Academic Gedaliah Braun on the lack of Abstraction in African Languages:
“In a conversation with students in Nigeria I asked how you would say that a coconut is about halfway up the tree in their language. “You can’t say that,” they explained. “All you can say is that it is ‘up’.” “How about right at the top?” “Nope; just ‘up’.” In other words, there appeared to be no way to express gradations.
In Nairobi, I learned something else about African languages when two women expressed surprise at my English dictionary. “Isn’t English your language?” they asked. “Yes,” I said. “It’s my only language.” “Then why do you need a dictionary?”
They were puzzled that I needed a dictionary, and I was puzzled by their puzzlement. I explained that there are times when you hear a word you’re not sure about and so you look it up. “But if English is your language,” they asked, “how can there be words you don’t know?” “What?” I said. “No one knows all the words of his language.”
“But we know all the words of Kikuyu; every Kikuyu does,” they replied. I was even more surprised, but gradually it dawned on me that since their language is entirely oral, it exists only in the minds of Kikuyu speakers. Since there is a limit to what the human brain can retain, the overall size of the language remains more or less constant. A written language, on the other hand, existing as it does partly in the millions of pages of the written word, grows far beyond the capacity of anyone to know it in its entirety. But if the size of a language is limited, it follows that the number of concepts it contains will also be limited and that both language and thinking will be impoverished.
African languages are impoverished only by contrast to Western languages and in an Africa trying to emulate the West. While numerous dictionaries have been compiled between European and African languages, there are few dictionaries within a single African language, precisely because native speakers have no need for them. I did find a Zulu-Zulu dictionary, but it was a small paperback of 252 pages.
My queries into Zulu began when I rang the African Language Department at a University in Johannesburg and spoke to a white guy. Did “precision” exist in the Zulu language prior to European contact? “Oh,” he said, “that’s a very Eurocentric question!” and simply wouldn’t answer. I rang again, spoke to another white guy, and got a virtually identical response.
I called a larger university in Pretoria, and spoke to a young black guy. As has so often been my experience in Africa, we hit it off from the start. He understood my interest in Zulu and found my questions of great interest. He explained that the Zulu word for “precision” means “to make like a straight line.” Was this part of indigenous Zulu? No; this was added by the compilers of the dictionary.
But, he assured me, it was otherwise for “promise.” I was skeptical. How about “obligation?” We both had the same dictionary (English-Zulu, Zulu-English), and looked it up. The Zulu entry means “as if to bind one’s feet.” He said that was not indigenous but was added by the compilers. But if Zulu didn’t have the concept of obligation, how could it have the concept of a promise, since a promise is simply the oral undertaking of an obligation? I was interested in this, I said, because Africans often failed to keep promises and never apologized - as if this didn’t warrant an apology.
A light bulb seemed to go on in his mind. Yes, he said; in fact the Zulu word for promise — isithembiso — is not the correct word. When a black person “promises” he means “maybe I will and maybe I won’t.” But, I said, this makes nonsense of promising, the very purpose of which is to bind one to a course of action. When one is not sure he can do something he may say “I will try but I can’t promise.” He said he’d heard whites say that and had never understood it till now. As a friend summed it up, when a black person “promises” he means “I’ll try.””
How do we acquire abstract concepts? Is it enough to make things with precision in order to have the concept of precision? Africans make excellent carvings, made with precision, so why isn’t the concept in their language? To have this concept we must not only do things with precision but must be aware of this phenomenon and then give it a name.
How, for example, do we acquire such concepts as belief and doubt? We all have beliefs; even animals do. When a dog wags its tail on hearing his master’s footsteps, it believes he is coming. But it has no concept of belief because it has no awareness that it has this belief and so no awareness of belief per se. In short, it has no self-consciousness, and thus is not aware of its own mental states.
It has long seemed to me that some blacks tend to lack self-awareness. If such awareness is necessary for developing abstract concepts it is not surprising that African languages have so few abstract terms. A lack of self-awareness — or introspection — has advantages. In my experience neurotic behavior, characterized by excessive and unhealthy self-consciousness, is uncommon among blacks. I am also confident that sexual dysfunction, which is characterized by excessive self-consciousness, is less common among blacks than whites.
Time is another abstract concept with which Africans seem to have difficulties. I began to wonder about this in 1998. Several Africans drove up in a car and parked right in front of mine, blocking it. “Hey,” I said, “you can’t park here.” “Oh, are you about to leave?” they asked in a perfectly polite and friendly way. “No,” I said, “but I might later. Park over there” — and they did.
While the possibility that I might want to leave later was obvious to me, their thinking seemed to encompass only the here and now: “If you’re leaving right now we understand, but otherwise, what’s the problem?” I had other such encounters and the key question always seemed to be, “Are you leaving now?” The future, after all, does not exist. It will exist, but doesn’t exist now. People who have difficulty thinking of things that do not exist will ipso facto have difficulty thinking about the future.
It appears that the Zulu word for “future” — isikhati — is the same as the word for time, as well as for space. Realistically, this means that these concepts probably do not exist in Zulu thought. It also appears that there is no word for the past — meaning, the time preceding the present. The past did exist, but no longer exists. Hence, people who may have problems thinking of things that do not exist will have trouble thinking of the past as well as the future.
This has an obvious bearing on such sentiments as gratitude and loyalty, which I have long noticed are uncommon among Africans. We feel gratitude for things that happened in the past, but for those with little sense of the past such feelings are less likely to arise.
I quote from an article in the South African press about the problems blacks have with mathematics:
[Xhosa] is a language where polygon and plane have the same definition . . . where concepts like triangle, quadrilateral, pentagon, hexagon are defined by only one word. (“Finding New Languages for Maths and Science,” Star [Johannesburg], July 24, 2002, p. 8.)
More accurately, these concepts simply do not exist in Xhosa, which, along with Zulu, is one of the two most widely spoken languages in South Africa. In America, blacks are said to have a “tendency to approximate space, numbers and time instead of aiming for complete accuracy.” (Star, June 8, 1988, p.10.) In other words, they are also poor at math. Notice the identical triumvirate — space, numbers, and time. Is it just a coincidence that these three highly abstract concepts are the ones with which blacks — everywhere — seem to have such difficulties?
The entry in the Zulu dictionary for “number,” by the way — ningi — means “numerous,” which is not at all the same as the concept of number. It is clear, therefore, that there is no concept of number in Zulu.
White rule in South Africa ended in 1994. It was about ten years later that power outages began, which eventually reached crisis proportions. The principle reason for this is simply lack of maintenance on the generating equipment. Maintenance is future-oriented, and the Zulu entry in the dictionary for it is ondla, which means: “1. Nourish, rear; bring up; 2. Keep an eye on; watch (your crop).” In short, there is no such thing as maintenance in Zulu thought, and it would be hard to argue that this is wholly unrelated to the fact that when people throughout Africa say “nothing works,” it is only an exaggeration.
The New York Times reports that New York City is considering a plan (since implemented) aimed at getting blacks to “do well on standardized tests and to show up for class,” by paying them to do these things and that could “earn [them] as much as $500 a year.” Students would get money for regular school attendance, every book they read, doing well on tests, and sometimes just for taking them. Parents would be paid for “keeping a full-time job . . . having health insurance . . . and attending parent-teacher conferences.” (Jennifer Medina, “Schools Plan to Pay Cash for Marks,” New York Times, June 19, 2007)
The clear implication is that blacks are not very motivated. Motivation involves thinking about the future and hence about things that do not exist.
The Zulu entry for “motivate” is ‘banga’, under which we find “1. Make, cause, produce something unpleasant; . . . to cause trouble . . . . 2. Contend over a claim; . . . fight over inheritance; . . . 3. Make for, aim at, journey towards . . . .” Yet when I ask Africans what banga means, they have no idea. In fact, no Zulu word could refer to motivation for the simple reason that there is no such concept in Zulu; and if there is no such concept there cannot be a word for it. This helps explain the need to pay blacks to behave as if they were motivated.
The same New York Times article quotes Darwin Davis of the Urban League as “caution[ing] that the . . . money being offered [for attending class] was relatively paltry . . . and wondering . . . how many tests students would need to pass to buy the latest video game.” Instead of being shamed by the very need for such a plan, this black activist complains that the payments aren’t enough! If he really is unaware how his remarks will strike most readers, he is morally obtuse, but his views may reflect a common understanding among blacks of what morality is: not something internalized but something others enforce from the outside. Hence his complaint that paying children to do things they should be motivated to do on their own is that they are not being paid enough.
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DID YOU KNOW? Singapore has an elite police unit called the ‘Gurkha Contingent’ that Lee Kuan Yew recruited via the British for their loyalty and competence. He often deployed them to police race riots because he trusted them to be effective and impartial enforcers of the law
Total voicenoteification of X - a complete victory for the Third World. Continued introduction of new features to the site that improve ease of access for people from ‘In My Culture Family Is Important’ Countries. No need for the written word. X to be turned into a digital Brazil
“YOU CAN’T JUST DO THINGS” - Trying and Failing to Copy Bukele - The Ecuador Case 🇪🇨
With the spread of ‘Bukeleism’ in Latin America, assumption might be that the continent is on track to improve significantly in the near future, maybe maybe potentially even become ‘Basically Fine’. Was told recently though that this isn’t quite yet the case. Some countries have already tried to copy the Bukele model of ‘just locking up all the criminals’ with far less success. The Ecuador case is very instructive
In 2023 and then in 2025 Daniel Noboa was elected as President of Ecuador on an anti-crime platform, pledging to significantly improve the country’s safety as in El Salvador. Noboa has attempted to tackle Ecuador’s crime crisis using some methods that resemble those employed by Bukele - eg states of emergency, military deployments, prison crackdowns and the framing of criminal organistions as enemies of the state - but the results have been far less dramatic vs in El Salvador. Violence in many Ecuadorian cities remains high despite extensive security operations
Why is the Bukele approach not working as well in Ecuador? The most important distinction is that Ecuador’s gangs are deeply connected to international drug trafficking networks. Organisations such as Los Choneros and Los Lobos are not just local street gangs (MS13 in El Salvador would infamously control defined territory within Salvadoran cities) and are instead linked to a multinational cocaine trade connecting producers in Colombia and Peru with markets in North America and Europe. As long as these trafficking routes remain profitable, criminal groups alway have strong incentives to rebuild after arrests, raids and leadership losses
Geography also makes Ecuador more difficult to control. Unlike El Salvador - which is relatively small, flat and densely populated - Ecuador contains remote Amazonian jungle regions, mountainous terrain, extensive coastlines and very porous borders. Criminal groups can relocate, hide and operate in areas where government presence is always going to be limited. ‘Just go and hide in the jungle’-maxxing is unfortunately generally an effective strategy. A successful military operation (and there have been many, often in these kinds of remote locales and in conjunction with the US) may clear an area but only temporarily and without permanently eliminating the underlying organisations being targeted
A big structural challenge too is that Ecuador’s gangs do not function like conventional armies. Military forces or at least Bukele-style gang sweeps are designed to defeat organised groups that hold territory and present identifiable targets. Ecuadorian criminal organisations though often operate as decentralised networks consisting of eg local cells, prison-based coordinators, corrupt contacts, subcontractors, informants and hired assassins etc. Because gangs generally avoid direct confrontation with soldiers too police security operations will rarely achieve decisive victories
Another major reason Noboa has struggled to replicate Bukele’s success is that violence in Ecuador’s cities remains closely tied to the criminal economy. Many homicides stem from disputes between gangs over trafficking routes. Even if security forces weaken one group rivals will move in to compete for the same opportunities. Infamously violent cities such as Guayaquil (jokingly called Guaya-‘kill’) will always remain strategically important because they contain important infrastructure - ports, transport links, warehouses etc. As a result, urban violence has proven resilient even when gang members can sometimes be decisively identified. Military patrols and emergency measures may suppress violence temporarily but gangs will just adapt and reorganise. Homicide rates and other forms of violent crime remain significantly higher than they were a decade ago
One of the other big differences between Ecuador and El Salvador is the legal environment. Like Bukele, Noboa has used emergency powers extensively, but unlike in El Salvador those powers do not completely override Ecuador’s constitutional framework. Courts retain the authority to review emergency measures and the government must generally justify the continuation of exceptional powers. Security forces cannot simply detain unlimited numbers of people indefinitely without legal processes. Authorities must also consider the risk of arresting people who are not actually involved in criminal activity, particularly because, again, Ecuador’s criminal networks are often less visible and less clearly defined than the gangs targeted in El Salvador
Mass incarceration also creates practical legal problems. Thousands of detainees require prosecutors, judges, prison space and administrative capacity. If large numbers of arrests are not supported by sufficient evidence cases may collapse or generate significant political and legal controversy. These constraints do not prevent strong action against gangs, but they make a Bukele-style strategy more difficult to implement on the same scale. Political conditions differ too. Bukele after his initial successes benefited from extraordinarily high public support and a political environment that allowed him to pursue a highly centralised security strategy. Ecuador’s political system has historically been more fragmented, with stronger institutional constraints, competing political interests and greater opportunities for opposition groups, courts and other actors (the left is strong in politically volatile coup-happy Ecuador, ex- left wing Presidents like Rafael Correa and Lenin Moreno still retain significant influence) to challenge government policies, especially where police and military operations can be portrayed as ‘thuggish’, ‘in violation of human rights’ etc
Ecuador’s greatest obstacle is that its criminal problem is structurally different from El Salvador’s. Bukele confronted gangs that depended heavily on controlling neighbourhoods within a small national territory. Noboa faces a decentralised criminal ecosystem tied to international drug trafficking. As in El Salvador military operations, emergency powers and mass arrests have disrupted these organisations and produced some successes - but they haven’t generated the decisive collapse of criminal networks that occurred in El Salvador. The continuing profitability of the drug trade, the decentralised nature of crime in Ecuador, Ecuador’s topography and the legal and institutional constraints of Ecuador’s democratic system have all combined to make the country’s security challenge far more difficult to resolve
An aside - Colombia, by comparison, has similar structural issues to Ecuador (as well as an even stronger left and a history of armed ‘anti-rightist’ insurgency) that will likely ensure its criminal networks continue to flourish to some degree even if Abelardo ‘The Tiger’ de la Espriella wins the presidential election on a Bukeleist platform and proves more competent than Ecuador’s Noboa
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What El Salvador was like before Bukele - different kind of situation vs in countries like Ecuador, Colombia and Peru
Colombia phoning it in with its derivative election; candidates are man who looks like Bukele who has Bukele’s politics vs man who looks like Trotsky who has Trotsky’s politics. A real microcosm of the ideological split in Latin America though - keeps it simple and easy to follow
There is sense that as much as ‘these kinds of countries’ want to ‘do a Bukele’ there are not enough actual Bukeles to go around to ‘do a Bukele’ everywhere properly. For instance in Ecuador President Daniel Noboa was elected to ‘do a Bukele’ but has so far had only partial success because Ecuador unlike El Salvador has a lot of jungle and mountains and all the criminals just go and hide in the jungle and mountains. Compare and contrast also Colombia’s previous unsuccessful attempts to eradicate eg FARC, who also just went and hid in the mountains
Almost reached the point where Arsenal is the official National Team of the Yookayian peoples
Zohran has (correctly) intuited that Arsenal spiritually represents the Yookay project - which he is of course totally ideologically aligned with. When he wears an Emirates kurta or gushes about the Gooners he is implicitly advancing a project of international Yookayification
Common sight in Brazil, especially in poorer areas, is infrastructure with bizarro topsy-turvy world de-constructed shapes and forms. Houses as thin as a person, shopfronts draped in jungle foliage-like wiring, red clay brick favelas with non-sequitur storeys from the upside down dimension layered on top of each other like badly stacked Tetris blocks. Really just a deconstructivist favelapunk nightmare, neighbourhoods full of buildings that look like they were designed by Frank Gehry on a $20 budget. Fun in the abstract to be sure but also a really ‘what the hell is going on in Brazil’-type phenomenon
Might surprise you but Brazil does actually have fairly extensive building and electrical codes, including standards from the Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas (ABNT) and municipal building regulations. On paper many cities require permits, structural standards, grounding, breaker systems and safety compliance. In practice, nobody cares and violations are rarely prosecuted
Informal construction or ‘autoconstrução’ is a major element of favela growth. People ‘just show up’ on say a hillside one day and start building their little huts and there isn’t really anything you can do to stop them. A significant share of housing - especially in poorer urban peripheries and some favelas - has historically been self-built floor by floor over many years without architects or formal inspection. This can produce irregular shapes, exposed rebar, unfinished upper stories and random ad hoc extensions with Pablo Picasso dimensions. An incremental building culture exists where even legal buildings are often expanded gradually too as families try to save money. You may see odd geometry or apparently unfinished façades because owners either intend to add another floor later, don’t have money for anything else or, again, (because a lot of favela culture is in the mind) just don’t care
WRT the farcical amounts of wiring in some areas, improvised overhead wiring - sometimes called ‘spaghetti wiring’ - will be a result of unauthorised power hookups, aging infrastructure or overlapping telecom / electrical cabling. When you see electricity poles covered in this kind of wiring often it will be because people have attached those wires to the grid in order to siphon electricity off from it
I’ve seen a lot of unusually-shaped buildings in poorer neighbourhoods in Brazil and while I’m a very open-minded pro experimenting with form in architecture person don’t think I’ve ever seen a finished project were I thought “wow what a postmodernist triumph.” Building that sticks with me most was the Alice in Wonderland restroom at a roadside gas station I encountered while in Brazil’s northeast. Went in the gas station to buy a Coca Cola Zero and a protein bar, asked where the bathroom was. Time to fall down the rabbit hole! Attendant gave me a comically oversized key and pointed me to a tiny narrow door at the edge of the station forecourt. Put the key in the lock and opened the door, it opened up into a long, narrow stained white tile hallway only slightly wider than my shoulders. It got weirder - as I walked down the hallway the floor would undulate sharply, jolt up and down in level. The walls kept getting narrower and the roof lower too until eventually I couldn’t walk straight on. Had to turn and shimmy along sideways to keep progressing. Eventually had to crouch down slightly too because the roof was getting too low. When I finally reached the end of the passage there was a small hobbit door which I had to duck into to reach the toilet. Half expected to find a white rabbit inside. As it turned out there was no rabbit but it did at least seem like the bathroom had been built for rabbits, ceiling couldn’t have been higher than about 160cm. Had a piss and then made my way back along the passageway. Was in a bit of a stupor for a while afterwards, really remarkable through the looking glass spatial design. Only in Brazil