Approximately 12 months ago, π·πΊ initiated a large-scale long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. I have gathered data on the long-range strike (LRS) weapons employed by Russia and Ukraine's success in intercepting them. This thread provides a summary of the findings. π𧡠1/14
According to official information provided by the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia has launched a minimum of 3,967 long-range strike weapons against Ukraine in the past 12 months. Out of these, 3,249 were successfully intercepted. 2/14
Please note that this estimate may underestimate the total number of long-range strike weapons launched, while it may potentially overestimate the number of intercepted long-range strike weapons (e.g., the AFU potraying failed launches as successful intercepts). 3/14
In any case, these numbers indicate the staggering amount of ammunition consumed in modern warfare. Contemporary wars are missile wars. States must adapt and prepare accordingly, investing in both their own offensive strike capabilities and defensive countermeasures. 4/14
The first intense period occurred during Winter 22/23 when π·πΊ targeted Ukraine's electrical infrastructure, predominently using cruise missiles. The highest number of LRS launched in a single day also occured during this period, with Russia launching 131 LRS on 17 Nov 22. 5/14
The intensity of long-range strikes decreased from Jan-Apr 23, but picked up again in May. Sep 23 was the highest month in terms of LRS launched. However, it is evident that the use of cruise missiles in these attacks has decreased, likely due to stockpile shortages. 6/14
The total count of long-range strike weapons launched can be categorized as follows: 2,227 long-range drones (Shahed 136) (56.1%), 1,673 cruise missiles (42.2%), and 67 ballistic missiles (1.7%). 7/14
On average, Ukraine has managed to intercept 87.2% of launched long-range drones, 76.5% of launched cruise missiles, and 41.8% of launched ballistic missiles. 8/14
Looking at the total number of launched missiles, the majority of missile systems used were Kh-101/Kh-55/Kh-555 (740) and 3M-14 Kalibr (427) missiles. It is highly probable that the "unidentified missile" category mainly consists of these two types of missiles as well. 9/14
Ukraine achieved great success in intercepting subsonic cruise missiles (Kh-101/55/555, 3M-14 Kalibr, & Kh-59), moderate success in intercepting ballistic missiles (Iskander-M & Kinzhal), and low to no success in intercepting supersonic cruise missiles (P-800 Onyx & Kh-22). 10/14
There is a strong correlation (0.973) between the number of launched & intercepted LRS. I.e., as the number of launched LRS increases, so does the number of intercepted LRS. This indicates that πΊπ¦'s missile defense system is capable of defending against largescale attacks. 11/14
On average, for every additional long-range strike weapon launched, there is an increase of 0.776 in the number of intercepted long-range strike weapons. Note also the high R-squared, which suggests that launched LRS is a strong predictor of intercepted LRS in the model. 12/14
The implications of this cannot be overstated. It directly challenges a significant portion of the pre-war discourse on missile defense, which argued that missile defense is ineffective, especially when dealing with large-scale and complex missile raids. 13/14
However, these statistics also highlight a gap in πΊπ¦'s IAMD capability. At present πΊπ¦ cannot effectively defend against supersonic cruise missiles. Ukraine requires additional Patriot launchers, radars, and interceptors to adequately protect against these types of threats. 14/14
In the upcoming months, I will provide regular updates on these statistics and highlight important developments in light of Russia's forthcoming Winter missile campaign. I will also try to post more on π΅Sky, so follow me over there if you don't already (same handle).
Note that in post 10 of this thread, the number of intercepted unidentified LRS is higher than the number of launched unidentified LRS. This is because ithe AFU provides more detail on the types of Russian LRS launched, while the information on intercepted LRS is less specific.
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I sent out my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the state and viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent in 2025.
You can access the post via the link my bio.
Below a short summary.
1/5
Russia's nuclear arsenal faces two primary challenges: maintaining its nuclear warheads and sustaining a viable fleet of delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs.
While both pose difficulties, warhead maintenance is likely the lesser challenge for Russia.
2/5
In contrast, Russiaβs inability to move beyond Soviet-era technology and field a next-generation ICBM presents a more serious challenge over the medium to long term.
To be clear, several nuclear-armed states face difficulties in replacing Cold War-era systems.
3/5
Briefly on a potential Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear infrastructure:
My colleague and supervisor, @Malfrid_BH, has written an excellent article on Israel's preventive attacks against Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the 1980s, which remains as relevant as ever.
1/6
The article reexamines Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. While it delayed Iraqβs nuclear ambitions, the strike also pushed Iraq to pursue a more covert and determined nuclear weapons program in the years following.
2/6
After the attack, Iraq shifted its strategy, dispersing facilities and focusing on secret, military-oriented nuclear development. The attack also increased Iraq's determination, driven by national pride, the desire for a security deterrent, and fear of future strikes.
3/6
On September 25, the Kremlin announced plans to revise its nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions for nuclear use.
This raises a critical question: How credible is this latest nuclear threat, and how credible are Russian nuclear threats in general?
Short thread π§΅π:
1/10
I categorize π·πΊ nuclear threats into four types: cheap talk, state-sanctioned rhetoric, preparations for limited nuclear use, and preparations for large-scale nuclear use. Each varies in intensity & credibility.
We have observed the first two types, but not the latter two.
2/10
Cheap talk includes non-official rhetoric like TV discussions by excentric talkshow guests about nuking Western cities.
These discussions do not reflect official policy & ignore the immense costs of nuclear use to Russia, making them non-credible and generally ignorable.
A few people asked if all 22 S-300/S-400 sites around Moscow are still active or if some systems have been removed and redeployed, likely closer to Ukraine.
In other words, does Moscow's air defense network underperform because it no longer exists?
A short thread. 1/8
First, @AS_22im is the true expert on tracking S-300/S-400 sites. I recommend you follow him.
My TL;DR: Satellite imagery indicates that most air defense sites around Moscow remain intact, although some have lost a few launchers, while other sites are completely gone.
2/8
A good example of an air defense site that remains fully in-tact is the one near Novovorino (56.1676, 37.82313).
The image on the left is from June 2019, the one on the right from May 2024. The only difference is that the launchers are erected, suggesting higher readiness.
Ukraine's Sapsan SRBM is one of three primary missile projects that πΊπ¦ is working on. The other two are the Neptune ASCM (in production) and the Korshun LACM (in development).
Hrim-2 is a shorter-range variant intended for export and is largely identical with the Sapsan.
1/5
The missile missile follows other SRBMs, like the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M and the South Korean Hyunmoo-2, in form and function.
The missile is powered by solid fuel & has a claimed range of 400-500 km, though reports have stated that this may be extended to 700 km or more.
2/5
Sapsan reportedly has a payload capacity of 480 kg. The tapered warhead seen in the picture of the Hrim-2 is well-suited for a penetrator warhead, providing the missile with significant hard-target kill capability β something currently lacking in Ukraine's missile arsenal.
3/5
Taurus uses a 'smart' fuse that counts the layers and void spaces the warhead penetrates, making sure the warhead explodes at precisely the right moment, rather than relying on a set timer.