A few thoughts on today, in no particular order. First, among Israelis: impossible to overstate the level of shock. The intelligence failure resembles 1973, but you almost have to go back to 1948 to find an analogue for the violence that played out in cities and towns. 🧵
It'll take a few days to know the scale of Israel's response. Netanyahu has historically been cautious about using military force. But he's now surrounded by a coterie of incompetent ideologues, and public opinion will probably be in favor of a dramatic change to the status quo.
The presence of so many Israeli hostages in Gaza will be an argument against a major ground offensive. But they are worth far more to Hamas alive than dead: the group will want to exchange them for prisoners to score a political victory.
That gets at a second point: why Hamas did this. The backdrop to today is not just the miserable conditions in Gaza, it's also a looming succession struggle in the West Bank, the historic unpopularity of Mahmoud Abbas and the possible collapse of the PA.
There is a bizarre analytical tendency to forget that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is decades old and rooted in real grievances. Or maybe not bizarre: it serves a political purpose to ignore that and blame everything on geopolitics ("Iran wants to sabotage normalization").
Third: not only will today's events put talk of normalization on hold, they should also put to rest the discredited idea that Israeli-Arab normalization would magically make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict go away.
And finally, a thought for far too many people on here: you shouldn't celebrate anything in this fucking conflict. It always ends in tears.
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Quick thread on oil, Biden and Saudi, because there are a few distinct issues that get muddled in the conversation: Is the latest OPEC+ production cut meant as a snub to America? Is it perceived as one? And what does this all mean for the Saudi-American relationship?
First, is it meant as a snub? The oil market is a mess right now. OPEC+ has little spare capacity; many producers fail to meet their quotas; sanctions on Russia are bifurcating the market; all sorts of wild cards about demand; and so on.
The Saudis have a rational interest in keeping prices high (trillion-dollar linear cities ain't gonna pay for themselves). They, and the rest of OPEC+, also want prices to be stable, and they want the oil sector to look lucrative enough that firms invest in building new capacity.
Needless to say, it's unusual for a president to issue a preemptive defense of a foreign trip. Biden has done so with a bizarre smorgasbord of an op-ed that unintentionally says a lot about his administration's Middle East policy over the past 18 months. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…
First, they don't have much to show for their efforts. Biden takes credit for last year's Gaza war lasting "just 11 days": inspirational stuff, guys. And for Yair Lapid calling Mahmoud Abbas to wish him a happy Eid, as if that was some sort of major diplomatic breakthrough.
Which leads to another theme: taking credit where it isn't quite due. The truce in Yemen, for example, came after long efforts by the UN, shifting battlefield dynamics and Saudi exhaustion with a losing war. But Biden presents it as the result of America's "persistent diplomacy."
If you've never been to Gaza it's hard to grasp just how bleak it is. A whole generation now has grown up locked in a tiny enclave. They're coming of age in a place with no work, endless blackouts, barely any clean drinking water, and little prospect of getting out.
When I first started visiting, a decade ago, people directed their anger largely at Israel. In recent years they direct it at everyone: Israel, Egypt, America, the PA, Hamas, the UN. No one thinks the blockade will end; no one thinks political actors care about their plight.
Three years ago this week I stood on a berm in eastern Gaza and watched Israeli soldiers shoot hundreds of protesters. Some died. Others lost infected limbs in crowded hospitals short on medical supplies. Another "round," another awful human toll, and nothing changed for it.
A quick thread on this piece. James Jeffrey has obviously been on a months-long effort to polish his legacy from the Trump years. Can only speak for myself, but I've come away from every interview, and now this article, thinking he's done the opposite. foreignaffairs.com/articles/middl…
First, the whole thing is a post hoc rationalization of Trump's approach to the Middle East. He didn't have a strategy. What he had, at best, were impulses that guided his policy: be tough on Iran; embrace Israel; don't criticize American partners in the region.
But none of this amounted to a strategy in the sense of setting achievable goals, identifying realistic actions that would accomplish those goals, and anticipating the behavior of adversaries. It was a chaotic, impulsive mess.
Let me preface this by saying that there's still much we don't know about the Beirut disaster. What ignited the ammonium nitrate stockpile? (Lots of rumors, no concrete answers.) Who kept it at the port for years? Who stood to benefit from it?
But there is zero evidence that this was an attack, some kind of Israel/Hezbollah issue. In fact there is a growing body of fabricated "evidence," photos and videos doctored to support this claim—which should make people even more skeptical of it.
The Occam's-razor explanation here is criminal negligence—an understatement; those words don't seem nearly strong enough—on the part of a Lebanese government that has been criminally negligent for decades. That is an entirely plausible explanation.
This is the Trump plan's "conceptual map" of Israel and Palestine. The occupied West Bank becomes isolated cantons, connected by a handful of roads; the Palestinians cede large chunks of territory, in return for a couple of random plots in the Negev awkwardly linked to Gaza.
The plan "contemplates the possibility" of Umm al-Fahm, the third-largest Arab city in Israel, and other nearby towns "becoming part of the State of Palestine," which is basically the platform of ethnic cleansing that Avigdor Lieberman ran on in the 2015 election
Palestinians will get "first-rate infrastructure solutions" to connect their cantons in the West Bank; to reach Jordan; and to travel between Gaza and the West Bank. If you've ever dealt with the traffic in either Israel or Palestine, you'll understand why this is funny