and Brent oil is lower than media-reported Urals prices suggest [3/7]
EU has decided to move forward with earlier proposal to screen investment proposals (most notably from China through its Belt and Road Initiative) - move is significant for several reasons [Thread 1/6]
FDI screening decisions taken by member states - criteria include:
(a) critical infrastructure/supply or critical inputs such as energy, or
(b) implies access to sensitive information/ability to control information, or
(c) relates to freedom/pluralism of media [2/6]
EU member states will consider:
• Who is the investor and the target company?
• In which sectors do they operate and where?
• What is the value of the investment and where the
funding is coming from?
• When does the transaction take place? [3/6]