Seems like, in Lebanon, we've reached a point where both combatants have decided that the cost of continuing the war now outweighs the expected benefits of continuing the war: you get to a ceasefire when neither Israel nor Hezbollah sees a better alternative. 🧵 The ceasefire deal has a lot of critics in Israel: Benny Gantz, for example, said Israel had only done "half the job". But none of those critics outline a coherent, realistic vision for how they would end the war. They just want to keep fighting and chase unicorns.

So, yes, encouraging (if unsurprising) that Iran's state media is downplaying the Israeli attack, claiming it was repelled by air defenses. Suggests there's no immediate desire to retaliate. But that doesn't mean the region is just going back to the status quo... 🧵 First, the broader context for Iran: an ongoing failure of deterrence. After the April strikes the IRGC chief promised a "new equation" in which Israeli attacks on Iran's interests would draw direct retaliation. Israel wasn't deterred, as we've seen since Haniyeh's assassination.

I have a piece this week about the idea that "you can't kill an idea", a pithy statement that leads to poor analysis. Hamas and Hezbollah are institutions, not ideas: there's reason to think they will emerge from this war in radically diminished form. 🧵 economist.com/middle-east-an… Scholars argue that so-called "decapitation" strikes don't work. That's often true. But what Israel has done to both groups in the past year goes far beyond that: killing echelons of leaders, ravaging not just their military capabilities but their economic and political bases.

A few scattered thoughts, starting with a mea culpa: one thing I clearly got wrong in recent months was underestimating how much Israel was willing to take escalatory risks in Lebanon, and assuming there was some threshold at which Hezbollah would be compelled to respond. 🧵 Nasrallah was wedded to his idea that he could sustain an open-ended but limited conflict. Maybe he was afraid to escalate; maybe he believed his own rhetoric about deterrence. Who knows. Whatever the reason, he locked himself into a dead-end strategy and never rethought it.

There's no strategy anywhere, not in 🇮🇱 nor in 🇱🇧. Hezbollah has spent a year bombarding northern Israel as if depopulating Kiryat Shmona was an end in itself. But it failed to achieve its strategic aims: to relieve military pressure on Gaza or compel Israel into a ceasefire. 🧵 The months went on, pressure on the Israeli government mounted, and Netanyahu grew more comfortable with escalation and risk-taking in Lebanon. By then, however, Nasrallah had stuck himself way out on a limb, wedded to a quixotic "support front" on behalf of Hamas.

Iran has a dilemma. The barrage it fired at Israel in April broke its taboo against direct conflict but failed to impose deterrence. Now it feels compelled to do something bigger—but it will discover that it has few military options for reprisals. 🧵 economist.com/middle-east-an… Ballistic missiles are limited in number, and their launchers are a vulnerable bottleneck. Cruise missiles and drones need hours to cover the >1,000km to Israel. Forget air strikes or ground troops. Geography matters: Iran cannot bring overwhelming force to bear against Israel.

Israel is desperate to find Arab states willing to fix Gaza for them. The UAE wants to be seen as the Arab state most willing to help. Hence these sorts of meetings. But they don't mean the UAE is *actually* about to play a big role in a day-after plan. 🧵 axios.com/2024/07/23/us-… As @Abdulkhaleq_UAE lists here, the UAE has conditions for going to Gaza: an invitation from a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister; an Israeli commitment to let the PA govern Gaza and pursue a two-state solution; America in a leadership role.

https://twitter.com/Abdulkhaleq_UAE/status/1815800842533925355

Our briefing this week @TheEconomist is about Gaza's future. Optimistic "day-after" schemes have little basis in reality. No one has a real plan to provide security, distribute aid and start rebuilding—only a hope that someone else will do these things. 🧵 economist.com/briefing/2024/… That's also the subject of our Weekend Intelligence podcast. @zannymb asked politicians in Israel and Palestine about the actual "day after", the one where someone will need to control a lawless territory. They offered a lot of dangerously rosy thinking. economist.com/podcasts/2024/…

This talk of a "limited" Rafah offensive seems like spin from a White House that wants to backtrack from its warnings. And it dovetails with an Israeli talking point about how the evacuation from Rafah shows that Israel listened to America (it didn't). 🧵 timesofisrael.com/israel-moves-t… As @haaretzcom explains, the "limited" Rafah offensive isn't limited at all: "In practice, it is a deep ground operation, with a pattern of destruction similar to what has been seen in other cities across the Gaza Strip during earlier stages of the war." haaretz.com/israel-news/se…

A few thoughts after a long night. First, I think there's a strong case that Iran's reprisal was a strategic error. For months Israel was increasingly isolated, America looked feckless and Iran was projecting power through proxies whilst preserving detente with Arab states. 🧵 Then came last night. It was bad for Iranian deterrence. Iran opted for a big attack rather than a symbolic one, but a big attack that was calibrated not to do much damage. That won't deter Israel; on the contrary, it will make Iran look weak and ineffective.

In our cover package this week I write about how Israel has won the battle but lost the war. It has arguably achieved many of its goals. But it did so in a way that will ultimately leave it more insecure, more divided at home and more isolated abroad. 🧵 economist.com/briefing/2024/… Israel has done real damage to Hamas. Short of men and materiel, it will be years before the group can again pose a serious threat. It is also unlikely to rule Gaza, where its popularity has plummeted: many Gazans blame Hamas for dragging them into a war it could not hope to win.

I have a piece in @ForeignAffairs this week on myth and reality in the Middle East. The war has shattered a bunch of illusions about a shifting balance of power in the region. Instead the past five months revealed a power vacuum: no one is in charge. 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/po… What were those illusions? Before October 7th policymakers in various countries argued that the Palestinian cause was dead, that an emerging Israeli-Gulf alliance would constrain Iran and that a multipolar, post-American moment had arrived in the Middle East.

A couple of good threads from Yemen experts on the strikes against the Houthis. This from @IbrahimJalalYE explains how they will use the strikes to boost their domestic and regional standing and distract from their atrocious governance in Yemen

https://twitter.com/IbrahimJalalYE/status/1745595354752360832

And this, by @gregorydjohnsen, on how America has a range of options in Yemen, from "do nothing" to limited box-ticking air strikes to attacking Iran directly, none of which are good options

https://twitter.com/gregorydjohnsen/status/1745638383399940585

A few half-formed late-night thoughts. Israel's room for maneuver on a ground invasion has just shrunk dramatically. Not just because it has lost a good deal of international support, but because the region is now boiling. 🧵 We've seen protests in the West Bank against Abbas (who is historically unpopular to begin with), protests in Jordan, crowds gathering outside the American embassy in Lebanon. And the risk of Iranian-backed groups opening other fronts has probably risen markedly.

On Israel and Lebanon: the messaging from Hizballah is that a major ground offensive in Gaza would draw it into the war. That is a threat worth taking seriously. But there are also a couple of caveats to throw out. One is that a broad swath of Lebanese do not want to get involved. The country is falling apart, mired in one of the worst economic crises in history. It cannot afford a war, and Hizballah would face unpredictable political consequences at home for dragging it into one.

Quick 🧵 on this @WSJ piece, which reports claims from Hamas and Hizballah that Iran "helped plan Hamas's Saturday surprise attack on Israel and gave the green light." Those claims are being used to support a narrative that is thus far unsubstantiated. wsj.com/world/middle-e… Let's state from the outset: of course there was some Iranian role in this attack. Iran finances Hamas and Islamic Jihad, smuggles weapons to Gaza and provides technical help for building rockets and drones. To say Iran was not involved *at all* is just propaganda.

A few thoughts on today, in no particular order. First, among Israelis: impossible to overstate the level of shock. The intelligence failure resembles 1973, but you almost have to go back to 1948 to find an analogue for the violence that played out in cities and towns. 🧵 It'll take a few days to know the scale of Israel's response. Netanyahu has historically been cautious about using military force. But he's now surrounded by a coterie of incompetent ideologues, and public opinion will probably be in favor of a dramatic change to the status quo.

Quick thread on oil, Biden and Saudi, because there are a few distinct issues that get muddled in the conversation: Is the latest OPEC+ production cut meant as a snub to America? Is it perceived as one? And what does this all mean for the Saudi-American relationship? First, is it meant as a snub? The oil market is a mess right now. OPEC+ has little spare capacity; many producers fail to meet their quotas; sanctions on Russia are bifurcating the market; all sorts of wild cards about demand; and so on.

Needless to say, it's unusual for a president to issue a preemptive defense of a foreign trip. Biden has done so with a bizarre smorgasbord of an op-ed that unintentionally says a lot about his administration's Middle East policy over the past 18 months. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/… First, they don't have much to show for their efforts. Biden takes credit for last year's Gaza war lasting "just 11 days": inspirational stuff, guys. And for Yair Lapid calling Mahmoud Abbas to wish him a happy Eid, as if that was some sort of major diplomatic breakthrough.

If you've never been to Gaza it's hard to grasp just how bleak it is. A whole generation now has grown up locked in a tiny enclave. They're coming of age in a place with no work, endless blackouts, barely any clean drinking water, and little prospect of getting out. When I first started visiting, a decade ago, people directed their anger largely at Israel. In recent years they direct it at everyone: Israel, Egypt, America, the PA, Hamas, the UN. No one thinks the blockade will end; no one thinks political actors care about their plight.

A quick thread on this piece. James Jeffrey has obviously been on a months-long effort to polish his legacy from the Trump years. Can only speak for myself, but I've come away from every interview, and now this article, thinking he's done the opposite. foreignaffairs.com/articles/middl… First, the whole thing is a post hoc rationalization of Trump's approach to the Middle East. He didn't have a strategy. What he had, at best, were impulses that guided his policy: be tough on Iran; embrace Israel; don't criticize American partners in the region.