Russians are actively expanding their training ground facilities in the rear areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and within Russia. This expansion aims to tackle logistical bottlenecks that arose after the 2022 mobilization, signifying efforts to improve infrastructure. 🧵Thread
2/ In this specific image, we can observe the emergence of a new training facility with fresh infrastructure within the boundaries of preexisting tank training grounds near the Novopavlivka mining settlement in the Khrustalnyi area of Luhansk oblast.
3/ A closer examination of the facility reveals the presence of a training lane designated for infantry and armored vehicles like tanks. Furthermore, multiple clusters of smaller buildings have emerged across the training grounds.
4/ Numerous expansions and enhancements to facilities like these have been occurring, particularly in late 2022 and continuing into 2023. This suggests that the russians are aiming to optimize their training facility capacities and align training programs with recent experiences
5/ While this fact may not be groundbreaking on its own, it does, in my view, signify the russian objectives of continuous mobilization and training. It underscores their commitment to a sustained, enduring war of varying intensities, whether it be low or high-intensity warfare.
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With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
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2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
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2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.