Leading up to and during the counter-offensive, many independent observers underestimated the preparedness of russian defenses. Seemingly unremarkable tree lines concealed well-prepared russian positions, fortified and complemented by extensive minefields. 🧵Thread:
2/ In Section One, which displays satellite imagery of the tree line near Robotyne on July 13th, it is evident that while there are some noticeable changes near the tree line, such as earthworks, the majority of positions remain concealed and not clearly visible.
3/ In Section Two, the August imagery exposes the presence of russian positions after tree destruction. many observers primarily focused on visible defensive lines, often missing concealed positions. This led to a misconception of vast, empty spaces between the fortifications.
4/ In the final, third section depicting the situation on September 11th, we can finally discern a system of trenches and concealed individual positions along the tree line.
5/ Let's take another look and run a brief comparative analysis. In this case, independent observers may focus on the visible trench, ignoring concealed positions. However, the absence of foliage reveals the defensive positions clearly
6/ Overall, these positions are typically detectable by drones, particularly when occupied by enemy forces. Yet, there have been cases where they eluded detection, were only partially revealed, or mistakenly presumed unmanned, catching approaching Ukrainian forces off guard.
7/ As events progressed, it became clear that these seemingly empty areas were fortified and ready for defense. The remaining spaces were heavily mined and closely watched by drones, which allowed artillery and loitering munition to attack approaching troops
8/ This can also partly explain the lack of a swift advance after Ukrainian forces breached the visible defensive line, with AT trench and dragon's teeth.
Ukrainian troops must still face enemy positions in many tree lines, along with FPVs, artillery, mines, and helicopters.
9/ Continuing offensive progress hinges on artillery ammo availability for advancing troops, as it's vital to suppress numerous enemy defenses and force their withdrawal. Additionally, the readiness of reserves to advance and take positions remains crucial.
10/ The comprehensive analysis can be found on my project's website, "Frontelligence Insight," listed in my bio. It offers a more detailed and expanded version of this thread.
11/ I kindly request you to like, follow, and share the first message in the thread.
These materials are accessible thanks to the support received through Buy Me A Coffee. This support enables me to acquire and share imagery with analysis, including this thread.
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News of Ukrainian missile production (Flamingo missile) is inspiring, both at home and abroad. Yet, unless the production site, which was opened for journalists, was staged for cameras, it is striking how many details were left exposed - enough to make geolocation possible.
2/ Equally concerning is the decision to show crew members’ faces and list their positions. In our past investigations, my team was able to identify Russian servicemen and intelligence officers using just one facial photo, tracing some even to their actual home addresses
3/ Revealing factory staff could enable local agents from locals to follow employees and, in turn, uncover the site almost certainly making it a target. The interior itself is highly distinctive, a skilled team could likely narrow its location to a handful of candidates.
Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:
2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.
3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread:
2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller.
3/ The unidentified drone is powered by a two-stroke gasoline DLE engine produced by China’s Mile Haoxiang Technology Co.
The DLE engine is mounted in the nose of the fuselage, making the drone most similar to the “Italmas” loitering munition produced by Russia’s Zala Group
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold
So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:
Demilitarization – failed.
Regime change in Kyiv – failed.
Full control over Donbas – failed.
Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.
🧵Short thread:
2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.
3/ Russia failed to remove Zelenskyy or his government. Kyiv remains fully under Ukrainian control. The chances of a pro-Russian party winning the next election are slim to none
1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration
2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context
3/ It is positive that Ukrainian forces contained the threat and prevented it from developing into an operational breakthrough. However, the scale of reinforcements required was significant. According to Deep State, the following units were involved in the reinforcement effort: