The 2nd Russian logistical vehicle army, from Sept 2022 onward, was made up of a trickle of new Kamaz trucks, reactivated Ural trucks and an increasing percentage of the UAZ/loaf/Scooby Doo vans.
This December 2022 video is typical for that 2nd period. 7/
And an apples to apples 31 July 2023 look at FPV drone kills in the priority #Bakhmut direction showed a 50-50 ratio of Kamaz tactical trucks to UAZ "loaf" vans.
Which tells us a great deal about the attrition of RuAF trucks in the last 2.5 months😱
This happened to the Imperial Russian Army in 1917.
Yet the 🇷🇺 promoters & appeasers (AKA see DC de-escalation) are both more vocal & confident by the day.
They reject the notions & mathematics of attrition warfare, and fervently believe that all war is fast maneuver war.
13/
If you cannot achieve a continuous Blitzkrieg you are losing, and damn the historical experience.🙄
This is astounding.🤡
Materiel attrition can be recovered potentially quickly, with enough cash in hand.
14/
But the Ruble crash to one US penny to a Ruble means 🇷🇺 lacks foreign exchange cash.
And how does 🇷🇺 recover from the kind of deep personnel attrition @Cyberdefensecom calls out, especially in junior and mid ranking RuAF officers?
14/
And in a non-commissioned officer free, 🇷🇺officer-centric structural leadership model?
What motivates these people to believe that 🇷🇺 is looking better on key attrition metrics when all of the 🇷🇺 milbloggers say the RuAF are going down is incomprehensible.🤦♂️
15/
This is proof that the Dunning Kruger effect is at work.
The less these 🇷🇺 promoters & DC appeasers know, the smarter they imagine themselves to be.
16/
It's quite obvious that when it comes to evidence of enormous🇷🇺 truck and personnel losses.
These 🇷🇺 promoters & DC appeasers are filtering data to get the desired "invincible Russia" preconception
This is a reality that will have to faced regarding Israeli actions in Gaza going forward.
"The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that as of the beginning of 2020, Israel may have a stockpile of about 980 ± 130 kilograms of plutonium
...(International Panel on Fissile Materials 2021). That amount could potentially be used to build anywhere between 170 and 278 nuclear weapons, assuming a second-generation, single-stage, fission-implosion warhead design with a boosted pit containing 4 to 5 kilograms
2/
...of plutonium.4"
This link provides more information on Israel nuclear cruise missile armed submarines mentioned above.
This map is a 150 km radius map of Southern Crimea from the damaged and by-passed Chonhar Bridge just north of Dhzankoy.
And remember, that is as the bird flies.
Ground travel on primary and secondary roads to supply depots is going to greatly reduce this footprint.
2/
The use of manual labor to fill/unload trucks takes a lot more time than with pallets & forklifts.
This means RuAF trucks do one trip a day to 93 mile/150 km and _maybe_ two a day to 47 mile/75 km with the drivers getting a little sleep & their truck
The way such "calculated risks" works in real life is that senior Israeli political and flag rank leaders invested in the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon refused to hear anything contrary to their "calculated risk consensus" concerning Hamas.
2/
My gut says this is an Israeli Air Force budget driven thing.
The reason I say that is the failure to put a West Bank style 20 foot wall between Gaza and Israel the way there is between the West Bank and Israel.
Money spent on a Gaza wall isn't available for Hezbollah.
3/
3. (con't) supply system. 4. SUV's have an incredibly short service life in an artillery fragment rich battlefield. (SUV radiators & high speed fragments don't mix well)
The absolute last place you use an SUV is as a logistical resupply vehicle is supporting artillery.
3/
Counter battery fire will shred SUV non-run flat tires as well as radiators.
Yet, here we are with Russia in Southern Ukraine.
Russian tactical trucks in the Artillery have to be as rare as junior officers in the Russian Army infantry battalions.