Leading up to and during the counter-offensive, many independent observers underestimated the preparedness of russian defenses. Seemingly unremarkable tree lines concealed well-prepared russian positions, fortified and complemented by extensive minefields. 🧵Thread:
2/ In Section One, which displays satellite imagery of the tree line near Robotyne on July 13th, it is evident that while there are some noticeable changes near the tree line, such as earthworks, the majority of positions remain concealed and not clearly visible.
3/ In Section Two, the August imagery exposes the presence of russian positions after tree destruction. many observers primarily focused on visible defensive lines, often missing concealed positions. This led to a misconception of vast, empty spaces between the fortifications.
4/ In the final, third section depicting the situation on September 11th, we can finally discern a system of trenches and concealed individual positions along the tree line.
5/ Let's take another look and run a brief comparative analysis. In this case, independent observers may focus on the visible trench, ignoring concealed positions. However, the absence of foliage reveals the defensive positions clearly
6/ Overall, these positions are typically detectable by drones, particularly when occupied by enemy forces. Yet, there have been cases where they eluded detection, were only partially revealed, or mistakenly presumed unmanned, catching approaching Ukrainian forces off guard.
7/ As events progressed, it became clear that these seemingly empty areas were fortified and ready for defense. The remaining spaces were heavily mined and closely watched by drones, which allowed artillery and loitering munition to attack approaching troops
8/ This can also partly explain the lack of a swift advance after Ukrainian forces breached the visible defensive line, with AT trench and dragon's teeth.
Ukrainian troops must still face enemy positions in many tree lines, along with FPVs, artillery, mines, and helicopters.
9/ Continuing offensive progress hinges on artillery ammo availability for advancing troops, as it's vital to suppress numerous enemy defenses and force their withdrawal. Additionally, the readiness of reserves to advance and take positions remains crucial.
10/ The comprehensive analysis can be found on my project's website, "Frontelligence Insight," listed in my bio. It offers a more detailed and expanded version of this thread.
11/ I kindly request you to like, follow, and share the first message in the thread.
These materials are accessible thanks to the support received through Buy Me A Coffee. This support enables me to acquire and share imagery with analysis, including this thread.
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One point of tension between Zelensky and the Biden admins was the issue of allowing ATACMS strikes inside Russia. Frontelligence Insight conducted geospatial analysis and spoke with former U.S. officials and experts from leading US think tanks. Summary of our report🧵:
2/ When a Pentagon spokesperson suggested that Russia had moved assets capable of KAB strikes from airfields within ATACMS range, the statement was correct. Our research confirms that Russia relocated Su-34/35 jets from bases like Voronezh Air Base.
3/ At the same time, our analysis of satellite imagery from September 28 reveals that at least 14 combat and transport helicopters, along with eight Su-25 close-air-support jets, were stationed at the Kursk airport when the images were captured.
Ukraine is likely approaching the final stages of the active phase of the war. I suggest taking a look at my assessment, which draws on General Budanov’s overlooked speech at the Yalta Conference, along with insights from other reports and assessments
🧵Thread:
2/ Any war of attrition tests endurance, economics, diplomacy, and the ability to replace losses. As the war continues, these issues intensify, pushing one side closer to a tipping point. Production and the capacity to replace losses are tangible factors that can be projected
3/ One notable point from Budanov’s speech was Russia’s plan to produce 149 T-90M tanks in 2024.
Russia has been heavily relying on refurbishing older tank models from its Soviet-era stockpiles. Most of its current tank fleet on the battlefield is no longer in production.
After reviewing an internal correspondence leak from a Russian military electronics plant "Mikropribor", Frontelligence Insight, with data provided by @CyberResUa discovered that the production of the Su-57 is in jeopardy without access to crucial Western components. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to correspondence between the head of the procurement bureau at the "Red Banner" plant (a part of Almaz-Antei) and "Mikropribor" in August 2022, Mikropribor was given a list of required equipment for the MPPU-50. Keep this device name in mind- it's important
3/ The provided list consists of foreign-made components, including the WA36 Fixed Attenuator, EA-PS 3150, and PLR7 60-12 power supplies, all sourced by various Russian companies. The goal of procurement is to ensure the assembly of automated workstations for testing the MPPU-50
An alleged drone strike has targeted the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, according to early reports. The depot, closely monitored by Frontelligence Insight for its role in artillery ammo logistics, gained international attention in 2023 following the arrival of North Korean ammo.
🧵Thread
2/ Krasnodar Governor Veniamin Kondratyev reported that two UAVs targeting Tikhoretsk were "suppressed", with debris causing a fire and detonation of flammable materials. Videos on social media suggest a large denotation
Screenshot from the video posted by @war_monitor_ua
3/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot was expanded in 2023 to store North Korean munitions. Most ammo arrived by train in containers, unloaded and stored in revetments - essentially pits in the ground under open sky. Civilian trucks then transported the munitions to frontlines
As Russian forces close in on Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub in Ukraine's Donbas region, concerns about its potential loss are mounting. There is uncertainty about why Pokrovsk is more significant than other recently lost towns. This thread aims to clarify this and other aspects:
2/ Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, Avdiivka was vital for Ukrainian troops, serving as a fortress, protecting key logistical routes in Donetsk Oblast, and a potential foothold for deoccupying Donetsk. Since 2022, Russia has invested heavily in capturing it
3/ Pokrovsk, with a pre-war population of ~60,000, lies west of Avdiivka at a key railroad crossroads. It has become a key distribution hub, supporting Ukrainian forces along a broad frontline from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond. The railways are highlighted in red
Ukrainian MFA stated that Belarusian armed forces are concentrating a significant number of personnel, weapons, and equipment near Ukraine's northern border under the guise of exercises
🧵It's still early to draw any definitive conclusions, but a few points should be considered:
2/ In February 2024, Frontelligence Insight and Rochan Consulting released an analysis of the Belarusian military's readiness, concluding that its combat units are typically manned at only 30-40% capacity, relying heavily on mobilization, with the rest filled during mobilization
3/ This suggests that if Belarus was seriously preparing for a major invasion, significant mobilization efforts would be seen. For fairness, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of an attack; it's more about the potential scale of attack if ever happens