Leading up to and during the counter-offensive, many independent observers underestimated the preparedness of russian defenses. Seemingly unremarkable tree lines concealed well-prepared russian positions, fortified and complemented by extensive minefields. 🧵Thread:
2/ In Section One, which displays satellite imagery of the tree line near Robotyne on July 13th, it is evident that while there are some noticeable changes near the tree line, such as earthworks, the majority of positions remain concealed and not clearly visible.
3/ In Section Two, the August imagery exposes the presence of russian positions after tree destruction. many observers primarily focused on visible defensive lines, often missing concealed positions. This led to a misconception of vast, empty spaces between the fortifications.
4/ In the final, third section depicting the situation on September 11th, we can finally discern a system of trenches and concealed individual positions along the tree line.
5/ Let's take another look and run a brief comparative analysis. In this case, independent observers may focus on the visible trench, ignoring concealed positions. However, the absence of foliage reveals the defensive positions clearly
6/ Overall, these positions are typically detectable by drones, particularly when occupied by enemy forces. Yet, there have been cases where they eluded detection, were only partially revealed, or mistakenly presumed unmanned, catching approaching Ukrainian forces off guard.
7/ As events progressed, it became clear that these seemingly empty areas were fortified and ready for defense. The remaining spaces were heavily mined and closely watched by drones, which allowed artillery and loitering munition to attack approaching troops
8/ This can also partly explain the lack of a swift advance after Ukrainian forces breached the visible defensive line, with AT trench and dragon's teeth.
Ukrainian troops must still face enemy positions in many tree lines, along with FPVs, artillery, mines, and helicopters.
9/ Continuing offensive progress hinges on artillery ammo availability for advancing troops, as it's vital to suppress numerous enemy defenses and force their withdrawal. Additionally, the readiness of reserves to advance and take positions remains crucial.
10/ The comprehensive analysis can be found on my project's website, "Frontelligence Insight," listed in my bio. It offers a more detailed and expanded version of this thread.
11/ I kindly request you to like, follow, and share the first message in the thread.
These materials are accessible thanks to the support received through Buy Me A Coffee. This support enables me to acquire and share imagery with analysis, including this thread.
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Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
AWOL and desertion cases in the Russian army have doubled and tripled in recent months, with battlefield desertions rising sharply, according to tens of thousands of records reviewed by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵This thread summarizes the key insights drawn from the data:
2/ Before proceeding, we thank the Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com for providing additional documents containing the full list of service members. While the source is trusted, we carried out our own inspection and verification to confirm the list’s authenticity.
3/ Our team randomly selected 21 cases from the file and used third-party services to verify each soldier’s name, date of birth, and address or region. In 19 cases the data fully matched; the two discrepancies were in addresses, likely due to changes before/after enlistment
Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion
So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.