Leading up to and during the counter-offensive, many independent observers underestimated the preparedness of russian defenses. Seemingly unremarkable tree lines concealed well-prepared russian positions, fortified and complemented by extensive minefields. 🧵Thread:
2/ In Section One, which displays satellite imagery of the tree line near Robotyne on July 13th, it is evident that while there are some noticeable changes near the tree line, such as earthworks, the majority of positions remain concealed and not clearly visible.
3/ In Section Two, the August imagery exposes the presence of russian positions after tree destruction. many observers primarily focused on visible defensive lines, often missing concealed positions. This led to a misconception of vast, empty spaces between the fortifications.
4/ In the final, third section depicting the situation on September 11th, we can finally discern a system of trenches and concealed individual positions along the tree line.
5/ Let's take another look and run a brief comparative analysis. In this case, independent observers may focus on the visible trench, ignoring concealed positions. However, the absence of foliage reveals the defensive positions clearly
6/ Overall, these positions are typically detectable by drones, particularly when occupied by enemy forces. Yet, there have been cases where they eluded detection, were only partially revealed, or mistakenly presumed unmanned, catching approaching Ukrainian forces off guard.
7/ As events progressed, it became clear that these seemingly empty areas were fortified and ready for defense. The remaining spaces were heavily mined and closely watched by drones, which allowed artillery and loitering munition to attack approaching troops
8/ This can also partly explain the lack of a swift advance after Ukrainian forces breached the visible defensive line, with AT trench and dragon's teeth.
Ukrainian troops must still face enemy positions in many tree lines, along with FPVs, artillery, mines, and helicopters.
9/ Continuing offensive progress hinges on artillery ammo availability for advancing troops, as it's vital to suppress numerous enemy defenses and force their withdrawal. Additionally, the readiness of reserves to advance and take positions remains crucial.
10/ The comprehensive analysis can be found on my project's website, "Frontelligence Insight," listed in my bio. It offers a more detailed and expanded version of this thread.
11/ I kindly request you to like, follow, and share the first message in the thread.
These materials are accessible thanks to the support received through Buy Me A Coffee. This support enables me to acquire and share imagery with analysis, including this thread.
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Gallup, the famous analytics firm known for its public opinion polls, recently released a study titled "Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War." The data might sound controversial, with many citing the headline without delving deeper into the survey. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the latest survey, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians now favor a swift, negotiated resolution to the war. This a notable increase from 2023, when only 27% expressed this sentiment, reflecting a 25% increase in just one year
3/ At first glance, it might seem as though Ukrainians are giving up. However, the phrase "negotiated end to the war" is ambiguous: many, including myself, want peace and negotiations, but without capitulation. This nuance becomes clearer in the follow-up question of the poll.
The announcement permitting Ukraine to strike inside Russia with ATACMS came just yesterday, but evidence suggests Russia has been fortifying the Kursk military airbase since early October. Analysis from Frontelligence Insight🧵:
2/ Satellite imagery shows new aircraft revetments being built, expanding the airfield's capacity for jets. Both the new and existing revetments are being reinforced with what appears to be concrete blocks for added protection.
3/ The changes are clearly visible when compared to imagery of the same airfield spot from 2022. These newly built revetments offer limited protection, primarily against shrapnel and shockwaves, aiming to minimize damage from missile or drone strikes in the vicinity
Early reports suggest that Ukraine's use of ATACMS missiles may come with specific geographic limitations.
This nuance might significantly influence the outcomes of their use. Here’s a breakdown of what we can expect, given that the information about limitations is correct🧵:
2/ As reported before by our team Frontelligence Insight, Russian forces have moved many key air assets beyond ATACMS range, leaving mainly helicopters and close-support jets at the Kursk airfield within striking distance, reducing high-value targets
3/ Russia has a vast network of makeshift ammo depots, command posts, rail stations, and other tactical sites in Kursk oblast. However, their sheer number far outstrips the limited missiles available to Ukraine.
The second part of Frontelligence Insight's investigation, based on leaked emails and documents provided by @CyberResUa, reveals new details about Russia's 2022 struggles to produce critical Su-57 components due to reliance on Western parts. 🧵Thread with investigation details:
2/ In the first part of our investigation, we examined the correspondence between Almaz-Antei's affiliate "Red Banner" and Joint Stock Company "Mikropribor" discussing how a critical component, the MPPU-50, put state contracts for Su-57 production at risk
3/ As we discovered, the MPPU-50 module is used in the L-band antenna system (N036L-1-01) for the radar complex of the Sh-121 weapon control system on Su-57. The leaked documents reveal a decision to expand production to additional facilities to fulfill the contract.
One point of tension between Zelensky and the Biden admins was the issue of allowing ATACMS strikes inside Russia. Frontelligence Insight conducted geospatial analysis and spoke with former U.S. officials and experts from leading US think tanks. Summary of our report🧵:
2/ When a Pentagon spokesperson suggested that Russia had moved assets capable of KAB strikes from airfields within ATACMS range, the statement was correct. Our research confirms that Russia relocated Su-34/35 jets from bases like Voronezh Air Base.
3/ At the same time, our analysis of satellite imagery from September 28 reveals that at least 14 combat and transport helicopters, along with eight Su-25 close-air-support jets, were stationed at the Kursk airport when the images were captured.
Ukraine is likely approaching the final stages of the active phase of the war. I suggest taking a look at my assessment, which draws on General Budanov’s overlooked speech at the Yalta Conference, along with insights from other reports and assessments
🧵Thread:
2/ Any war of attrition tests endurance, economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war continues, these issues intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point. Production and the capacity to replace losses are tangible factors that can be projected
3/ One notable point from Budanov’s speech was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024.
Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tank models from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is no longer in production.