Approximately 12 months ago, 🇷🇺 initiated a large-scale long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. I have gathered data on the long-range strike (LRS) weapons employed by Russia and Ukraine's success in intercepting them. This thread provides a summary of the findings. 👇🧵 1/14
According to official information provided by the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia has launched a minimum of 3,967 long-range strike weapons against Ukraine in the past 12 months. Out of these, 3,249 were successfully intercepted. 2/14
Please note that this estimate may underestimate the total number of long-range strike weapons launched, while it may potentially overestimate the number of intercepted long-range strike weapons (e.g., the AFU potraying failed launches as successful intercepts). 3/14
In any case, these numbers indicate the staggering amount of ammunition consumed in modern warfare. Contemporary wars are missile wars. States must adapt and prepare accordingly, investing in both their own offensive strike capabilities and defensive countermeasures. 4/14
The first intense period occurred during Winter 22/23 when 🇷🇺 targeted Ukraine's electrical infrastructure, predominently using cruise missiles. The highest number of LRS launched in a single day also occured during this period, with Russia launching 131 LRS on 17 Nov 22. 5/14
The intensity of long-range strikes decreased from Jan-Apr 23, but picked up again in May. Sep 23 was the highest month in terms of LRS launched. However, it is evident that the use of cruise missiles in these attacks has decreased, likely due to stockpile shortages. 6/14
The total count of long-range strike weapons launched can be categorized as follows: 2,227 long-range drones (Shahed 136) (56.1%), 1,673 cruise missiles (42.2%), and 67 ballistic missiles (1.7%). 7/14
On average, Ukraine has managed to intercept 87.2% of launched long-range drones, 76.5% of launched cruise missiles, and 41.8% of launched ballistic missiles. 8/14
Looking at the total number of launched missiles, the majority of missile systems used were Kh-101/Kh-55/Kh-555 (740) and 3M-14 Kalibr (427) missiles. It is highly probable that the "unidentified missile" category mainly consists of these two types of missiles as well. 9/14
Ukraine achieved great success in intercepting subsonic cruise missiles (Kh-101/55/555, 3M-14 Kalibr, & Kh-59), moderate success in intercepting ballistic missiles (Iskander-M & Kinzhal), and low to no success in intercepting supersonic cruise missiles (P-800 Onyx & Kh-22). 10/14
There is a strong correlation (0.973) between the number of launched & intercepted LRS. I.e., as the number of launched LRS increases, so does the number of intercepted LRS. This indicates that 🇺🇦's missile defense system is capable of defending against largescale attacks. 11/14
On average, for every additional long-range strike weapon launched, there is an increase of 0.776 in the number of intercepted long-range strike weapons. Note also the high R-squared, which suggests that launched LRS is a strong predictor of intercepted LRS in the model. 12/14
The implications of this cannot be overstated. It directly challenges a significant portion of the pre-war discourse on missile defense, which argued that missile defense is ineffective, especially when dealing with large-scale and complex missile raids. 13/14
However, these statistics also highlight a gap in 🇺🇦's IAMD capability. At present 🇺🇦 cannot effectively defend against supersonic cruise missiles. Ukraine requires additional Patriot launchers, radars, and interceptors to adequately protect against these types of threats. 14/14
In the upcoming months, I will provide regular updates on these statistics and highlight important developments in light of Russia's forthcoming Winter missile campaign. I will also try to post more on 🔵Sky, so follow me over there if you don't already (same handle).
Note that in post 10 of this thread, the number of intercepted unidentified LRS is higher than the number of launched unidentified LRS. This is because ithe AFU provides more detail on the types of Russian LRS launched, while the information on intercepted LRS is less specific.
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I published a new Missile Matters post today, offering an initial battle damage assessment of Flamingo’s first combat use.
Proof of concept was established, but the strike also revealed likely shortcomings.
Access the post via the link in my bio. Summary below.
1/6
High-resolution satellite imagery shows two impacts.
Depending on the nominal aimpoints, missile one probably missed by 15 to 40 meters and missile two by 80 to 200 meters.
Missile three did not reach the target area, whether due to outside influence or internal failure.
2/6
Fire Point stated that the Flamingo has a CEP of 14 meters, meaning 50 percent of missiles should land within 14 meters of their aimpoint, about 93 percent within 28 meters, and the remainder outside the 28-meter radius.
3/6
With recent focus on Ukrainian missiles, from Flamingo to "Long Neptune" and others, I thought I'd provide context by tracing the evolution of Ukraine's missile programs.
Link in bio, short summary below.
1/6
Ukraine’s missile industry has moved through several distinct phases since 2014, from modest post-Soviet capabilities and problem-ridden pre-war programs to wartime improvisation, foreign reliance, and now ambitious attempts at independent production.
2/6
From relying almost entirely on Western partners in 2023 for long-range strike capabilities, Ukraine by 2025 fields a diverse but still imperfect missile arsenal, with lighter drones and mini-cruise missiles forming the backbone.
3/6
I published my latest newsletter post earlier today, offering an initial assessment of the FP-5 Flamingo’s specifications, lethality, survivability, and strategic implications.
You can find the full post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/6
The FP-5 Flamingo is the first "heavy" missile system in Ukraine's indigenous missile arsenal, combining long range with a large payload.
This offers significant advantages in terms of missile lethality through improved warhead penetration and greater explosive yield.
2/6
The ultimate impact of the Flamingo on the battlefield will depend on Ukrainian production levels and its survivability against Russian missile defenses.
Ukrainian output goals of more than 200 units per month by the end of the year are certainly ambitious.
3/6
I estimate U.S. and European production of ballistic missile interceptors and compare it to Russia’s output of conventional ballistic missiles.
Access the post via the link in my bio.
Short summary below.
1/7
Russia is currently estimated to produce a total of 840 to 1,020 ground-launched 9M723 and air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- to medium-range ballistic missiles annually, or 70 to 85 per month.
This represents roughly a 15 to 40 percent increase compared to 2024.
2/7
In contrast, combined Patriot interceptor production (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) stands at 850 to 880 in 2025.
By 2027, this will increase to over 1,100 interceptors, and to over 1,400 by 2029 (if Rheinmetall starts producing PAC-3 MSE interceptors).
3/7
I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russia’s inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6