Leading up to and during the counter-offensive, many independent observers underestimated the preparedness of russian defenses. Seemingly unremarkable tree lines concealed well-prepared russian positions, fortified and complemented by extensive minefields. 🧵Thread:
2/ In Section One, which displays satellite imagery of the tree line near Robotyne on July 13th, it is evident that while there are some noticeable changes near the tree line, such as earthworks, the majority of positions remain concealed and not clearly visible.
3/ In Section Two, the August imagery exposes the presence of russian positions after tree destruction. many observers primarily focused on visible defensive lines, often missing concealed positions. This led to a misconception of vast, empty spaces between the fortifications.
4/ In the final, third section depicting the situation on September 11th, we can finally discern a system of trenches and concealed individual positions along the tree line.
5/ Let's take another look and run a brief comparative analysis. In this case, independent observers may focus on the visible trench, ignoring concealed positions. However, the absence of foliage reveals the defensive positions clearly
6/ Overall, these positions are typically detectable by drones, particularly when occupied by enemy forces. Yet, there have been cases where they eluded detection, were only partially revealed, or mistakenly presumed unmanned, catching approaching Ukrainian forces off guard.
7/ As events progressed, it became clear that these seemingly empty areas were fortified and ready for defense. The remaining spaces were heavily mined and closely watched by drones, which allowed artillery and loitering munition to attack approaching troops
8/ This can also partly explain the lack of a swift advance after Ukrainian forces breached the visible defensive line, with AT trench and dragon's teeth.
Ukrainian troops must still face enemy positions in many tree lines, along with FPVs, artillery, mines, and helicopters.
9/ Continuing offensive progress hinges on artillery ammo availability for advancing troops, as it's vital to suppress numerous enemy defenses and force their withdrawal. Additionally, the readiness of reserves to advance and take positions remains crucial.
10/ The comprehensive analysis can be found on my project's website, "Frontelligence Insight," listed in my bio. It offers a more detailed and expanded version of this thread.
11/ I kindly request you to like, follow, and share the first message in the thread.
These materials are accessible thanks to the support received through Buy Me A Coffee. This support enables me to acquire and share imagery with analysis, including this thread.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread:
2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.
3/ Despite growing logistical problems, Ukrainian command has made bad choices to launch Russian-modelled assaults. The attempt to capture positions while already struggling to hold current ones, with fewer troops and less equipment, lead to predictably poor outcome
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?